Jesse Razaqpur

The accused was charged with simple possession of crack cocaine.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the police detention, search of the vehicle, and strip search, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the police detained the accused based on mere suspicion and hunches rather than reasonable grounds, conducted an unlawful search of the vehicle, and performed an unjustified strip search.

The court excluded the evidence of the crack cocaine under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's order requiring it to pay over $580,000 in costs to the respondents following a mistrial caused by the late disclosure of cellphone records.

The trial judge found the Crown's negligence violated s. 7 of the Charter and awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale using the civil costs regime.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order, holding that costs against the Crown in criminal proceedings are only appropriate where there is a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards, which was not present here.

The Court also held that the trial judge erred in importing the civil costs regime into the criminal context.

A jury trial arising from the kidnapping, extortion, assault, and unlawful confinement of the complainant.

The court issued written reasons for numerous pre‑trial and mid‑trial rulings including mistrial motions, evidentiary disputes, cell tower evidence admissibility, video‑link testimony under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code, interpretation issues under s. 14 of the Charter, and jury charge requests.

The court dismissed several defence mistrial applications, permitted certain Crown evidence including cell tower records as factual evidence, allowed video‑link testimony from a witness abroad, and provided jury instructions concerning fabricated statements and the Browne v. Dunn rule.

The jury ultimately convicted two accused and acquitted one.

Three inmates were charged with assault causing bodily harm to a fellow inmate at Maplehurst Correctional Centre on November 19, 2014.

The Crown sought to introduce video evidence of the assault with identification testimony from a correctional officer.

The court held a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence under the Leaney test.

The court found that while the officer had prior acquaintance with the accused and was in a better position than the trier of fact to make identifications, the threshold reliability of the identification evidence was not established because the Crown relied on a Historical Unit Assignment document that was demonstrably inaccurate.

The document showed 35 inmates in a unit with a maximum capacity of 32, and showed inmates in cells where they were not actually housed.

Without reliable evidence of which inmates were assigned to which cells, the officer's identification methodology—tracking blurry figures back to assigned cells—could not meet the reliability threshold.

The charges were dismissed.

In a criminal prosecution for kidnapping, extortion, and assault, the court conducted a blended voir dire regarding the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police following a 911 call and police entry into a residence where a bound complainant was discovered.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights, particularly the right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The court found that one police officer violated the accused’s right to counsel during investigative detention but declined to exclude certain statements after applying the s. 24(2) framework from Grant.

Spontaneous utterances and statements made after proper cautions and waiver of counsel were admitted, while statements allegedly made to another officer in the police cruiser were excluded because the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to unreliable notes and evidentiary inconsistencies.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained after police entered a residence without a warrant following a 911 call reporting a gun and possible emergency.

Police arrived, detained an occupant in the backyard, and conducted a sweep of the home where they discovered a complainant tied to a bed in the basement and seized two envelopes during the search.

The applicants argued the entry and subsequent seizure violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held the warrantless entry was justified under the police duty to protect life and safety in response to an emergency 911 call.

The seizure of the envelopes was lawful as plain view evidence discovered while officers were lawfully present in the home.

In a criminal jury trial on kidnapping, extortion, and assault charges, the Crown sought to adduce hearsay statements made by an absent alleged participant through a former friend.

The court held the co-conspirators' exception did not apply because there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that a joint criminal enterprise involving the accused already existed when the statements were made.

The court also rejected alternative hearsay routes based on penal interest, present intention, motive, and credibility corroboration, finding the proposed evidence irrelevant to the live issue of the identity and participation of the accused.

The application was dismissed, subject only to a narrow allowance to refer to the Square One meeting to refresh the witness's memory about a phone number.

In a mid-trial motion, the accused sought to exclude a forensic DNA analysis on the basis that police handling of cloth restraints during an earlier trial created a serious risk of contamination.

The court held that, even accepting the factual allegations regarding handling and continuity, the complaint went to the weight of the DNA evidence rather than its admissibility.

Applying the trial judge’s case-management authority, the court found there was no reasonable likelihood that a voir dire would assist in determining admissibility.

The application was summarily dismissed as unmeritorious and brought too late.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging their right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been breached.

The case involved charges of kidnapping, extortion, and assault arising from a violent abduction.

The court conducted a detailed Morin analysis of delay, allocating periods to inherent requirements, defence delay, institutional delay, and Crown delay, including delay caused by a mistrial following disclosure failures.

The court determined that total Crown and institutional delay amounted to approximately 14 months and 27 days, falling within the Morin guidelines.

Although some prejudice was established, it did not reach the level required to justify a constitutional remedy, and the seriousness of the offences weighed strongly in favour of a trial on the merits.

During a criminal jury trial involving allegations including kidnapping and extortion, the Crown sought to introduce oral statements attributed to one accused that differed from the version summarized in an earlier pre‑trial ruling on voluntariness.

The updated police testimony suggested that the accused named co‑accused as involved in the offence.

The trial judge held that the credibility of the differing versions of the statement was a matter for the jury and that the earlier ruling on voluntariness could not be revisited mid‑trial based on a changed evidentiary landscape.

Applying the discretionary exclusionary framework for prejudicial evidence, the court concluded that the probative value of the “new” version was not outweighed by prejudice to the co‑accused.

The statement would therefore be admitted without editing, with appropriate limiting instructions to the jury that it could only be used against the declarant accused.

The accused brought a voir dire seeking exclusion of statements made to police following his arrest for offences including kidnapping and extortion.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter due to investigative detention without timely access to counsel.

The court rejected claims of language barriers, intoxication, coercion, and police oppression, finding the accused understood English, had an operating mind, and spoke voluntarily in the hope of improving his situation.

Although a brief 10‑minute breach of s. 10(b) occurred before counsel rights were given, the impugned statement was spontaneous and the breach was minor.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held admission of the statements would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused appeared for sentencing after a jury conviction for trafficking a small quantity of crack cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime arising from an undercover police “opportunity drug buy.” The Crown sought a custodial sentence of eight months, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

Applying the principles of sentencing under ss. 718–718.2 and 742.1 of the Criminal Code, the court considered the offender’s youth, absence of prior record, stable employment history, and the very small quantity of drugs involved.

Although trafficking in crack cocaine is a serious aggravating factor, the court found minimal risk of reoffending and concluded that community supervision would not endanger the safety of the community.

A conditional sentence was imposed to balance denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.

The applicants, jointly charged with trafficking in cocaine, brought applications to stay the charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to trial was approximately 28 months.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that the institutional delay of 15 months was within acceptable limits, considering the inherent time requirements of a joint trial and the actions of the accused.

The court also found minimal prejudice to the applicants.

The applications for a stay were dismissed.

During a jury trial for cocaine trafficking, the Crown invoked investigation privilege to prevent disclosure of the surveillance location from which a police officer observed the accused during an undercover drug transaction.

The court reviewed the principles governing investigative technique and observation post privilege, balancing the public interest in protecting police methods and cooperating third parties against the accused’s right to make full answer and defence.

The judge permitted extensive cross‑examination regarding the officer’s ability to observe but prohibited questions that would reveal the precise surveillance location or whether the officer was inside or outside a building.

The jury was instructed that the privilege limited defence cross‑examination and that this limitation could affect the weight given to the officer’s testimony.

The jury ultimately acquitted one accused and convicted the other.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking to modify the standard racial bias challenge-for-cause question used during jury selection under the Parks framework.

The moving party proposed a multiple-choice question intended to better detect conscious and unconscious racial bias among prospective jurors.

The court reviewed prior decisions considering the proposed approach, including cases approving and rejecting the use of multiple-choice questions.

Finding no evidentiary basis to conclude the proposed question was more effective than the established Parks question, the court exercised its discretion to maintain the standard formulation.

The jury panel was directed to be asked the traditional Parks question during jury selection.

The accused was charged with possession of six illegal firearms and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

The firearm charges were based entirely on videos found on cell phones seized from the accused's home, as no actual firearms were recovered.

The court had to determine whether the items in the videos were real firearms, and whether the possession occurred in Toronto and within the alleged timeframes.

The court found the accused guilty on two counts of firearm possession, relying on circumstantial evidence including the appearance of the guns, the accused's handling of them, and his threatening commentary.

The accused was acquitted on the other firearm counts due to lack of proof regarding location or timing.

The accused was also acquitted of conspiracy to traffic cocaine, as the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that an agreement had been reached.

This is a judicial interim release hearing for an accused charged with nine counts including attempt fraud, uttering forged documents, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The accused, a 42-year-old with a significant criminal history including prior fraud convictions and weapons offences, sought bail.

The Crown opposed release on primary and secondary grounds.

The court found the accused's testimony to be unreliable and lacking in credibility, with numerous inconsistencies regarding his family situation, financial circumstances, and criminal history.

An initial bail program proposal was deemed inadequate.

A subsequent plan involving a private surety collapsed when the proposed surety learned of the accused's background and outstanding warrants.

The court ordered detention, finding a substantial likelihood the accused would fail to appear and commit further offences.

The accused was charged with two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance contrary to section 145(3) of the Criminal Code, with alleged offence dates of November 14 and 16, 2011.

The Crown sought to admit an original information and a certified copy of a recognizance as evidence.

The defence challenged the admissibility of these documents on the basis that the Canada Evidence Act notice served by the Crown was deficient because it referred to an information with different offence dates than the one actually tendered.

The court ruled that while the notice was deficient under the Canada Evidence Act, both documents were admissible at common law as public documents and under the principled approach to hearsay established in R. v. Khan.