COURT FILE NOS.: CR/23-697, 23-678, 23-655
DATE: 2024/09/03
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Crown
- and -
TRAYONTE ECCLESTON
Offender
COUNSEL:
Y. Laine and A. Grady, for the Crown Attorney, J. Razaqpur, for the Federal Prosecution Service of Canada
R. Rusonik, for Mr. Eccleston
HEARD: May 13, 14 and 21, 2024
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
A. J. Goodman, J.:
[1] On August 6, 2021, at a restaurant parking lot in the southeast part of the City of Hamilton, Trayonte Eccleston, (“Trayonte” or “Eccleston”) shot several individuals, killing Keden Bond (“Keden”) and wounding Shaquan Noel (“Shaquan”) and James Bond (“James”).
[2] On December 22, 2023, Eccleston pled guilty to second-degree murder, as well as various firearms and drugs offences, contrary to their respective provisions in the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (“CDSA”). As a result of the plea, Eccleston is to be sentenced to life imprisonment for second-degree murder. The only matter to be decided is the period that he must serve before he is eligible to apply for parole. Parole ineligibility must be fixed between 10 and 25 years.
OVERVIEW:
[3] On August 6, 2021 at approximately 7:43 p.m., members of the Hamilton Police Service (“HPS”)responded to the area of Mud Street East and Paramount Drive in Hamilton for reports of gunshots fired. Upon arrival, police located three males behind the Moghul’s Restaurant, all suffering from gunshot wounds and they were transported to the hospital. These three males were subsequently identified as Keden (17 years old), Shaquan (19 years old) and James (35 years old). Shaquan and Keden are brothers. James is Shaquan’s and Keden’s uncle.
[4] At 7:06 p.m., prior to the victims arriving at the plaza, a black BMW was observed entering the plaza and parking in front of the Shoppers Drug Mart (“Shoppers”). The BMW is registered to Trayonte. After parking the vehicle, Trayonte exited the driver’s seat of the vehicle and entered the Shoppers. At 7:19 p.m., surveillance footage captures Trayonte exiting the store at the same time as the victims’ Hyundai Elantra is driving past the store. The Hyundai travels directly past the BMW before continuing onwards to the rear of the Moghul’s Restaurant. Trayonte can be observed on CCTV footage looking at this vehicle as it passed. The Hyundai’s front passenger side window was down and was occupied by Shaquan.
[5] After the Hyundai passed the BMW, Trayonte entered the driver’s seat of the parked BMW and began to follow the path of the Hyundai. James drove the Hyundai to the rear of the Moghul’s Restaurant, whereupon he, Keden and Shaquan exited the car. Thereafter, they retrieved some marijuana, to roll a marijuana cigarette. While the three victims were outside of their parked Hyundai, the BMW driven by Trayonte passed by them on several occasions, travelling in behind the rear of the stores in both directions.
[6] At 7:38 p.m., the BMW returns westbound on Mistywood Drive and parks on the south side of Mistywood, just west of the driveway leading into 2 Mistywood Drive. Mistywood Drive borders the commercial plaza where the Shoppers, Mogul’s Restaurant and I See Eyecare store are. At 7:39 p.m., Trayonte exits the driver’s door of the BMW, along with a second male who exits the front passenger door. Trayonte is wearing the same clothing as he was seen wearing earlier at the Shoppers, although his hooded sweatshirt is now pulled up over his head. His is also wearing a surgical mask. The second male is also wearing a hooded sweatshirt with the hood up over his head, and is wearing a surgical mask.
[7] The two men walk southbound through the Paramount Place seniors’ residence parking lot towards the fence line of this property. After exiting the parking lot, the two men hop the fence into the property of the commercial plaza, directly in front of where the victims were preparing to smoke a marijuana cigarette.
[8] From the plaza side of the fence, a witness observed Trayonte and the second male jump down to the ground over the bushes that were planted on the commercial side of the fence. Immediately upon landing on the ground, the two men both raised their arms, stood stationary shoulder-to-shoulder, and started shooting in the direction of the rear wall of the Moghul’s Restaurant. In the witness’ words, they fired “an enormous amount of bullets”. The witness observed each male to have a firearm in each of their hands, heard the shots fired and saw the smoke associated with the gunshots.
[9] Shaquan testified at the preliminary hearing that while he, Keden and James were standing outside of the Hyundai behind the Moghul’s Restaurant, someone came out of the bushes and started shooting at them. Shaquan and Keden tried to run, but Keden collapsed to the ground. Shaquan called 911.
[10] After the shots were fired, the civilian witness then observed Trayonte and the second male turn and jump back through the bushes, disappearing from the line of vision. At 7:42 p.m., a pedestrian on Mistywood Drive observed the two men exit the parking lot of Paramount Place and get into the front seats of the BMW.
[11] Police located 17 spent rounds of ammunition in the area where the victims were shot. Two different types of ammunition were located, having been fired from different firearms. There were 10 rounds of 40 calibre spent ammunition and seven rounds of 9mm spent ammunition. The two firearms used in this shooting were never recovered.
[12] Keden was transported to hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries. He suffered two penetrating gunshots wounds to the head, with the bullet entering behind and below his left ear, penetrating his head from back to front. This resulted in non-survivable brain injury that would have resulted in immediate collapse. A post-mortem examination was completed. Keden had no defensive wounds.
[13] James was also transported to hospital suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. He was shot in the right inferior area of his neck, his left scapular spine and his right leg. James remained in hospital, undergoing multiple surgeries, after which he was transferred to a rehabilitation centre. His discharge diagnosis was polytrauma, which refers to multiple injuries involving multiple organs or systems, and quadriplegia. He is now confined to a wheelchair with no hope of ever walking again.
[14] Shaquan was also transported to hospital suffering from a gunshot wound to his left foot. He was treated and released from hospital thereafter.
[15] The HPS began to conduct surveillance of Trayonte following this shooting. At the end of August, he was observed to move out of his family home located at 35 Hibiscus Lane in Hamilton. On October 14, 2021, a search warrant was executed at his residence at 202 Gleave Terrace in Milton. In the living room, in plain view, and underneath the coffee table, the police located a Glock 30, 45 calibre semi-automatic firearm and a Glock 21, 45 calibre semi-automatic firearm, both with serial numbers defaced, along with a clear bag with 31 rounds of 9 mm ammunition. The Glock 30 is a prohibited firearm due to its barrel length. Trayonte acknowledges that he was in constructive possession of these items. The firearms located in the residence are not the same firearms that were used in this shooting.
[16] On the second story landing of the Milton residence was an FN five-seven semi-automatic firearm. Inside the common bathroom on the second floor of the residence, police located 373.43 grams of fentanyl in 17 separate baggies and 241.25 grams of cocaine in one bag. Throughout the residence, the police found $1,465 in a cash box of the bedroom associated with Trayonte, nearly $85,000 under the living room table and $5,500 on a TV stand. In total, police located $92,475 in multiple bundles in these various locations. Trayonte did not have an authorization, license or registration certificate for any of the firearms.
Positions of the Parties:
[17] Ms. Laine, on behalf of the Crown, submits that the plea to the lesser and included offence of second-degree murder ought to attract an enhanced parole ineligibility period of between 20 to 22 years based on the numerous, serious aggravating features in this case. These include strong elements of planning and deliberation, the lack of mitigating factors, after-the-fact conduct, and the nature of the offender. The Crown invites this court to send a message to Eccleston and to similarly situated offenders that the appropriate sentence must reflect the ever-increasing concerns and attitudes towards gun violence. In addition, the Crown says that any social context evidence presented does not detract from the serious nature of the homicide and warrants denunciation. The Crown requests a weapons prohibition order pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code a non-contact provision, forfeiture and a DNA order.
[18] The Crown submits that the pleas to possession of a loaded restricted firearm and possession of a loaded prohibited firearm warrants seven years, with one year consecutive to the count of possession of a firearm while subject to a weapons prohibition order s. 117.01(3), totaling eight years concurrent. The Federal Crown submits a joint position for the guilty plea to possession for the purposes of trafficking fentanyl of 10 years in jail consecutive to the firearms counts and concurrent to the second-degree murder count.
[19] Further, the Crown submits that the murder, firearms and CDSA offences are extremely serious. Although the sentence for these crimes will run concurrently with his life sentence, the significance of these convictions is an important factor on the issue of parole ineligibility because this criminality bolsters the danger that he poses to the public. The very presence of guns in the community creates a risk that they may be used. The possession of firearms by persons who have already committed violent offences resulting in the imposition of a prohibition order constitutes a danger to the community.
[20] Counsel for Trayonte argues that the parole ineligibility period be limited to the minimum 10 to 12 year range. The defence submits that the court ought not to increase the period of parole ineligibility based on the lack of aggravating features, including no cogent evidence of any planning or deliberation, the impact of anti-Black racism as outlined in the evidence and reports, the age of the offender, and the lack of a serious criminal record, along with family and community supports. Other factors include his client’s guilty plea and expression of remorse. Furthermore, the court ought to consider Trayonte’s rehabilitation prospects and eventual reintegration back into the community. There appears to be no dispute with regards to the ancillary orders.
[21] The defence says that the case of R. v. Hayles-Wilson, 2018 ONSC 4337, aff’d 2022 ONCA 790, correctly sets out the range of parole ineligibility for a similar offence and offender like Trayonte who is found guilty after trial and without any consideration of the role of systemic anti-Black racism. That case provided three categories of seriousness: a high end requiring parole ineligibility of 18 to 22 years, a medium end of 14 to 16 years, and a low end being 12 years or less.
[22] The defence says that Trayonte’s offence could belong in the medium range if he was found guilty after trial and without any consideration of the role of systemic anti-Black racism. If Trayonte had been found guilty after a trial and without any consideration for Morris considerations, (R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, 159 O.R. (3d) 641), he is already a lesser offender than was Mr. Hayles-Wilson, and would fall at the lower end of the range of parole ineligibility, that is 14 years.
[23] Yet, the defence submits that the range of parole ineligibility for this offence and an offender like Trayonte who pleads guilty, still without any consideration for anti-Black systemic racism consideration, must be less, even if only 12 to 14 years.
[24] Moreover, the consideration of the extreme Morris considerations for Trayonte – both before the offence and throughout his incarceration already served and still to come – demand the greatest possible deviation from the parole ineligibility for an offence here and an offender like him who pleads guilty. So, the ultimate and appropriate parole ineligibility should be set to somewhere between 10 and 12 years, argues the defence.
[25] The defence contends that the message here to the Parole Board of Canada should be that they must seriously consider this Black man for parole earlier than they might otherwise. The odds are they will still discriminate against him whenever they do consider the question of parole eligibility, but at least he will have the improved chance that he faces as a socially disadvantaged Black man as recognized by Morris, and its progeny.
[26] The defence submits that, notwithstanding the very serious nature of the offences, this is a unique case that warrants the court’s discretion in sending a message to the Parole Board and rendering a sentence at the lowest end of the range, between 10 to 12 years of parole ineligibility.
Victim Impact Statements:
[27] Various victim impact statements (“VIS”) were filed with the court.
[28] Keden was 17 years at the time of his murder. His family has been devastated by his death. His sister, 15-year-old Shydell, speaks about how Keden’s mother, Andrea, feels “hate, sadness and a devastating emptiness and hopeless, but she still gets up and speaks life into [her] and her siblings everyday while feeling dead inside.” Shydell states that she will “never get over this.” She describes the amazing person Keden was and that Trayonte and his accomplice “ruined and severed so many hearts” in murdering her older brother. “Who could so something so senseless and why? Keden loved me and I miss my brother more than I can explain. I will forever say his name and I stand on everything my brother was and who he was and what he did for others. I will remember him by how he loved, lived, laughed and inspired others and not by your evil acts of violence and hatred in your heart.”
[29] Keden’s other sister, Kedrea, speaks about the death of her best friend and the unbearable agony she has experienced as a result how many people’s lives he touched. “He was a loving and caring brother. He was so quiet and laid back, he would never get into anything with anyone because he was so soft. When Keden came around everyone would laugh and have fun. He is missed and loved by so many people. He touched the lives of others at school, work, family and friends.”
[30] Andrea Bond, Keden’s mother, writes that she hasn’t slept a single night peacefully since his death. She speaks about how special Keden was because he made others feel special. She speaks about what she has gone through since his death, including an ongoing fear for her children and family. She is confused, heartbroken and will never be the same, barely able to cope let alone help her other children through this trauma. “A piece of me is gone forever. Keden was my heart and my best friend. Keden was the closet to me and we did everything together. My mind, body and soul feel like I will never have peace nor closure after losing him, and I live with this nightmare every day. Seeing my family go through all this agony and pain has my heart devastated and broken. This is pain that no amount of time can take away. My mental health has severely declined with depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety; all for which I am now medicated for and am currently in therapy since that horrible day. I will never hear his laugh again. I will never see his smile or feel his warm hugs ever again. I won’t get to see him start college. I will never see him get married or get grandchildren from him. All these hopes and dreams have been ripped away from me. Keden was the kid who was so soft and so quiet.”
[31] Amanda Bond, Keden’s aunt and Andrea’s sister, speaks about the trauma they had to endure when he was taken off of life-support. “I will never recover from the pain and sorrow I feel from him no longer being here. I will cherish all the moments I shared with him. He is a beautiful spirit, and we will always honour his name. In his honour, I named my baby girl, born on October 14, 2023, Malani Keden Lee Mighty.”
[32] Gloria Halfkenny, Keden’s grandmother, writes “[h]e had plans of becoming an electrician like his gradfather. Now he will never have the chance to do so or anything else.”
[33] Deborah Mantok, Keden’s aunt, writes“[h]e was brilliant, smart, kind, soft spoken (at least to me, Aunty Deborah), kindhearted, witty, full of laughs, jokes and pranks on his mom (my big sis). His death has truly impacted not just mine or my children’s lives, but so many more, that till this day it still hurts us all to think this amazing boy whom I’ve personally watched grow up from a baby to be such a handsome loving man with so much life and such a bright future ahead of him!”
[34] Others who provided VIS’ speak of the nightmares, depression and PTSD that they experienced as a result of Keden’s death, and the ongoing pain they experience from this irreplaceable loss of life. As Gloria Halfkenny wrote in her VIS: “[i]magine what [Shaquan] was going through seeing his brother pass away in his arms. He now suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and wakes up at night screaming from nightmares. There is no way to quantify the enormous impact that this must have had on Shaquan.”
[35] The victims’ family opines that in respect of James, one can also infer the enormous impact that this shooting must have had on him. He too was a witness to the shooting, and present when his young nephews were shot. Moreover, James’ injuries were nothing short of catastrophic, having been shot in the neck, spine and leg. As his mother, Gloria writes “[e]veryday for weeks, we watched him in the intensive care unit fighting for his life.”
[36] Despite the absence of a VIS from Shaquan, there is no doubt that this shooting also had a devastating impact on him. Shaquan was beside his brother when he collapsed to the ground, having been struck by the gunfire. He now has to live his life without his brother and having witnessed his murder.
[37] Before I move on, and without taking anything away from the profoundly emotional and sincere comments referenced in the various VIS’, I am unable to consider any of the statements therein regarding what the various writers opine is the appropriate sentence. Nor can I consider their suggestions about any sentencing considerations or remarks related to retribution. Those statements go beyond the admissible nature and scope of VIS in criminal proceedings.
[38] That said, I want the family and friends of Keden to know that I have not failed to recognize your pain and sorrow and I have not forgotten the tragedy of his untimely death. The VIS’ outline the heartfelt sense of bereavement and loss felt by family and friends.
[39] Eccleston has been convicted of murder and will be sentenced to a mandatory life sentence. Nothing I do here will bring Keden back or expunge the grief felt by his family. However, I cannot exact vengeance. The focus at this proceeding is what sentence I am to impose based on fairness, balancing the legal principles, the jurisprudence and the circumstances of this case and the offender.
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES:
[40] Under s. 745(c) of the Criminal Code, on conviction for second degree murder, the offender must be sentenced to life imprisonment. The offender has no eligibility for parole for a fixed period ranging from a minimum of 10 to a maximum of 25 years.
[41] Section 745.4 empowers the sentencing judge to increase the general parole ineligibility period from the minimum of 10 years to the period that the judge deems fit, up to the maximum of 25 years. Section 745.4 also requires that in exercising their discretion, the sentencing judge must have regard to the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission and the recommendation of the jury.
[42] In R. v. Shropshire, 1995 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, at para. 27, the Supreme Court of Canada articulated the standard to be applied in assessing the exercise of a judge's discretion under s. 744 [now s. 745.4] as follows:
... as a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years but this can be ousted by a determination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in s. 744, the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitability to be released into the general public assessed. To this end an extension of the period of parole ineligibility would not be “unusual”, although it may well be that, in the median number of cases, a period of 10 years might still be awarded.
[43] As well, the Supreme Court held that the power to extend the period of parole ineligibility need not be sparingly used and is not restricted to "unusual circumstances": Shropshire, at para. 31. The court recognized that "in permitting a sliding scale of parole ineligibility, Parliament intended to recognize that within the category of second-degree murder there will be a broad range of seriousness reflecting varying degrees of moral culpability”: Shropshire, at para. 29.
[44] It is clear that sentencing ranges are merely guidelines, and a judge must apply all of the considerations that flow from Part XXIII of the Criminal Code to arrive at a just and proper sentence. Sentencing remains an individualistic process requiring a careful exercise of judicial discretion. Parole ineligibility is a punishment separate and apart from the length of sentence.
Circumstances of the Offender:
[45] An extensive and comprehensive Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report (“EPSR”) was prepared in this case, which was reviewed.
[46] The offender has a prior youth court record.
[47] Not only that, but the offender has committed several misconducts while housed at various institutions awaiting disposition. At the Central North Correctional Centre, he admitted guilt and was reprimanded with a loss of 119 days of canteen privileges for an assault on another inmate. On October 4, 2022, he was found guilty of and received three days of close confinement for Commits/Threats Assault (on other). On May 21, 2023, he was placed on misconduct for Commits/Threats Assault (on other). On November 14, 2023, he was found guilty of Commits/Threats Assault (on other) and received two days close confinement. On October 4, 2022, there was a physical altercation between four inmates, including Eccleston.
Character of the Offender:
[48] I also had the benefit of an Impact of Race and Culture Assessment (“IRCA”) report.
[49] At the time of these offences, Trayonte was a young man of 19 years. The IRCA report details that throughout his upbringing, Trayonte experienced periods of homelessness and unstable housing, poverty, hunger, parentification, and exposure to criminality within the family and communities he lived in. The report suggests that Trayonte felt pressured and was expected to provide financially for his family, regardless of how he secured his money.
[50] The defence contends the contents of the report reveal how racialized poverty had the cumulative effect of extremely marginalizing Trayonte into a crime despite him being a naturally good, kind, unselfish, selfless, quiet, and respectful child. He was inexorably slid into armed illegal drug trafficking. The marginality of his family and himself effectively made choices for him by denying him other choices at a point in his young life when his ability to exercise self-control, to make proper decisions, regulate his emotions, and avoid risk-taking behaviours would not only still have been developing as for anyone his age, but whose development of these was already handicapped by his upbringing.
[51] What is clear from the IRCA report is that Trayonte learned at a young age how to earn money through illegitimate means. He dropped out of school in grade 10 and began selling drugs. Thereafter, Trayonte was immersed in a criminal lifestyle. It seems that he never engaged in, or attempted to engage in, prosocial activities or legitimate employment.
[52] I appreciate his siblings experienced racism in this regard, but there is no evidence that Trayonte himself experienced specific discrimination in terms of employment. At the time of his arrest, he was living in his own residence along with his younger brother (who was a 17 at the time) and his girlfriend. From the Agreed Statement of Facts, he was driving a BMW registered to him. When the police executed a search warrant in his home, police seized nearly $100,000 in cash in addition to an enormous amount of drugs, which in themselves have a very significant street value, and several firearms.
[53] These additional factors are important to consider because the assets that Trayonte had, including the illicit drugs, demonstrate that his involvement in the criminal subculture goes well beyond any notion of providing subsistence for his family (as suggested in the IRCA report). It is clear on the evidence that Trayonte was involved in high level drug trafficking and that this business was highly lucrative for him.
[54] Moreover, the IRCA report details that Trayonte took responsibility for all of siblings. His sister speaks about how he did not want his siblings to grow up the way he grew up, hence he took on providing for his siblings. His stepmother claims that Trayonte continues “to try to tell his younger siblings to stay in school and not get in trouble”. It is clear that Trayonte assisted his mother and siblings financially. At the same time, it should be noted that the influence he had on siblings when the search warrant execution. He was living with his 17-year-old younger brother, in a residence with loaded firearms, enormous amounts of drugs and cash in plain view. This counterbalances the tenor of the report in this regard.
[55] Furthermore, the IRCA report indicates that collateral sources suggest that Trayonte’s personality and values are inconsistent with the offences for which he is being sentenced and that “this is not Trayonte’s personality; its not who he is”. It should be noted that the only collateral sources canvassed by the author of this report were Trayonte’s close family members. It is unclear if they understood the extent to which Trayonte was involved in the criminal subculture or whether they had limited insight into the life he was really leading at the time of these offences.
[56] The preponderance of evidence suggests that Trayonte is indeed very entrenched in a criminal subculture. He has been dealing drugs since he was in grade ten. He was convicted of Possession of a Scheduled Substance (Cocaine) for the purpose of trafficking in 2020. Only one day after the expiry of his probation order he was out in public with a loaded firearm, and ultimately killed a boy and injured two others. Only two months after that he was found to be engaged in high-level drug trafficking with three loaded firearms in his home and an exorbitant amount of cash.
[57] Finally, the author of the IRCA report notes that Trayonte is prepared to take responsibility for his actions and he pled guilty to the offences. I find this is true. When addressing the court, Trayonte expressed genuine regret to the family for his actions. His comments and apology to the family appeared to be sincere.
IRCA Reports and the Prevailing Jurisprudence:
[58] It is clear that the IRCA report and the social context evidence is not relevant to the seriousness of the offence. A judge’s role is to determine the seriousness of the offence based on the specific circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, its normative wrongfulness and the harm posed or caused by that conduct in the circumstances in which the conduct occurred: Morris, at para. 13. That said, social context evidence may assist with respect to assessing the moral blameworthiness of the offender or the blending of sentencing objectives to arrive at a fit sentence: Morris, at para. 76; R. v. Husbands, 2024 ONCA 155, 170 O.R. (3d) 486, at para. 60. In particular, social context evidence may assist in establishing that the offender had disadvantaged circumstances that limited or influenced the choices that they made that brought them before the court.
[59] Importantly, the court in Husbands, at para. 59, makes it clear that even when there is relevant social context evidence, deterrence and denunciation still play a predominant role in sentencing for serious crimes, including those involving firearms. The Court of Appeal in Husbands noted, at para. 60, that “depending on the seriousness of the offence, that seriousness can weigh more heavily in the sentencing calculus than any mitigation of the offender’s moral blameworthiness.”
[60] In Husbands, the court cites the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Abdulle, 2023 ONCA 32, 166 O.R. (3d) 307, leave to appeal refused. One of the bases for the appeal in Abdulle was whether the trial judge erred with respect to the consideration of evidence related to anti-Black racism. In Abdulle, at para. 39, the Ontario Court of Appeal held:
[E]ven though it was an error for the trial judge not to accept that the appellant had suffered some measure of anti-Black discrimination, he made no error in finding “the offence is so serious that the practical reality would have been that it would have had virtually no impact on the determination of an appropriate period of parole ineligibility.”
[61] Moreover, in Husbands, at paras. 54-62, the Ontario Court of Appeal made clear that the IRCA report cannot diminish the seriousness of the offence, namely the circumstances surrounding it or the nature of the offence itself. Rather, the IRCA report assists with the proportionality analysis and assessing the moral blameworthiness of the offender.
[62] Therefore, the IRCA report’s only relevance on sentencing, both in this case and in Morris, Abdulle and Husbands, is on the issue of the accused’s character, which involves an assessment of moral blameworthiness. This factor is a consideration on sentencing with fixed sentences, and on life sentences when parole ineligibility is at issue.
Connection Between Anti-Black Racism and the Offences:
[63] The court in Morris, at para. 97, discusses the need for “some connection” between background and systemic factors and the circumstances that are said to explain the criminal conduct in issue. That connection, though it need not be causal, remains important to avoid mitigation in sentencing being based solely on the offender’s race.
[64] Typically the stronger the connection between the background and systemic factors of the offender and the circumstances that are said to explain the criminal conduct in issue, the greater the impact this evidence will have on the offender’s moral blameworthiness. Conversely, when there is only a weak connection between the background factors and systemic racism and the crime that the offender has committed, it is more likely that the impact of the relevant circumstance will be low or negligible: see R. v. Murray, 2021 ONSC 597, at para. 133.
[65] I am persuaded that the social context evidence is relevant because of its connection to the basis upon which Trayonte became involved in the criminal justice system. However, this is not one of those cases, like in Morris, where the social context evidence is connected more directly to the offender’s choice to engage in the offence in question. Here, the social context evidence does not speak to the targeted murder of Keden, and the shooting of Shaquan and James.
[66] Although in some cases an offender’s background, character, prospects and life choices may assist a sentencing judge in giving more weight to rehabilitation and less weight to specific deterrence, I tend to agree with the Crown that this is not one of those cases. There is an absence of a connection between these factors and the murder that Trayonte intentionally chose to engage in.
The Offender’s Criminal Record:
[67] As referenced earlier, Trayonte’s youth record is also relevant.
[68] It is true that Trayonte’s record is not as extensive as certain of the other offenders that are reflected in the cases presented by the parties. Yet, one could argue that the offender’s record demonstrates a pattern of conduct in relation to drug trafficking. This is troubling because it highlights that he was not deterred in his criminal behaviour by findings of guilt and his experience with the criminal justice system, and more importantly, he was not rehabilitated despite the supports involved with being on probation for one and a half years. In fact, he continued to engage in drug trafficking very shortly after his probation order completed for these offences.
[69] Notably, the probation order that was imposed for the offender’s drug trafficking conviction expired one day prior to his participation in the murder of Keden and the shooting of Shaquan and James. Recall that the firearms in Trayonte’s home were not those used in the shooting a few months beforehand. In addition to these loaded firearms and ammunition, he was also in possession of 373.43 grams of fentanyl, 241.25 grams of cocaine and nearly $100,000 in cash.
[70] This may suggest that all the aforementioned factors place Trayonte on a level playing field with other offenders being sentenced to second-degree murder who have serious criminal records. It also speaks to the same consideration on the issue of parole ineligibility: the accused’s character.
Incidents in the Jail:
[71] As mentioned, another factor to consider is Trayonte’s violent behaviour since his incarceration, as outlined in the numerous misconduct summaries.
[72] Trayonte has continued to engage in violence despite being under a microscope at the jail, despite knowing of his upcoming sentence hearing at which his behaviour in jail would be scrutinized and despite having received consequences for such misconducts while incarcerated. This information is relevant to the accused’s background and character and demonstrates that his prospects for rehabilitation are not positive.
RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE:
[73] All counsel have referred to a significant number of authorities setting out parole ineligibility findings in cases of second-degree murder.
[74] The Crown provided Husbands, Abdulle and R. v. Edwards-Lafleur, 2023 ONSC 5463 on the issue of IRCA reports.
[75] The offender in Husbands brought a concealed, fully loaded, semi-automatic handgun to the Eaton Centre that he fired 14 times in a food court with more than 700 people present. Two people were killed, and five others were seriously injured. The offender was convicted of two counts of manslaughter, five counts of aggravated assault, one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and one count of intentionally discharging a firearm while being reckless as to the life and safety of another person. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for seven years on each of the manslaughter convictions. An IRCA report was available to the sentencing judge in Husbands. The offender appealed on the ground that the judge failed to properly consider the social context evidence of anti-Black racism and its effect on the offender.
[76] The Ontario Court of Appeal supported the trial judge’s conclusion in Husbands that the social context evidence provided little mitigation of moral blameworthiness of the offender: at para. 70. The court found the trial judge was alive to the social context evidence captured by the IRCA report and understood it’s importance in sentencing. However, the social context evidence was not sufficiently connected to the offender’s decision to carry a loaded, concealed semi-automatic firearm to one of the busiest public places in Canada’s largest city nor to taking out the firearm and firing 14 shots when over 700 people were close by. The fact that the offender is unhappy with how the social context evidence was weighed is not a proper basis to say the trial judge committed a reversible error: see Husbands, at paras. 74-78.
[77] Similar remarks were made by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Abdulle. As mentioned, on appeal it was argued that the sentencing judge did not place sufficient emphasis on the evidence of anti-Black racism and its impact on the accused: Abdulle, at para. 10. The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge’s decision and found that although it was an error for the trial judge not to take the anti-Black racism evidence into consideration, this error did not affect the sentence imposed because the offence was so serious: Abdulle, at paras. 35, 39. Moreover, the court in Abdulle wrote, at para. 40, that where an offence is serious, denunciation and deterrence are pushed to the foreground despite whatever diminution of moral responsibility could be granted to the offender.
[78] The Crown also referred to my earlier decision in Edwards-Lafleur. There, an enhanced pre-sentence report was prepared for sentencing of several firearm-related offences. While the evidence of anti-Black racism in the offender’s life was considered, it did not have a significant impact on his moral blameworthiness: Edwards-Lafleur, at para. 46.
[79] Together, these cases demonstrate that social context evidence of anti-Black racism and how it has impacted the offender are important in assisting judges to craft appropriate sentences. At the same time, this evidence will not necessarily impact the sentence where the offences before the court involve serious gun violence. The offender’s moral blameworthiness can remain high even in the context of their lived experience, including experiences with anti-Black racism. It bears repeating what the Court of Appeal wrote in Morris, at para. 76 (citations omitted):
Evidence that an offender's choices were limited or influenced by his disadvantaged circumstances, however, speaks to the offender's moral responsibility for his acts and not to the seriousness of the crimes. Possession of a loaded, concealed handgun in public is made no less serious, dangerous, and harmful to the community by evidence that the offender's possession of the loaded handgun can be explained by factors, including systemic anti-Black racism, which will mitigate, to some extent, the offender's responsibility.
[80] Furthermore, I have been provided with numerous cases from both counsel on the issue of parole ineligibility.
[81] The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Sinclair, 2017 ONCA 38, 345 C.C.C. (3d) 1, leave to appeal refused [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 212, at paras. 148-151, reviewed the general principles of parole ineligibility orders. Those general principles are: (1) deterrence and denunciation are relevant considerations in determining the length of parole ineligibility; (2) the general rule of imposing 10 years of parole ineligibility may be ousted by a trial judge’s determination that a longer period of ineligibility is appropriate; and (3) appellate courts should only intervene if the application of an erroneous principle has resulted in a period of parole ineligibility that is clearly or manifestly excessive or inadequate.
[82] In Sinclair, the offender appealed his conviction of second-degree murder and the sentence imposed. The offender shot the victim to death in front of a bus shelter. The trial judge sentenced the offender to the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment and imposed a 14-year period of parole ineligibility.
[83] The court in Sinclair found that the murder occurred in response to a provocative remark directed towards the accused by the victim. There was only one shooter involved in Sinclair and one victim, though it too was in public where there were others who were at risk. There do not appear to have been any elements of planning or deliberation at play in Sinclair.
[84] The offender in Sinclair was 18 years old at the time of the shooting. He had nearly two dozen previous convictions for various offences, including robbery, failure to appear or comply with court orders, and various weapons, firearms and drug offences. At the time of the shooting, the offender was bound by, and in breach of, two separate firearm prohibitions.
[85] In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal in Sinclair, at para. 138, wrote:
In establishing the period of parole ineligibility at 14 years, the trial judge considered the predominance of aggravating over mitigating factors and the high degree of moral culpability associated with the killing in broad daylight, literally at the feet of innocent bystanders including two very young children. The appellant, 18 years old, was walking around armed with a .38 calibre handgun in open defiance of two firearm prohibitions. He made it clear to those with whom he had a verbal contretemps that he was armed and prepared to use his weapon. The only mitigating factors were his age and his expression of remorse at sentencing. Rehabilitative prospects often associated with the youthful offenders were diminished here by the appellant's significant record and his apparent unwillingness to comply with court orders.
[86] There were no Morris-type considerations in Sinclair, nor any significant mitigating factors identified, aside from his expression of remorse at sentencing and his age. The situation is the same here; there a limited number of mitigating factors in this case, but two of them are that Trayonte is a youthful offender and that he has taken responsibility for the offences and expressed remorse.
[87] Another instructive case mentioned earlier is Hayles-Wilson. I will review and comment on this case in depth later in these reasons. For now, a summary of the similarities and distinguishing features will suffice.
[88] The offender in Hayles-Wilson was convicted of second-degree murder after carrying a loaded handgun to a basketball tournament at a community center in Toronto and proceeding to fire eight shots. One person was killed, and another was injured by a stray bullet.
[89] Hayles-Wilson and the case at bar are comparable in many aspects. For example, Hayles-Wilson was quite young at 23 years old. Trayonte was 19. Unlike Trayonte, Hayles-Wilson had no criminal record and had exhibited pro-social tendencies in his youth. However, Hayles-Wilson was similarly implicated a criminal lifestyle. The court found that the actions of Hayles-Wilson were influenced by, and perhaps at the direction of, a criminal organization. That is distinguishable from the case before the court.
[90] In Hayles-Wilson, eight shots were fired by one gunman, as opposed to 17 shots fired in rapid succession by two gunmen. The murder in Hayles-Wilson was a planned murder in a public place, as in the case before me, though it appears to have occurred rather impulsively. Unlike here, the events in Hayles-Wilson unfolded quickly, without time for the accused to deliberate the consequences of his actions. This is a significant distinguishing factor from the case before the court, as there is some evidence of planning and deliberation here.
[91] Hayles-Wilson involved one unarmed murder victim. This too is a significant distinguishing factor from the case before the court; here, there were three victims. Hayles-Wilson was subject to misconducts and lockdowns while in custody, like Trayonte.
[92] Finally, and importantly, Hayles-Wilson was a sentencing after trial. The case at bar is a sentencing after a guilty plea. In addition, Hayles-Wilson was only being sentenced for the murder, whereas here Trayonte is being sentenced for other serious gun and drug crimes, alongside second-degree murder.
[93] Another case is R. v. Paredes, 2014 ONCA 910, 317 C.C.C. (3d) 415. In Paredes, the Ontario Court of Appeal reduced a 15-year parole ineligibility period to 12 years. The offender shot and killed the victim as the victim was walking down the street. Shortly before the shooting, the offender and his co-accused had been evicted from a bar by the bouncers and was angry with the bouncers for evicting him. The Crown contended that the offender fired the gun at the bouncers but missed and hit the victim. The offender pleaded guilty to the lesser included offence of manslaughter, but the plea was not accepted by the Crown. At trial, the offender acknowledged that he had caused the victim’s death. He testified that he had not intended to harm or kill anyone, but only intended to frighten the bouncers. The offender was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility of parole for 15 years. At the time of the offence, the offender was 22 years of age and had no prior record.
[94] The Ontario Court of Appeal, at para. 45, found there were features of that case that distinguished it from many gun violence cases. The offender had a licence for the gun and had purchased the gun lawfully, although his possession of the loaded gun in the bar was itself a serious crime. Most significantly, the offender was 22 years old at the time of the offence, had no criminal record, and no prior involvement with the law or illicit gun use. This offence was very much out of character for the appellant. Bearing in mind the offender’s age, his antecedents and his strong family support, the offender showed high potential for rehabilitation. The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge rightly focused on denunciation and deterrence, the judge lost sight of the offender’s personal circumstances and potential for rehabilitation: Paredes, at para. 48. As a result, the parole ineligibility period was reduced from 15 years to 12: Paredes, at para. 49.
[95] Paredes involved only one victim, in public, at 1:00 a.m. The shooting followed a confrontation the accused had had with the bouncer at a bar, who was the intended target of the shooting. The finding of guilt was based on the principle of transferred intent. In Paredes there were no apparent elements of planning and deliberation, and this offence seems to have occurred impulsively.
[96] Furthermore, Paredes had no criminal record and was not convicted of subsequent firearms and drug trafficking offences, as contrasted to Trayonte. Paredes had a gun license and had purchased this firearm lawfully. By contrast, Trayonte was bound by a weapons prohibition and had no license or authorization to possess a gun.
[97] In this context, the court in Paredes, at para. 45, found that the “offence was very much out of character” for the offender. The court found that the accused had showed real potential for rehabilitation. There is no evidence that supports that contention as it relates to Trayonte, particularly having regard to the October 14, 2021, post murder re-offending.
[98] In R. v. Suthakaran, 2020 ONSC 4245, aff’d 2024 ONCA 50, 433 C.C.C. (3d) 175, the offender was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 12 years. Suthakaran’s friend and another person were fighting, while part of a group of 10 people outside a bar. Suthakaran pulled out a gun and fired a shot at other people but hit and killed the friend instead. The Crown sought parole ineligibility for 13 years. The defence argued that it should be 10 years.
[99] The mitigating factors were that Suthakaran was 21 years old at the time of the offence and had no prior record. He also had family support. The aggravating factors included unlawful possession of a loaded, concealed handgun and that the shooting occurred in a public place with other persons present. These aggravating factors substantially negated any mitigating effect that might be said to flow from the fact that the fatal altercation arose on the sudden: Suthakaran, at para. 14.
[100] Suthakaran differs from the case at bar because it involved a murder in the context of a physical fight between two groups, not an unprovoked ambush. Only one gunshot was fired, and there was only one victim. In addition, the offender had no criminal record and was not convicted of other unrelated violent offences. The court also found there was a strong prospect of rehabilitation, whereas here, Trayonte’s prospect of rehabilitation is questionable.
[101] Other helpful cases include those summarized below.
[102] In R. v. Persaud (1999), 1999 CanLII 1115 (ON CA), 123 O.A.C. 392 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 84, the offender was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 15 years. The 19-year-old offender brought a semi‑automatic gun to a “flea market” where many people were present. He shot the intended victim eight times, killing him, and shot an innocent bystander twice. At the time of the offence, the offender had a youth record, including offences for robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of an offence. The 15-year parole ineligibility was upheld by the Court of Appeal.
[103] The facts of Persaud are limited because this is an appellate decision, but this did occur in a public place. There was only one gunman; there is no mention of elements of planning or deliberation; and this does not appear to have been an ambush, as in the case before me. Further, there is no mention as to whether the murder weapon was recovered or whether there was flight thereafter. There was a youth record, but no post-murder offending.
[104] In R. v. Weese, 2016 ONCA 449, 350 O.A.C. 170, the offender was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 22 years after being found guilty of second-degree murder and four counts of aggravated assault. The offender got into an altercation in a pub in Toronto. He fired 14 bullets outside the bar, hitting six different people and killing one innocent bystander. The offender appealed his conviction and sentence; both were upheld by the Court of Appeal: Weese, at para. 33.
[105] Weese is similar to the case at bar in the following ways: the murder occurred in a public place; multiple people were injured, and one killed; 14 shots were fired; and the offender belonged to a discriminated-against group (Weese is Indigenous). Weese is also distinguishable from this case in many ways. In Weese, there was only one shooter, whereas here there are two. The shooting in Weese followed an earlier argument and wasn’t an ambush. Importantly, the elements of planning and deliberation are absent in Weese; the sentencing came after a trial; the offender had a lengthy criminal record; and the offender was not being sentenced for other serious offences.
[106] The offender in R. v. Ahmed, 2023 ONSC 1364, was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 18-years following the shooting death of the victim. In that case, the offender and co-accused entered the victim’s vehicle while attempting to steal the victim’s car. A struggle ensued and one of the offenders shot the victim three times in the torso, killing him. Both offenders were responsible for his death as co-principals: Ahmed, at para. 12.
[107] The similarities to the case at bar include the following: the offender in Ahmed was young at the time of the offence (he was 18); he grew up in an area in which he was exposed to crime, violence and loss that impacted the decisions he made leading up to the murder; there were two shooters; and the victim was unarmed, defenseless and ambushed. Additionally, the offender in Ahmed was subjected to lockdowns in jail and had misconducts on his record, like Trayonte, though it is unclear how many and what time.
[108] Ahmed can also be distinguished in many ways. As examples, the sentencing came after a trial, not after a guilty plea; the offender had no criminal record and good rehabilitation prospects; the murder occurred in the context of a carjacking; the shooting was impulsive and not as a result of planning and deliberation, though it did occur in the context of a forcible confinement. Further, the murder in Ahmed occurred in a car in a public place. This makes it less aggravating in terms of the danger to others around than the case before me. Last, a significant distinguishing feature is that there was only one victim in Ahmed, as opposed to three in the case at bar.
[109] Next is the oral decision of Bawden J. in R. v. Mohamed, 2021 ONSC 7615. The offender in Mohamed was convicted of murder and manslaughter after shooting and killing two individuals outside a night club in Toronto. The offender and the victims were in confrontations outside the club. When the offender was leaving the area by car, he grabbed a gun from underneath a car seat as he “planned to attack [the victim] and terrorize him with the gun”: Mohamed, at para. 18. When the offender jumped out of the car to rush at the second victim, the first victim punched the offender in the face. The offender then reached into his waistband, took out the handgun and shot the first victim in the head: Mohamed, at para. 19. The second victim ran towards the offender’s car and jumped onto the side of it in attempt to prevent the offender from fleeing: Mohamed, at para. 20. The offender shot the second victim in the chest through the open door of the car: Mohamed, at para. 20. The offender was found guilty of second-degree murder and manslaughter. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 18 years for the former, and 15 years imprisonment for the latter, running concurrently.
[110] There are many similarities between Mohamed and the case at bar. For example, there were two unarmed victims who were initially aware of the accused’s presence; one of the victims succumbed to his injuries; the shooting took place in a public place; the offender was young at the time of the offences (24 years old); he had a rough upbringing characterized by abuse that drove him out of his home into criminality; and he had support in the community.
[111] In contrast, there are also many distinguishing facts, including: the sentence came after a trial rather than following a guilty plea; the offender had no criminal record; the offender was not being sentenced for serious unrelated offences, though he was subject to a weapons prohibition at the time; and the murder occurred in the context of a heated dispute involving one of the victims striking the offender. Furthermore, the manslaughter occurred in the course of the victim frustrating the offender’s attempt to flee.
[112] The key distinguishing factor is that both shootings in Mohamed occurred impulsively; there was no planning and deliberation: Mohamed, at para. 61. This is in stark contrast to the ambushed attack in this case.
[113] Next is Murray. There, the co-accused brothers were convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 20 years for the horrific murder of a 17-year-old boy. The offenders approached the victim as he was leaving an apartment building. They fired several shots at the victim and then cornered him, where one brother shot the victim and the other stabbed him twice. The stab wounds were fatal.
[114] The facts in Murray are as close to first degree murder as it gets, with both planning and deliberation clearly present in the actions of the offenders: Murray, at paras. 20, 22. Murray is similar to the case before the court in that it was a two-on-one targeted attack involving a gun on an unarmed, innocent victim. In addition, the offenders in Murray were on weapons prohibitions orders, as Trayonte was here.
[115] There are also many distinguishing factors between Murray and the case at bar. For example, Murray was a sentencing after a trial, as opposed to a guilty plea, and both offenders in Murray have significant criminal records and significant numbers of misconducts in jail. The murder in Murray took place at 2:00 a.m., and although it occurred in a public place, there was no one around. Moreover, the murder in Murray involved only one victim, as opposed to three. And, neither offender in Murray pled guilty to additional serious and unrelated offences at the same time, as here.
[116] The next case is R. v. Chambers, 2018 ONSC 2070, aff’d 2023 ONCA 444, an oral decision of my colleague, Skarica J. The offender in Chambers was a co-accused and was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 18 years for second degree murder, as well as nine years imprisonment for two counts of aggravated assault, running consecutively. A dispute had broken out over the music being played during a party. During the argument, the offenders pulled out their firearms and aimed them at the partygoers, shooting three people and killing one.
[117] The similarities to this case include there being three unarmed victims, one who died and two who were seriously injured; the offender was young at the time of the offence (he was 23 years old); the offender had a difficult upbringing; and, like Trayonte, the offender completed high school while in custody. The distinguishing features include the sentence being imposed after a trial, not after a guilty plea; the offender had a lengthy criminal record; there were not additional serious unrelated offences charge; and it was not an ambush that involved planning and deliberation.
[118] Another case that was referred to me is R. v. Belic, 2011 ONCA 671. The sentencing decision is lacking in facts; however, what is clear is that the offender was convicted of second-degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault for shooting and killing one person, and shooting and injuring two others at a student pub. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 18 years, and seven years imprisonment for the aggravated assault, running concurrently.
[119] The similarities include the fact that an illegal gun was used to shoot at three unarmed individuals in a public place, killing one and injuring two. In addition, the offender in Belic was young at the time of the offence; he was described by Glass J. as “an adult in his twenties”: Belic, at para. 11. He also had a criminal record beginning when he was a youth. In contrast, Belic is distinguishable from the case before me because Belic was a sentencing after a trial and there was no element of planning or deliberation.
[120] Finally, R. v. Johnson, 2010 CarswellOnt 9357, [2010] O.J. No. 5440 (S.C.), was referred to and considered by me. There, the offender was found guilty of second-degree murder, attempted murder and two counts of discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life. The convictions arise after the offender and an associate robbed a club. There was an altercation between the offender and a security guard; the offender fired three shots, missing the security guard, but hitting and killing an innocent bystander standing outside the club. Another innocent bystander was shot in the chest by a stray bullet but survived the injuries. The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 18 years for the second-degree murder, and 10 years imprisonment on each of the remaining charges.
[121] The similarities between Johnson and the case at bar include the offender was young; had a difficult upbringing; a criminal record and there were multiple victims and one who died. The shooting occurred in a public place. There are also a number of distinguishing features, including that the sentencing occurred after a trial, rather than a guilty plea; the shooting was impulsive and there was no suggestion of planning and deliberation; and there was no weapons prohibition binding the offender in Johnson, as there was for Trayonte.
ANALYSIS:
Parole Ineligibility:
[122] The overarching principles for the determination of parole ineligibility are set out by s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code and include the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offences.
[123] In assessing s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code to decide whether to increase the period of parole eligibility, all the objectives of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 are relevant. Section 718 of the Criminal Code directs that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society by imposing sanctions that reflect enumerated objectives.
[124] Pursuant to ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Code, the principles of sentencing include denunciation, separating the offender from society, providing a sense of responsibility in the offender, and acknowledging the harm done to the victims and the community.
[125] Proportionality is, of course, one of the overarching principles of sentencing. A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
[126] General and specific deterrence are the objectives of sentencing which are most relevant in making this determination in this case, along with denunciation of the unlawful conduct. While rehabilitation is a part of the sentencing equation, it is important to impose a sentence that promotes a sense of responsibility in Trayonte and an acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.
[127] The circumstances of the offence and of the offender must be analyzed to identify the aggravating and mitigating factors.
Aggravating Factors:
[128] First, the murder was carried out with two firearms. In addition to the fact that firearms were used in the commission of this murder, the type of firearms used is also aggravating. It is clear from the 40 calibre and 9mm shell casings left behind at the scene that semi-automatic firearms were used, enabling the two shooters to fire 17 rounds of ammunition at the victims in a matter of seconds.
[129] Second, at the time of the shooting, Trayonte was bound by a weapons prohibition order as a result of his finding of guilt for drug trafficking in 2020. As I noted in Edwards-Lafleur, at para. 43, the fact that he was breaching this court order “would have been clear to him as he went about sourcing out an illicit weapon and ammunition. He made a conscious choice to breach the weapons prohibition.”
[130] The third and most aggravating factor is that the facts support the conclusion that the murder of Keden and the shooting of James and Shaquan had some elements of planning and deliberation. This is in contrast to many of the cases provided by the parties that involved impulsive acts.
[131] Recall that Trayonte and his accomplice stalked the three victims after they drove past his BMW parked outside the Shoppers. The victims’ vehicle then travels through the plaza and comes to a stop behind the Moghul’s Restaurant. Trayonte follows thereafter and passes by this spot, and his vehicle then turns around and passes by the victims’ location again, before circling around the businesses to pass the victims’ location for a third time. The victims’ vehicle was not located on the main thoroughfare of the plaza. It is clear that Trayonte’s acts of circling around to the rear of the plaza multiple times was intentional and in furtherance of surveilling the victims.
[132] After circling past the victims’ car for the third time, Trayonte loops back around and exits the plaza, travelling north on Paramount Drive, and then eastbound on Mistywood Drive. Moments later, Trayonte stops his vehicle just in front of Paramount Place, a complex whose parking lot abuts the rear of Moghul’s restaurant. Trayonte idles just at the entrance of the Paramount Place parking lot for about 30 seconds before continuing east on Mistywood Drive. This location is where he and his accomplice ultimately return to cut through the parking lot.
[133] When Trayonte returned westbound on Mistywood Drive six minutes later, his vehicle was parked facing westbound in the eastbound curb lane. The shooters then exit the car with their hoods up, both wearing masks, which implies an intention to conceal their identities.
[134] Trayonte makes his way through the parking lot towards the victims with his accomplice. By this point, 20 minutes have passed since Trayonte first saw the victims. A further 10 minutes elapsed after that, during which Trayonte staked out a path to take to shoot the three victims.
[135] Together with his accomplice, Trayonte hopped the fence to confront the victims where they had been seen when he was circling the area in his vehicle.
[136] This was not a drug deal, or a robbery gone wrong. In fact, the Agreed Statement of Facts and the video compilation suggest the exact opposite. There was no interaction or engagement with the victims at all prior to Trayonte and his accomplice drawing their guns and opening fire on the unsuspecting victims.
[137] I agree with the Crown’s submission that, based on the totality of the evidence, there can be no doubt that there are some persuasive elements of planning in relation to the murder of Keden. Albeit, I am not concluding that the planning and deliberation has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
[138] The fourth aggravating factor is that this brazen shooting occurred in broad daylight, in a public space, with innocent bystanders in the surrounding area. This was a cowardly execution, involving two armed men ambushing three unarmed men, without provocation.
[139] The fifth aggravating factor at play here is the after-the-fact conduct. This includes the fact that the two firearms that were used in the commission of this shooting have never been recovered. It also includes the offender’s flight, without any contemplation as to the magnitude and destruction of his actions.
[140] The next aggravating factor is that in unleashing 17 rounds of ammunition in rapid succession. Not only was Keden killed, but Shaquan and James were also struck by the gunfire, the latter suffering catastrophic life-altering injuries.
[141] Trayonte’s prior youth record includes findings of guilt in February 2020 for possession of a scheduled substance and fail to comply with a recognizance.
[142] Finally, the emotional impact that this shooting had on the victims, their friends and families.
Mitigating Factors:
[143] Trayonte is remorseful. Both through the reports filed for this hearing and orally in court, he expressed a sincere apology for his actions and the pain he had caused to the victims’ families.
[144] Trayonte has successfully completed numerous self-awareness and other courses while incarcerated. In addition to the coursework, he has been in counselling since he has been in custody and has pursued his education. From the defence materials, it is clear that he has used his time thus far in custody productively.
[145] Of fundamental import to this sentencing decision is the fact that Trayonte pleaded guilty to second degree murder, albeit after the preliminary inquiry was held but after the defence approached the Crown to resolve the case. In my opinion, the fact this was a guilty plea is a significant and meaningful mitigating factor. It clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility and remorse. It avoids a trial and having the victims and the family relive the tragedy in an open forum.
[146] Trayonte’s young age is a further mitigating factor; he was only 19 years old at the time of these offences. He continues to have the support of his family.
[147] Mr. Rusonik has also pointed to the lockdowns as articulated in Trayonte’s tally since his incarceration on October 14, 2021. There is also the issue of the numerous misconducts while incarcerated. That said, the court in Murray noted, at para. 137, that the consensus seems to be that if the court has discretion to take harsh conditions into account in terms of affixing a period of parole ineligibility, this should have little effect. In this regard, I do not follow the approach suggested in R. v. Morales, 2023 ONSC 1607, and prefer the prevailing jurisprudence: see, for example, R. v. Champagne, 2023 ONSC 908, R. v. Corner, 2018 ONSC 1529. To his credit, Mr. Rusonik did not stress this point in oral submissions.
[148] There is also the evidence of anti-Black racism and the offender’s lived experiences as outlined in the IRCA report and other materials filed. He has been subjected to anti-Black racism, to which I will address momentarily.
The Appropriate Range of Sentence:
[149] I need to spend some time to revisit and discuss the ranges of parole ineligibility for second degree murder as discussed in Hayles-Wilson, referenced extensively by both the Crown and defence.
[150] In Hayles-Wilson, Code J. ultimately imposed a period of ineligibility of 15 years after a thorough review of the Ontario authorities. Recall that Hayles-Wilson was 23 years of age and had no prior criminal record, although Code J. noted that he was associated with members of a street gang. Hayles-Wilson was tried on a charge of first-degree murder, but he was convicted of second-degree instead. Code J. seemed to interpret the jury’s verdict as reflecting a doubt on the issue of deliberation, not in relation to whether the killing was planned. He characterized it as “a targeted planned murder”, and “a near first degree murder”: Hayles-Wilson, at paras. 15 and 29.
[151] In Hayles-Wilson the offender had fired eight shots at the victim as he stood in the midst of a crowd of people outside a community centre on the evening of a basketball tournament at which children were in attendance.
[152] In his analysis, Code J. reviewed various cases involving "brazen public shootings" and concluded they fell within three categories: (1) the bottom end of the range of 12-14 years where the circumstances of the offence were less aggravating or there were unusual mitigating circumstances; (2) the top of the range where 18-22 years were imposed in the most serious of cases with the worst offenders; and (3) the middle range of 14-16 years, with a mix of factors. A reference to various cases with similar features was cited in Hayles-Wilson at paras. 18-26, segments of which are referred to below:
[19]At the bottom end of the range are cases where a 12 year parole ineligibility period has been imposed. See: R. v. Maciel, 2007 ONCA 496; R. v. Paredes (2014), 2014 ONCA 910, 317 C.C.C. (3d) 415 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Lewis, 2012 ONSC 2488. All of these cases involved somewhat unusual circumstances that were less aggravating or more mitigating and that justified situating the case towards the bottom end of the range…
[21] At the other end of the spectrum are a number of cases, relied on by the Crown, where parole ineligibility periods of 18 to 22 years have been imposed. See: R. v. Weese, 2016 ONCA 449; R. v. Chambers, 2018 ONSC 2070; R. v. Belic (2008), 76 W.C.B. (2d) 508 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Sarrazin, 2000 Carswell Ont 5078. All of these cases involved more serious offences and worse situated offenders than in the case at bar. In Weese, the accused fired at least 14 shots outside a bar, with a semi-automatic handgun, after an altercation inside the bar. An innocent bystander was killed and six others were wounded. The 26 year old accused had a lengthy criminal record for violence, including a prior shooting, and the trial judge found that there was “no possibility of rehabilitation”. The parole ineligibility period was set at 22 years. In Chambers, the accused shot and killed three persons at a party after a dispute over music. The accused was 23 years old, he had a “lengthy criminal record”, he was “firmly entrenched in the criminal subculture”, and he was a “moderate risk for violent recidivism”. The parole ineligibility period was set at 18 years. In Belic, the accused took a loaded handgun to a student pub, created a confrontation, and shot and killed one person while injuring two others. He was “an adult in his twenties” with “an extensive criminal record reflecting violence”, including a prior firearms prohibition. The parole ineligibility period was set at 18 years. Finally, in Sarrazin the accused shot and killed “a rival gang member” on a public street corner in Ottawa, after what appears to have been some degree of planning and preparation. The accused Sarrazin was the shooter. He had a prior record, described as “not all that serious”, but he was a member of a criminal “street gang”. The parole ineligibility period was set at 18 years.
[22] It can be seen that all four of these cases in the 18 to 22 year parole ineligibility range involved recidivists with prior criminal records, some quite serious, and they involved dangerous public offences with multiple victims, or significant risk to multiple victims, or with gang-related motives.
[23]What remains is the group of cases in the mid-range, where the parole ineligibility period was set between 14 and 16 years. See R. v. Danvers, supra; R. v. Grant (2016), 2016 ONCA 639, 342 C.C.C. (3d) 514 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Doucette (2015), 2015 ONCA 583, 328 C.C.C. (3d) 211 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Monney, supra; R. v. John, 2011 ONSC 3313; R. v. Stewart 2008 CanLII 70846 (ON SC), [2008] O.J. No. 5449 (S.C.J.).
[26]The leading authority in Ontario concerning the need for “exemplary” sentences in these kinds of cases remains Danvers. In that case, the accused murdered a security employee at a crowded night club in Toronto, after he was told to leave the club. The murder was described as “motiveless, impulsive and senseless”, by both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal. In other words, it lacked the aggravating factor of planning that is present in the case at bar. The accused was only 19 years old but he had a relatively serious prior criminal record for drug trafficking and weapons offences. The Court of Appeal held that a 15 year period of parole ineligibility properly balanced the gravity of the particular offence in that case and the youthfulness of the accused.
[153] I note that the Ontario Court of Appeal has not specifically endorsed the ranges identified in Hayles-Wilson. Yet, on appeal, the 15 year sentence was maintained. Nonetheless, the ranges in Hayles-Wilson referenced in Code J.’s decision have been favourably considered by many jurists at this level of court.
[154] I agree with the analysis and adopt the reasoning in Hayles-Wilson as to the parole ineligibility sentencing ranges, with the following modification.
[155] Importantly, the parameters endorsed by Code J. reflect disposition after a trial. Unlike Hayles-Wilson, here, we have a guilty plea. Thus, this particular case is an outlier from many of the homicide cases referred to by counsel and in the jurisprudence.
[156] Hence, with my adherence to the three Hayles-Wilson ranges aforementioned, I now supplement those ranges with a further guideline. In a case involving some elements of planning and deliberation, the use of a firearm, a brazen shooting and murder in public and violence, recidivists with prior criminal records, with a significant risk to multiple victims and the public, the guideline in the 18 to 22 year parole ineligibility range would normally apply.
[157] Yet, it bears repeating that of significance in the matter at bar is a prosecution of a second degree murder charge involving a guilty plea. None of the discussion or guidelines from Hayles-Wilson or its progeny, factor in or adopt that important consideration.
[158] Leaving aside for the moment, any consideration of the Morris factors, I find that with the aforementioned serious aggravating features, and with a guilty plea for second degree murder, (as opposed to disposition after trial) the outcome ought to fall in between the so-called “medium and high range” in Hayles-Wilson. Therefore, I adopt a modification and resolve that range of between 16 to 18 years of parole ineligibility in such circumstances is entirely appropriate and warranted.
Application of the Revised 16 to 18 year Parole Ineligibility Range to this Case:
[159] I return to the issue of anti-Black racism and the offender’s lived social context experiences. I note the following quote from Murray, at para. 125:
There is no question that anti-Black systemic racism exists in our society and our public institutions, including the education system and the judicial system. In addition to the well-known and helpful studies listed at the end of the PSR and those filed as exhibits at sentencing, this issue is established in the case law. As early as 1993, the Ontario Court of Appeal, after referring to a multitude of studies, acknowledged in R. v. Parks that anti-Black racism and negative stereotypes are embedded in our society, including in the criminal justice system. Doherty J.A. held in that case:
I do not pretend to essay a detailed critical analysis of the studies underlying the various reports to which I have referred. Bearing that limitation in mind, however, I must accept the broad conclusions repeatedly expressed in these materials. Racism, and in particular anti-black racism, is a part of our community's psyche. A significant segment of our community holds overtly racist views. A much larger segment subconsciously operates on the basis of negative racial stereotypes. Furthermore, our institutions, including the criminal justice system, reflect and perpetuate those negative stereotypes. These elements combine to infect our society as a whole with the evil of racism. Blacks are among the primary victims of that evil.
[160] I find support for this commentary in the jurisprudence. However, it is clear from Abdulle and Husbands that although moral blameworthiness may be mitigated to some extent by social context evidence, in cases involving serious violent offences, the social context evidence may not significantly diminish the otherwise high level of moral blameworthiness associated with these offences.
[161] The court in Husbands notes, at para. 76:
As previously noted, this court found that even in circumstances where Mr. Morris was carrying a firearm out of “genuine fear” as informed by social context evidence, it only acted as a “limited mitigating factor” and did not significantly diminish his moral blameworthiness.
[162] On the basis of these authorities, as well as those mentioned above, I am persuaded that the systemic racism issues may be relevant to a consideration of the offenders' background and the context in which this offence was committed. Clearly, in minor offences this kind of analysis might have a very substantial impact on the sentence to be given in a particular case. However, as the seriousness and violence of the subject offence increases, so too does the importance of deterrence, denunciation and separation of the accused from society: Murray, at para. 133.
[163] In my view, the impact of systemic racism and how it may have affected moral blameworthiness falls into the same category. It is relevant and it should be considered; but where an innocent man is murdered, as in this case, the impact of systemic racism pales in comparison to the horrific circumstances of the crime.
[164] The nature of the murder, and surrounding circumstances are similar, if not more aggravating than some of the cases proffered for my consideration. This was a dangerous shooting that occurred in a public place; there were multiple victims; there was a risk to other members of the public; and there were some elements of planning and deliberation.
[165] It is on this basis that the Crown submits that Trayonte falls within the high end (and even surpasses) the ranges in Hayles-Wilson. While this is not first degree murder, I am persuaded that the facts demonstrate some elements of deliberation. I find that there was some preparation and scheming in the brief time leading up to locating and shooting Keden and the other two victims. The murder was not entirely spontaneous. That being said, I am not prepared to classify this case as a “near first degree murder” as oft-described in other sentencing decisions.
[166] Despite Ms. Laine’s able submissions, I cannot accede to her ultimate position of an increased period of parole ineligibility. I am unable to distinguish the cases proffered by the prosecution to reach or pierce the 20-year mark.
[167] Moreover, I am not persuaded that the facts of this case or the circumstances of the offence and particular offender warrant surpassing the range established by the jurisprudence, including Hayles-Wilson, and modified by me for this case. As I have revised the “range” for parole ineligibility where a guilty plea has been rendered for an offence of second degree murder in similar circumstances, such inhibits my ability to elevate the ineligibility period to beyond the range as suggested by the Crown.
[168] On the offender’s behalf, Mr. Rusonik urges and invites this Court to make a pronouncement and enhance the Morris principles for parole ineligibility. To that end, he suggests that his client ought to benefit from the plethora of mitigating factors including the materials provided in Dr. Urbanik’s report. This includes but is not limited to his client’s lived experiences, poverty and racism in the social context. Counsel submits that prejudice and racism exist and are, in fact, mirrored within penitentiaries, including in programming, discipline, segregation and the granting of parole.[^1] Counsel submits that his client will do harder time and will suffer a disproportionately longer period before release on parole because of his race.
[169] Further, this court ought not to consider – or limit, the firearms and drug offences in the assessment of parole ineligibility, as it is a distinct concept from the length of sentence. For all of these and other factors referenced by counsel in argument, counsel he urges the court to set parole ineligibility at 10 to12 years.
[170] Mr. Rusonik’s submissions are well thought-out and are very persuasive, if somewhat novel. He submits that with the Hayles-Wilson guidance, this is the proper case to address these general and specific societal issues. While I am persuaded that some of these factors are to be considered, with respect, I must reject the lower range of parole ineligibility proposed by counsel. In my opinion, the suggested approach does not adequately address the principles as set out in the Criminal Code for the circumstances of this offence and of this particular offender. I leave it for another day and another case whether the imposition of parole ineligibility must be fully reflective of the principles as recommended by counsel.
[171] It is not lost on me that Trayonte has been convicted of second-degree murder, a shooting that not only killed a 17-year-old boy, but also resulted in life altering and catastrophic injuries to one victim, and a gunshot wound to another. Particularly, when this shooting event is considered alongside his subsequent offences, including gun possession and serious drug trafficking.
[172] Recall that in Hayles-Wilson, there was only one victim. By comparison, there are three victims in this case. One of these other victims had catastrophic and life-alerting injuries. Moreover, Hayles-Wilson did exhibit some elements of planning, but the events unfolded quickly, in a matter of seconds, so there was no time for deliberation. While I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt there was planning and deliberation, there were certainly some elements of both in this case. In this case, the shooting came to fruition after 20 minutes of the offender observing the victims, and it resulted in a rapid and coordinated ambush.
[173] I considered the time Trayonte has already spent in jail. While the Crown does not dispute that Trayonte was subject to lockdowns at the various institutions, it argues that it carries limited weight. I must contrast this with the evidence of this offender’s behaviour and numerous misconducts, whether instigated or not.
[174] As mentioned, Trayonte is a recidivist and continued to demonstrate anti‑social behaviour post-event. He had continued to engage in violence despite being under a microscope at the jail, despite knowing his behaviour in jail would be scrutinized and despite having received consequences for such misconducts while incarcerated. Even so, the court in Hayles-Wilson commented about this factor, at para. 12, and concluded that harsh pre-trial custody circumstances are not a particularly strong or mitigating factor in the context of determining a period of parole ineligibility for second degree murder.
[175] Accordingly, with due respect to counsel’s able submissions, and while I have considered this factor, I have given it reduced weight in reaching what I consider to be a fit sentence.
[176] Of course, he is not being punished twice for the after-the-fact conduct and offences, but it cannot be ignored when I consider the normative character of the offender and the other relevant factors.
[177] Trayonte stated that he is regretful and apologetic for his own involvement. I accept his expression of regret to the deceased’s family is insightful, but that can only go so far. What is troubling is the fact that he continued to be involved with handguns and drugs post incident, for which he pled to various charges. As mentioned, the overall context causes some concerns but I cannot categorically conclude that there is not some glimmer of hope for rehabilitation.
[178] As mentioned, I give little weight to the social context evidence because it has minimal connection to the conduct and offences at hand. It is clear that the Ontario Court of Appeal endorses the view that where a crime is very serious, social context evidence may have limited or no impact on the determination of moral blameworthiness of the offender: Morris, at paras. 75-77.
[179] Specifically, Trayonte pled guilty to two counts of possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition, contrary to s. 95 of the Criminal Code and one count of possession in breach of an order, contrary to s. 117.01. As well, he pled guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking. Facts were read in with respect to a third loaded firearm located in his home, substantial proceeds of crime and a substantial quantity of cocaine were also seized.
[180] One of these firearms found in Trayonte’s possession is a prohibited firearm due to its barrel length, and the other is a restricted firearm. The third firearm located in Trayonte’s home was also a semi-automatic handgun, a restricted firearm, and loaded with ammunition. The firearms were all carelessly and dangerously stored. Both of the Glock firearms had defaced serial numbers. In addition to the firearms possession, Trayonte also pled guilty to being in breach of his prohibition order. His possession of these loaded firearms was not an impulsive act.
[181] In furtherance of this point, I also consider the court’s comments in Johnson, at paras. 32-33:
The citizens of this city must be protected from individuals who choose to illegally possess weapons and even more importantly, who choose to use those weapons especially in such a premeditated and merciless manner. Individuals who choose to engage in such behaviour must be given the strongest possible message that such conduct simply will not be tolerated and, if it is committed, it will attract the severest of consequences. Severe consequences are also necessary to serve as a clear deterrent to others who might be inclined to engage in such conduct given the manifest danger that it poses for the lives and safety of other people.
It is frustrating that notwithstanding the number of times that the court has sent this message, a small number of members of our community either do not hear it or simply choose to ignore it. The result is that one tragedy follows another that follows another. In the course of all this, entirely innocent people, who are doing nothing more than any citizen of our community ought to be able to do in the course of living their lives, are struck down. Spouses are left without their partners, mothers without their sons and children without their fathers. The misery caused by such conduct spreads far and wide.
[182] The comments from the court in R. v. Kawal, 2018 ONSC 7531, at para. 11, similarly apply (citations omitted):
Handguns are a social evil. The Supreme Court has said and there can be no possible argument against it, “Gun-related crime poses grave danger to Canadians.” The primary purpose of handguns is to maim and to kill. Lawyers and judges see first-hand the destruction wrought by handguns. They are a disease, a plague on our communities. We have the means at our disposal to eradicate or at least to drastically curtail them. It is difficult to understand why our society would not do everything in its power to ensure that handguns are not available for criminal purposes.
[183] The use of firearms to commit this callous murder must be discouraged through the imposition of a sentence emphasizing denunciation and deterrence. Even with the guilty plea, the gravity of Keden’s murder and shooting of other innocent victims cannot be exaggerated. The totality of Trayonte’s actions, and the choices he made with reckless disregard for the safety of not only the victims but others, demonstrates the danger that the offender poses to the public.
CONCLUSION:
[184] I have a joint submission from the Federal Crown and defence counsel for 10 years’ incarceration for the CDSA offence.
[185] With regards to the CDSA, the joint position of 10 years for the fentanyl‑related count is within the range of sentence contemplated by R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, 411 C.C.C. (3d) 1, and its progeny.
[186] The Crown attorney has suggested that an eight year sentence is appropriate on the firearms-related offences alone, and consecutive to the 10 year CDSA charge. I accept these submissions. I also agree with the defence that it is appropriate to reduce this 18 year sentence to take into account the principles of totality and restraint. To that end, I impose a global sentence of 13 years for the CDSA and firearm offences. A forfeiture order is granted.
[187] I am advised that Eccleston has 951 days of pre-sentence custody, plus an additional approximate 110 days to this sentencing date, for a total of approximately 1061 days or 35.3 months. Notwithstanding the repeated misconducts in jail, I am prepared to provide the usual Summers credit at 1.5 to 1, which equates to 1592 days or 53 months: R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575. Therefore, the remaining time to serve on this segment of the sentence, both the firearms and CDSA offences combined, is a net disposition of eight and a half years, concurrent to the murder conviction.
[188] With regards to a conviction for second-degree murder, the imprisonment may continue for the rest of Trayonte’s natural life. Ultimately, it will be for the Parole Board of Canada to decide when, if ever, he has been sufficiently rehabilitated such that he is no longer a danger to others in our society and that he may be released on parole. My determination of the minimum period of time at which the offender will become eligible for release on parole does not necessarily mean that he will be released upon the expiration of whatever period I impose.
[189] In this case, I find that the need for denunciation and specific and general deterrence is paramount and are required at a high level. This, along with the many aggravating factors, requires a parole ineligibility period in the mid-range as set out in the jurisprudence and my modifications as detailed in these reasons. However, this consideration must be proportionate and balanced against the guilty pleas and referenced to the mitigating factors aforementioned.
[190] As discussed in these reasons, I adopt a revised 16 to 18 year range of increased parole ineligibility for second degree murder in such cases; with elements of some planning and deliberation, recidivists with prior records, involving dangerous public offences with firearms, one or more victims, or significant risk to multiple victims, and gratuitous violence, albeit with the mitigation of a guilty plea.
[191] In conclusion, the sentence to be imposed for the second degree murder conviction is as follows: Trayonte Eccleston is to provide a sample of his DNA pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code. I order a s. 109 lifetime weapons prohibition.
[192] In accordance with s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code, the offender is prohibited from communicating, associating or contacting directly or indirectly any member of Keden’s, Shaquan’s or James’ immediate family. A list of names will be provided by the Crown attorney to be included in the order.
[193] Trayonte Eccleston has been found guilty of second-degree murder and is sentenced to imprisonment for life. The life sentence will be noted to have begun from the date of his arrest, on October 14, 2021, with no eligibility for parole for 16 years.
A. J. Goodman, J.
Released: September 3, 2024
COURT FILE NOS.: CR/23-697, 23-678, 23-655
DATE: 2024/09/03
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
- and -
TRAYONTE ECCLESTON
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
A. J. Goodman J.
Released: September 3, 2024
[^1]: Case Study of Diversity in Corrections: The Black Inmate Experience in Federal Penitentiaries. Canadian Civil Liberties Association 2021: Fact Sheet on Anti-Black Racism in Canada’s Justice System. (references omitted).