K. Byers

The offender pleaded guilty to touching a person under the age of 16 for a sexual purpose.

The offence involved a 15-year-old victim whose family was close friends with the offender's family.

The court accepted a joint submission from counsel, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence while noting the offender's guilty plea and lack of prior record as mitigating factors.

The offender was sentenced to two years less a day of imprisonment, followed by three years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA order and a section 161 prohibition.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded on the Over 80 charge after withdrawing the impaired operation charge.

The central issue was whether the Crown could rely on the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, which requires that breath samples be taken "as soon as practicable." The court found that a 39-minute gap between the accused's arrival at the police station and the initial call to duty counsel, combined with a 20-minute delay before a second call to duty counsel, was not adequately explained.

The Crown failed to establish that the breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable," and therefore could not rely on the statutory presumption.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was abandoned during submissions.

The central issue at trial concerned whether the breath samples were obtained in compliance with the statutory requirement that they be taken "as soon as practicable" under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the police acted reasonably in all the circumstances, including the time taken to arrange vehicle impoundment, the delay at the police station, and the time required to facilitate the accused's access to duty counsel.

The breath samples were obtained within the two-hour statutory window and the Certificate of the Qualified Breath Technician was admitted into evidence.

The accused was convicted.

The applicants sought an order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring the respondents vexatious litigants.

The individual respondent had commenced multiple actions in Ontario regarding matters already settled in California, all of which were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or abuse of process.

He also engaged in harassing and abusive communications with opposing counsel.

The court found the respondent's conduct met the criteria for a vexatious litigant and ordered that he and his corporations require leave to commence any new proceedings in Ontario.

Requests to stay existing appeals and seal the court file were dismissed.

The defendants successfully moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for want of jurisdiction and sought their costs.

The plaintiffs argued they were impecunious and that no costs should be awarded.

The court held that impecuniosity does not immunize a party from costs, particularly where the action should not have been brought.

The court declined to award full or substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiffs' conduct did not reach the required threshold of reprehensible behavior.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the defendants, fixed at $25,000 and $35,000 for fees, plus disbursements and HST.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after acting as a delivery person for two suitcases containing two kilograms of cocaine.

He admitted to wilful blindness regarding the contents.

The offender fled the country while on bail but voluntarily returned years later due to his mother's terminal illness.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors, including the large quantity of drugs and his flight from justice, against mitigating factors such as his guilty plea, lack of related record, and family circumstances.

The offender was sentenced to five years in jail.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol on September 28, 2014.

The defence raised two Charter issues challenging whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the approved screening device demand, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the officer had both subjective and objective grounds to stop the vehicle based on speeding and mounting a curb, and that the approved screening device was in proper working order despite being calibrated on the 14th day prior to use.

The defendant was found guilty.