A. Brown

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of fraud under $5,000 after holding himself out as a licensed paralegal and accepting funds from two victims for legal services he was not qualified to provide.

The court found the offences involved a serious breach of trust that undermined public confidence in the administration of justice.

Given the offender's prior convictions for similar conduct and the high risk of re-offending, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed a 6-month custodial sentence followed by 18 months of probation and full restitution.

Society sought temporary care and custody of two children pursuant to s. 94(2)(d) of the CYFSA on the basis of severe chronic malnutrition, failure to thrive, rickets, hypothyroidism, and persistent parental non-compliance with medical recommendations.

The younger child fell below the zero percentile for weight, was diagnosed with life-threatening hypocalcemia, vitamin D deficiency, and iodine-deficient hypothyroidism attributable to prolonged exclusive breastfeeding and a restrictive vegan diet lacking essential micronutrients.

Parents demonstrated heavy mistrust of the medical system, repeatedly delayed or cancelled bloodwork, developmental assessments, and specialist appointments, and minimized the severity of the conditions.

The older child also presented with zinc and vitamin D deficiency, low carnitines, low amino acids, and bone changes suggestive of metabolic conditions.

Court found supervision order insufficient given parental lack of insight and the urgent daily nutritional and medical intervention required.

The defendant moved to compel the 94-year-old plaintiff, Estelle Bock, to attend an independent medical examination (IME) in Scarborough, Ontario, after she cancelled an initial appointment due to concerns about the long travel from Sarnia.

The plaintiff's family physician provided an affidavit stating that such travel would be detrimental to her health.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that requiring the plaintiff to travel to Scarborough was beyond inconvenient and jeopardized her health, despite the defendant's prima facie right to choose their expert.

The court granted the defendant leave to arrange an IME in London, Ontario, which the plaintiff's physician deemed medically feasible.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the plaintiff, payable forthwith, due to plaintiff's counsel's initial agreement to the Scarborough assessment.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs on the basis that the plaintiff was no longer ordinarily resident in Ontario.

The plaintiff, who alleged the defendant intentionally struck him with a motor vehicle while he was cycling, opposed the motion.

The court found the plaintiff had a good chance of success on the merits and that his adverse costs insurance policy was an adequate substitute for payment into court.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer undertakings from discovery, pay associated costs for obtaining documents, and produce a further and better affidavit of documents.

The documents at issue were the plaintiff's clinical notes and records from his treating physician for three years pre-accident and an updated walk-in clinic file.

The court found the documents relevant and within the plaintiff's power, and that the plaintiff must bear the costs of production as a cost of litigation.

The motion was granted in part, compelling production and cost payment by the plaintiff, but no costs were awarded for the motion itself due to conflicting case law.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident case brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting backlog of cases in the Southwest Region.

The trial was scheduled for January 2022.

The court noted the unprecedented crisis in the civil justice system and the need to prioritize criminal and family matters.

To prevent the case from becoming stale and to assist the administration of justice, the court provisionally struck the jury notice, allowing the case to proceed as a non-jury trial unless civil jury trials could be accommodated at the time of trial.

The defendant was tried on charges of Mischief and Over 80.

He sought to exclude evidence due to Charter violations, specifically an unreasonable search and seizure under section 8, arising from the police's warrantless entry into his father's home.

The court found that the police entry was unlawful as the consent obtained from the defendant's father was not informed, lacking disclosure of the police's dual purpose (welfare check and criminal investigation) and the father's right to refuse entry.

Consequently, the evidence obtained from this breach was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, leading to the dismissal of all charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code because the Certificate of Analyst presented at trial contained a different lot number than the other documentation.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably relied on the totality of the evidence, including the qualified technician's testimony and a newly prepared certificate, to conclude the Crown proved the target value of the alcohol standard beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and kidnapping, applied for judicial interim release.

The accused surrendered to police and admitted to driving the vehicle involved but denied knowledge of the murder.

The court found that the primary and secondary grounds for detention were not met due to the accused's lack of a criminal record and the strength of the proposed sureties.

On the tertiary ground, the court held that a properly informed reasonable person would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if the accused were released on a strict plan.

Bail was granted with stringent conditions, including house arrest, GPS ankle monitoring, and significant financial pledges from three sureties.

The defendant pleaded guilty to attempting to murder two individuals with an aluminum baseball bat and received facts regarding possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose and threatening to cause death.

The offences arose from a premeditated attack on the victims, who were connected to the defendant's prior conviction for sexual interference with a minor.

The defendant, while on parole and in violation of release conditions, traveled to the victims' home, disabled their vehicles, held them at gunpoint, bound them with zip ties, and attacked them with a baseball bat, causing serious injuries including skull fractures, brain bleeds, and in one victim's case, a subsequent brain aneurysm.

The court sentenced the defendant to 13 years imprisonment, considering aggravating factors including specific intent to kill, planning and deliberation, prolonged duration of attack, and violation of parole conditions, while noting the defendant's paraplegia resulting from police gunfire during apprehension.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and touching a person under 16 for a sexual purpose.

The case involved conflicting testimonies from the complainant, the accused, and a third witness (P.L.K.).

The court applied the W.(D.) analysis for assessing evidence in criminal cases.

While the court did not entirely disbelieve the complainant, significant inconsistencies and exaggerations in her testimony regarding material facts of the assault and immediate aftermath raised reasonable doubt.

The evidence of the accused and P.L.K. also had credibility issues.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and attempted choking.

The trial focused on the reliability of the complainant's identification evidence and the photo lineup procedure.

The complainant's testimony contained significant inconsistencies regarding the attacker's physical description, clothing, and details of the assault.

Although a photo lineup identified the accused, it was not conducted strictly according to police procedure.

The court found that despite the photo lineup and the accused's address matching the assault location, the cumulative frailties in the complainant's identification evidence created a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on both counts.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Master's costs award that declined to award costs to either side, arguing an error in principle and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The respondent opposed.

The court denied leave to adduce fresh evidence, finding a lack of due diligence and that the evidence would not affect the outcome.

The court also denied leave to appeal the costs order, finding no error in principle or plain wrongness in the Master's decision that neither party fully prevailed.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs for the appeal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the officer had reasonable grounds to investigate, the officer conducted an investigative detention and interrogation of the accused while the accused was naked without providing rights to counsel.

The court found breaches of section 8 (unreasonable seizure) and section 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court excluded the accused's verbal admissions, observations of impairment related to balance and coordination, and breath test results under section 24(2) analysis, finding that admitting such evidence would condone unacceptable police conduct and Charter violations.

However, observations regarding the accused's eyes and breath odour were admitted.

The over 80 charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol on September 28, 2014.

The defence raised two Charter issues challenging whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the approved screening device demand, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the officer had both subjective and objective grounds to stop the vehicle based on speeding and mounting a curb, and that the approved screening device was in proper working order despite being calibrated on the 14th day prior to use.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the arrest, the timing of breath tests, the privacy of counsel consultation, the failure to video-record breath tests, and the video surveillance of the holding cell.

The court found no Charter violations with respect to reasonable and probable grounds, reasons for arrest, timing of breath tests, or counsel consultation.

The court found that while video surveillance of the holding cell raised privacy concerns, there was no infringement of the accused's section 8 rights in the specific circumstances, as the accused had a reduced expectation of privacy while in custody and no part of his genitals was visible on the recording.

The court rejected applications for a stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence, finding that admission of the breath test results would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was charged with three counts of possession of identity documents relating to "Tim Banner" contrary to section 56.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case was essentially admitted.

The central legal issue was whether the Crown must prove that the person to whom the identity documents relate is a real person.

The court held that section 56.1 contemplates both real and fictitious identities, and the Crown is not obliged to prove that the individual named in the government-issued documentation is a real person.

The defendant was found guilty on all three counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought 60 to 90 days imprisonment on an intermittent basis, while defence counsel sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court imposed a 60-day intermittent sentence (served on weekends over approximately five months), three years probation with 100 hours of community service, and a three-year driving prohibition.

The court balanced the serious nature of the offence and the need for denunciation and general deterrence against the offender's personal circumstances, remorse, and rehabilitation prospects.

Following conviction for arson (causing damage by fire to property not wholly owned by the accused), the court rejected the defence submission for a conditional sentence and imposed six months imprisonment followed by two years probation.

The court found that while the first four prerequisites for a conditional sentence were met, the sentence would not be consistent with fundamental sentencing principles given the seriousness of arson, the absence of documented mental health issues (unlike comparable cases), and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The court imposed a DNA order and restitution order of $31,741.96 to the insurance company.

Four accused were convicted of intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a residential property on August 22, 2010, knowing or being reckless as to whether the property was inhabited.

The victim's residence was firebombed with Molotov cocktails in what was characterized as a crime for hire based on false allegations that the victim was a pedophile.

The offenders caused approximately $10,000 in damage.

One accused also faced charges of disguising his face with intent to commit an indictable offence and breaching probation.

Another accused faced an additional charge of attempting to obstruct justice.

The court imposed penitentiary sentences ranging from two to four and one-half years, with the lead offender receiving the longest sentence.

The court emphasized the seriousness of arson, particularly when targeting an occupied residence, and applied principles of denunciation and deterrence.