A. Brown

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol on September 28, 2014.

The defence raised two Charter issues challenging whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the approved screening device demand, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the officer had both subjective and objective grounds to stop the vehicle based on speeding and mounting a curb, and that the approved screening device was in proper working order despite being calibrated on the 14th day prior to use.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the arrest, the timing of breath tests, the privacy of counsel consultation, the failure to video-record breath tests, and the video surveillance of the holding cell.

The court found no Charter violations with respect to reasonable and probable grounds, reasons for arrest, timing of breath tests, or counsel consultation.

The court found that while video surveillance of the holding cell raised privacy concerns, there was no infringement of the accused's section 8 rights in the specific circumstances, as the accused had a reduced expectation of privacy while in custody and no part of his genitals was visible on the recording.

The court rejected applications for a stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence, finding that admission of the breath test results would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was charged with three counts of possession of identity documents relating to "Tim Banner" contrary to section 56.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case was essentially admitted.

The central legal issue was whether the Crown must prove that the person to whom the identity documents relate is a real person.

The court held that section 56.1 contemplates both real and fictitious identities, and the Crown is not obliged to prove that the individual named in the government-issued documentation is a real person.

The defendant was found guilty on all three counts.

The offender pled guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm after striking a pedestrian while speeding.

The victim suffered serious injuries including a compound fracture.

The Crown sought 60 to 90 days intermittent imprisonment, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, sentencing the offender to 60 days of intermittent imprisonment, three years of probation including 100 hours of community service, and a three-year driving prohibition.

Following conviction for arson (causing damage by fire to property not wholly owned by the accused), the court rejected the defence submission for a conditional sentence and imposed six months imprisonment followed by two years probation.

The court found that while the first four prerequisites for a conditional sentence were met, the sentence would not be consistent with fundamental sentencing principles given the seriousness of arson, the absence of documented mental health issues (unlike comparable cases), and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The court imposed a DNA order and restitution order of $31,741.96 to the insurance company.

Reasons for sentence following jury convictions for multiple sexual offences against a child aged 7 to 8, and two assaults by one offender.

The court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society had to predominate in sentencing adult offenders who sexually abused a vulnerable child in a position of trust.

Applying the appellate authorities on child sexual abuse sentencing and the pre-sentence custody credit framework from Summers, the court imposed a 6-year global sentence on one offender with 1.5:1 credit, and a maximum reformatory sentence on the co-offender with 1:1 credit.

Ancillary DNA, weapons, s. 161, and sexual offender registration orders were also made.

Four accused were convicted of intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a residential property on August 22, 2010, knowing or being reckless as to whether the property was inhabited.

The victim's residence was firebombed with Molotov cocktails in what was characterized as a crime for hire based on false allegations that the victim was a pedophile.

The offenders caused approximately $10,000 in damage.

One accused also faced charges of disguising his face with intent to commit an indictable offence and breaching probation.

Another accused faced an additional charge of attempting to obstruct justice.

The court imposed penitentiary sentences ranging from two to four and one-half years, with the lead offender receiving the longest sentence.

The court emphasized the seriousness of arson, particularly when targeting an occupied residence, and applied principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The applicant municipality sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that allowed the respondent to convert a 161-unit affordable rental apartment building into a condominium.

The municipality argued the Board erred in its application of the Planning Act and disregarded provincial and municipal policies protecting rental housing.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding reason to doubt the reasonableness of the Board's decision for failing to consider the specific city-wide housing policies and condominium conversion policies in the Provincial Policy Statement 2005 and the municipality's Official Plan.

The City of Toronto and Kingsway Residents Against Poor Planning brought motions for leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision approving a zoning by-law amendment for a seven/eight-storey development.

The applicants argued the Board erred in law by applying the repealed Etobicoke Official Plan rather than the City's in-force Official Plan, relying on the 'Clergy Principle'.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions, finding the Board committed no error of law and properly exercised its discretion in weighing the evidence and applying the Clergy Principle.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants sought their costs.

The Divisional Court fixed costs on a partial indemnity scale, allowing the disbursements as claimed but reducing the fees claimed due to duplication of time and excessive preparation time by junior counsel.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the court awarded each appellant $15,000 in fees, plus their respective disbursements, payable by the respondents.

The appellants appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision granting minor variances to the respondents for the construction of a new home.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the OMB erred in law by failing to properly apply the four-part test for minor variances under section 45(1) of the Planning Act.

The Court held that the OMB unreasonably focused almost exclusively on the impact of the variances, neglecting to adequately consider their size, desirability, and whether they maintained the general intent and purpose of the zoning by-law and official plan.

The matter was remitted to a different panel of the OMB.