Elizabeth T. French

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for parenting time during a period when his step-children were required to quarantine for Covid-19 after arriving from the United States, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondent sought full indemnity costs, while the applicant sought partial indemnity or no costs.

The court found no bad faith by either party but held the respondent's position was reasonable to protect the children's health.

Applying the principles from Mattina, the court awarded the successful respondent partial indemnity costs fixed at $2,500.

The respondent mother brought a motion to change the surname of the parties' 8-year-old child to include her own surname, hyphenated with the father's surname.

The applicant father opposed the change, arguing it was not in the child's best interests given her age and established identity.

The court, applying the "best interests of the child" test under the Change of Name Act, dismissed the mother's request, finding insufficient evidence that the child had an informed, independent, and consistent wish to change her name, or understood the permanent implications.

The court emphasized that changing a child's surname is a major child-rearing decision.

The applicant husband brought a motion to set aside a final consent order for custody in favour of the respondent wife and to impose restrictions on her travelling with the children.

The husband argued the consent order should be set aside under Rule 25(19)(c) of the Family Law Rules for not deciding a matter before the court (children's best interests not fully explored) or on contract law principles (lack of consensus ad idem, language barrier, duress, inadequate legal advice).

The court dismissed the husband's motion, finding no legal error for appellate review under Rule 25(19)(c) and that the contract law arguments (language barrier, duress, inadequate legal advice, risks of travel/absconding, FGM risk) were not substantiated by evidence under an objective standard.

While the motion to set aside was dismissed, the final order was varied by consent to include provisions for the wife to notify the husband of international travel with the children.

The applicant brought a motion for interim child support and section 7 expenses against the respondent, who was incarcerated and had no income.

The applicant sought to impute income to the respondent based on his pre-incarceration earnings, arguing his intentional criminal behaviour led to his unemployment.

The court declined to impute income on an interim basis, noting that imputation is discretionary and an incarcerated parent cannot modify their behaviour to earn income.

The court dismissed the motion without prejudice, leaving the issue for the trial judge to determine on a final basis.

The applicant's Motion to Change child support was settled, leaving only the issue of costs.

The respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $3,390, while the applicant requested no costs.

The court found success was mixed, as the applicant's overall support payment was reduced, but income was imputed at the old rate as sought by the respondent.

The court considered factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, including the importance and complexity of issues, reasonableness of conduct, and the impact of the self-represented applicant on the respondent's counsel's workload.

The court determined that a modest cost order was fair, requiring the applicant to contribute to the respondent's legal costs for facilitating the settlement and drafting the order, particularly given the applicant's self-representation.

The applicant Society brought a motion for summary judgment on its status review application, seeking Crown wardship for four children.

The parents opposed, seeking the return of the children or a period of Society wardship.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding disposition, as the parents lacked insight and had not made sustained progress to meet the children's complex needs, and granted Crown wardship.

However, the court found the parents rebutted the statutory presumption against access, ordering sibling access and access between the parents and the children, with further submissions required for the youngest two children.

The applicant Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship without access for the child A.N.L-R. The respondent mother opposed, while the respondent father did not participate.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the mother's documented mental health issues, unstable relationships involving domestic violence, and inability to provide adequate care.

Despite the mother's arguments for more time to address concerns and claims of insufficient support, the court determined there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Crown wardship was ordered, as less disruptive alternatives were deemed inadequate and the mother's plan lacked viability and sustained progress.

The court also found that the statutory presumption against access was not rebutted by either parent.

In a shared custody arrangement, the parents could not agree on which elementary school their young child should attend.

The court was asked to determine this specific incident of custody under the Children's Law Reform Act based on the child's best interests.

The court assessed factors including stability, proximity to the parents' homes, family supports, daycare connections, transportation considerations, school programming, and the availability of French Immersion.

Although both schools could meet the child’s needs, the court found stronger evidence regarding the programming and opportunities at the school proposed by the father, including the availability of early French Immersion.

The balance of the evidence favoured that option.

In a child protection proceeding, the mother brought a motion seeking an order dispensing with service of a society wardship application on the child’s father, citing serious safety concerns and the father’s history of sexual offences and absence from the child’s life.

The court considered the statutory framework under the Child and Family Services Act governing notice to parents in wardship proceedings.

The court held that the legislation strictly limits the circumstances in which service on a parent may be dispensed with and generally requires notice before a wardship order exceeding thirty days can be made.

While sympathetic to the mother’s concerns, the court concluded it lacked authority to fully dispense with service.

Service was temporarily dispensed with for thirty days under s. 39(7) of the Act pending further review after the Office of the Children’s Lawyer considered the matter.

A parenting dispute between unmarried parents concerning custody, access, and child support for two young children.

The applicant sought sole custody and primary residence, while the respondent sought joint custody with approximately equal parenting time.

Applying the best interests test under the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court found the applicant had historically taken the lead in managing the children’s educational and medical needs and demonstrated greater organizational capacity.

However, the court concluded that maximizing the children’s time with the respondent was beneficial and ordered expanded overnight access, including weekday overnights and extended weekend parenting time.

Child support arrears were fixed and the issue of ongoing support under s. 9 of the Child Support Guidelines was left for agreement or further submissions.