Court File and Parties
Date: 2020-07-09 Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between: Her Majesty the Queen – and – Aruran Suthakaran
Counsel: Paul Kelly and Levi Vandersteen for the Crown Brian Kolman for Aruran Suthakaran
Heard: July 9, 2020
Reasons for Sentence
MacDonnell, J.
1On February 27, 2020, Aruran Suthakaran appeared before this court and was arraigned on an indictment charging him with the second degree murder of Anik Stewart. On March 18, 2020, after 2 days of deliberation, the jury found Mr. Suthakaran guilty as charged. He is before the court today for sentencing.
2By virtue of ss. 235(1) and 745(c) of the Criminal Code, the sentence to be imposed on Mr. Suthakaran is a term of imprisonment for life without eligibility for parole until he has served at least 10 years. Pursuant to s. 745.4, however, it is open to me, after considering Mr. Suthakaran’s character, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the recommendations of the jury, to increase the period of parole ineligibility from 10 years to a maximum of 25. In R. v. Shropshire, at paragraph 27, Justice Iacobucci stated as follows with respect to the exercise of that discretion:
[As] a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility should be for 10 years, but this can be ousted by a determination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in s. 745.4, the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitability to be released into the general public assessed. To this end, an extension of the period of parole ineligibility would not be ‘unusual’, although in the median number of cases, a period of 10 years might still be awarded.
A. The Statutory Considerations
(i) the nature of the offences and the circumstances surrounding their commission
3I begin with a consideration of the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission.
4The Remedy Lounge and Café was a shisha bar that catered to a clientele of mostly young adults at the corner of Military Trail and Old Kingston Road in Scarborough. Mr. Suthakaran’s girlfriend, Alyssa Rupnarain, frequently attended at Remedy with her friends. Mr. Suthakaran was more of an occasional visitor as were three of his closest friends – Paco Chu, Ashveen Pirabagaran, and the deceased, Anik Stewart.
5Shakkil Shiyamalaraj and his friends were also frequent visitors at the Remedy. Ms. Rupnarain did not like Mr. Shiyamalaraj or his friends, in large part because she found them loud and obnoxious. There was no evidence that Mr. Suthakaran (or Paco Chu, Ashveen Pirabagaran or Anik Stewart) had, prior to the night of the murder, any negative interaction with Mr. Shiyamalaraj or anyone in Mr. Shiyamalaraj’s group.
6At around 11:30 p.m. on the evening of February 14, 2018, Mr. Suthakaran arrived at Remedy and joined Alyssa Rupnarain and a group of their friends at their tables. About an hour later, shortly after 12:30 a.m., Shakkil Shiyamalaraj and five of his friends arrived. They sat down at some tables not far from Mr. Suthakaran and the others. The two groups, however, did not appear to have any interaction with each other inside Remedy at any point that evening.
7Shortly after 1:00 a.m., everyone in Mr. Shiyamalaraj’s group got up, exited from Remedy, and gathered together on the sidewalk just outside of the front door. All of them were looking to the east toward three males who were approaching. Those three males were Anik Stewart, Ashveen Pirabagaran and Paco Chu. The two groups met at the front door. The greetings were not entirely cordial. What the source of the friction was and what was really going on remains a bit of a mystery. Mr. Shiyamalaraj claimed that he had not expected to meet the Stewart group when he went outside. He claimed that he only went outside because one of his friends went out, and he decided to follow him. Paco Chu testified that he and Anik and Ashveen were going to Remedy to meet girls. However, the footage from the security video shows that as he was approaching Remedy he was adjusting his hoodie to cover up his face. Counsel suggested to the jury, and I agree, that we never heard a completely truthful account of what either group was up to that morning.
8After the two groups met, two of Mr. Shiyamalaraj’s friends returned to the area where they had been sitting inside Remedy. Paco Chu also came inside, crossed the floor past the tables where Mr. Suthakaran and his group were seated, turned around, and began to head back to the exit. As he did so, Mr. Suthakaran got up and approached him. They appeared to have a very brief exchange, and then the two of them walked out of Remedy together. Within seconds, the two friends of Mr. Shiyamalaraj who had come back in also walked out to the front of Remedy.
9There were now 10 persons outside: the six persons in Shakkil Shiyamalaraj’s group – the three persons who had just arrived – Anik Stewart, Ashveen Pirabagaran and Paco Chu – and Mr. Suthakaran.
10Paco Chu said that when he tried to exit, someone stopped him, told him to go back inside and pulled down the part of the hoodie that was covering his face. Then, he said, he was punched and a brawl erupted. The video footage shows that when the fight started, Ashveen, Paco and two of Mr. Shiyamalaraj’s friends moved to the left away from the front door, toward Military Trail, onto the lawn area. Three of the others in Mr. Shiyamalaraj’s group remained near the front door. Very quickly, within four or five seconds of the eruption of the brawl, Shakkil Shiyamalaraj and Anik Stewart squared up to fight toward the far end of the walkway, at the corner of the building. Mr. Shiyamalaraj was closer to the front door, which was behind him. Mr. Suthakaran was just to the left of Anik, and somewhat to his rear, but largely out of the field of view of the video camera because he was mostly around the corner.
11At one point, the video shows Mr. Shiyamalaraj with his arms extended out from his sides and up in the air. Mr. Shiyamalaraj did not disagree that his right hand had the appearance of making a gun gesture, although it was not suggested that he actually was holding a gun. Mr. Shiyamalaraj testified, and I accept, that he was taunting Mr. Stewart. The fight between Mr. Shiyamalaraj and Anik Stewart was relatively brief: 17 seconds after the brawl had begun, and perhaps 12 or 13 seconds after Shakkil and Anik had faced off, Anik suddenly collapsed to the ground. He had been mortally wounded by a single gunshot that had struck him on the upper left side of his skull, a bit to the rear of the ear. The bullet penetrated the skull and travelled through the brain, from left to right and from back to front.
12As I have said, at the time when Anik Stewart was shot there were 10 persons, including Mr. Stewart, at the front of Remedy. What seven of those persons were doing at the time the shot was fired can be seen on the video footage and it was plain that none of them fired the shot. That left only Mr. Shiyamalaraj or Mr. Suthakaran. However, at the precise moment when Mr. Stewart was shot, a view of Mr. Shiyamalaraj and Mr. Suthakaran was either blocked or partially blocked by the front door of Remedy, which had briefly opened. The position of the defence was that the jury should find that Shiyamalaraj was the shooter. The position of the Crown was that the jury should find that it was Mr. Suthakaran. The Crown argued that Mr. Suthakaran meant to shoot Mr. Shiyamalaraj but by accident or mistake hit Mr. Stewart. Accordingly, the Crown argued, that Mr. Suthakaran was guilty of murder pursuant to s. 229(b) of the Criminal Code.
13The jury was instructed that they could not return a verdict of guilty of murder unless they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Suthakaran fired the shot that killed Mr. Stewart, that he fired it intentionally (i.e., that the gun was not discharged accidentally), and that he either meant to kill Mr. Shiyamalaraj or to cause him bodily harm that he knew was likely to kill him and he was reckless whether he died or not. All of those facts, therefore, were essential to the jury’s verdict. Section 724(2) of the Criminal Code provides that following a trial before a court composed of a judge and jury, a sentencing judge “shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty”. The jury was also instructed that they could not return a verdict of guilty of any offence unless they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Suthakaran was not acting in the lawful defence of Anik Stewart. Once again, that finding was essential to the jury’s verdict and must be accepted.
14Section 724(2) further provides that in addition to accepting any facts that were essential to the jury’s verdict, the judge may find to be proven any other relevant fact that was disclosed by the evidence at the trial. Where there is a dispute with respect to an “other relevant fact”, further evidence is required unless the sentencing judge is satisfied that sufficient evidence was adduced at the trial. Generally, the judge must be satisfied of the existence of a disputed fact on the balance of probabilities, but if the fact is an aggravating fact the judge must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. Sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to satisfy me beyond a reasonable doubt of the following additional facts:
(i) Mr. Suthakaran’s acquisition and possession of the handgun that he used to shoot Mr. Stewart was unlawful;
(ii) Mr. Suthakaran armed himself with a loaded handgun, which he concealed somewhere on his person, before making his way to Remedy on the evening of February 14. The only reasonable inference is that he did so anticipating that an occasion for the use of the gun might arise. In my view, this substantially negates any mitigating effect that might be said to flow from the fact that the fatal altercation arose on the sudden. I accept, however, that he did not anticipate an altercation specifically with Mr. Shiyamalaraj or with Mr. Shiyamalaraj’s friends.
(iii) When, in the course of the altercation between Mr. Shiyamalaraj and Anik Stewart, Mr. Suthakaran pulled the gun out and fired at Mr. Shiyamalaraj, Mr. Stewart was not in need of Mr. Suthakaran’s help to defend himself. Mr. Stewart was engaged in a run-of-the-mill fist fight and he was holding his own. Mr. Shiyamalaraj was not armed with a weapon of any kind, nor was there any evidence that Mr. Suthakaran believed that he was. Shooting at Mr. Shiyamalaraj in the circumstances was completely unnecessary to assist Mr. Stewart and in any event was manifestly unreasonable.
(iv) Discharging a firearm in the manner and place that he did was very dangerous. As Mr. Kelly pointed out in his sentencing submissions, the fact that Mr. Suthakaran hit Mr. Stewart rather than his intended target, Mr. Shiyamalaraj, illustrates the manifest danger of firing a handgun into the middle of a crowded and chaotic scene. There were seven other persons to the rear of the intended target, Mr. Shiyamalaraj. The shot hit Mr. Stewart but it could as easily have hit any one of the others.
(v) I infer from the fact that the shot struck Mr. Stewart on the upper side portion of his head that the gun was pointed in the direction of Mr. Shiyamalaraj’s head when it was fired. In the circumstances, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Suthkaran had the specific intent to cause death, as opposed to an intent to cause bodily harm that Mr. Suthakaran knew was likely to cause death.
(vi) After the shot was fired, and after Mr. Stewart had collapsed to the ground, Mr. Suthakaran briefly became engaged with Mr. Shiyamalaraj, attempting to strike him. Within seconds, however, Mr. Suthakaran fled from the scene on foot. He made no attempt to determine the extent of Mr. Stewart’s injury, to render assistance, or to call anyone for assistance. Put bluntly, he left his friend to die where he fell.
(ii) the character of the offender
15The second matter that a sentencing judge is required to take into account in making decisions with respect to parole ineligibility is the character of the offender.
16Mr. Suthakaran was born on September 2, 1996 in Sri Lanka. He was 21 years of age at the time of the murder of Anik Stewart, and he is 23 years old now. He is single and has no dependents. He came to Canada with his parents and his older brother when he was 8 years of age. His brother is now a Canadian citizen. Mr. Suthakaran and his mother are permanent residents. His father is now residing in the United States after being required to leave Canada due to immigration issues. His father’s deportation was difficult for Mr. Suthakaran, who is very close to him. His brother believes that after the deportation Mr. Suthakaran was not able to focus on school.
17Mr. Suthakaran described his parents as loving and supportive and his family as close-knit. His mother and brother confirmed that characterization. His mother and brother told the author of the Pre-sentence Report that he is a good and respectful person who has never displayed any violent tendencies or anger issues, and they continue to offer him their support. In a letter to the court, Mr. Suthakaran’s brother described him as “a kind, caring and genuine human being”. In a further letter, his mother said that he was “a very kind hearted soul” who “always made himself available for anyone that needed help”, and that “he has always had everyone’s best interest at heart… just to make sure that everyone was happy and smiling.”
18Both Mr. Suthakaran’s mother and brother made reference to the fact that they have not been able to visit him over the past 4 months due to the Covid 19 lockdowns. His brother indicated that this has been hard on Mr. Suthakaran, but there is no evidence from Mr. Suthakaran himself to flesh out what the impact has been.
19There is no history of mental health or substance abuse issues. Mr. Suthakaran is one credit short of his high school diploma. He had intended to attend college for auto mechanics or plumbing. He has had some employment in the past doing renovations with his father, and he subsequently worked in a drug store. He had been contributing to the family finances. He has no prior criminal history.
20The author of the Report noted that Mr. Suthakaran was polite and co-operative with her. I also note that Mr. Kelly fairly volunteered that throughout the history of this case Mr. Suthakaran and the members of his family have been nothing but respectful to the Crown and the court. Mr. Kelly further acknowledged that the very strong family support that Mr. Suthakaran has bodes well for his rehabilitation.
21Pursuant to s. 726 of the Criminal Code, Mr. Suthakaran was given an opportunity to address the court at the conclusion of the sentencing submissions of counsel. At that time, his counsel read into the record a statement written by Mr. Suthakaran in which he described the pain that he feels for the loss of his close friend Anik Stewart. I accept that the pain is genuine, but, to be clear, the statement does not constitute evidence of remorse, as Mr. Suthakaran, as is his right, continues to deny that he was the person who shot Mr. Stewart.
(iii) the recommendations of the jury
22The third matter that a sentencing judge must consider when determining an appropriate period of parole ineligibility in a murder case is any recommendation made by the jury. After retiring to consider the matter, the foreperson announced that two jurors declined to make any recommendation and that the remaining ten jurors recommended leaving the ineligibility period at ten years.
B. The Victim Impact Statements
23Victim impact statements from Anik Stewart’s mother, Petronia, and his sisters Saniya and Aliyah were presented in the course of the sentencing proceedings. Those statement were both eloquent and poignant, and it is apparent from them that Anik was a caring, loving and much loved son and brother, whose loss has profoundly affected his family.
C. The Positions of the Parties
24On behalf of the Crown, Mr. Kelly submitted that the appropriate period of parole ineligibility in this case is 13 years. On behalf of Mr. Suthakaran, Mr. Kolman submitted that the period should either be left at the statutory minimum or be fixed in the 10 to 12 year range. Mr. Kolman further submitted that some credit should be given for the restrictive conditions inmates in correctional facilities have been subjected to as a result of the Covid 19 pandemic.
D. The Applicable Principles
25A period of parole ineligibility is part of the life sentence of imprisonment that is mandatory for an offender convicted of second degree murder. Accordingly, in determining what period of ineligibility should be imposed, the general sentencing principles set forth in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code must be taken into account: R. v. Shropshire, supra, at paragraphs 23-24; R. v. Millard, 2018 ONSC 1299, at paragraph 29; R. v. Granados-Arana, 2018 ONSC 1756, at paragraph 34.
26The fundamental purpose of sentencing “is to contribute… to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of [six] objectives.” (Criminal Code, s. 718) Those objectives include the denunciation of unlawful conduct, deterrence of the offender and others who might be similarly tempted, separation of the offender from society where necessary, rehabilitation, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender. Whatever sanction is imposed must comport with the fundamental principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. (Criminal Code, s. 718.1) In addition, a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. (Criminal Code, s. 718.2(b))
E. Discussion
27In an effort to assist the court in arriving at a sentence that would be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances counsel have referred to a number of sentencing authorities in relation to parole ineligibility in cases, like the case at bar, that involved homicides arising from brazen public shootings. In particular they have referred to R. v. Danvers, [2005] O.J. No. 3532 (C.A.); R. v. Doucette, 2015 ONCA 583; R. v. Zekarias, 2014 ONCA 910; R. v. Badiru, 2012 ONCA 124; and R. v. Hayles-Wilson, 2018 ONSC 4337. The periods of parole ineligibility imposed in those cases ranged from 12 to 15 years.
28As I noted at the outset of these reasons, in Shropshire the Supreme Court of Canada stated that “as a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility should be for ten years, but this can be ousted by a determination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in s. 745.4, the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitability to be released into the general public assessed.” The Ontario Court of Appeal has made it clear, with respect to murders arising from brazen gun violence in public places, that the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission will normally require a period of ineligibility beyond the statutory minimum. In Danvers, for example, at paragraphs 77 and 78, the Court of Appeal endorsed the observation of the trial judge that “the use of handguns in public places cries out for lengthy increased periods of parole ineligibility” in order to protect the public. The Court stated: “There is no question that our courts have to address the principles of denunciation and deterrence for gun related crimes in the strongest possible terms.” See also Zekarias, at paragraph 44, and Doucette, at paragraphs 59-60. I am satisfied that this fact alone justifies an increased period of ineligibility for parole for Mr. Suthakaran. The more difficult question is the extent to which the period should be increased.
29In Danvers, the shooting occurred inside a nightclub in the presence of some 400 people. The offender had been asked to leave the premises by a security guard. When he refused to go, the security guard attempted to take hold of him. The offender produced a handgun and fired four shots, at least one of which struck the security guard, killing him. The trial judge imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 18 years. The Court of Appeal held that the appropriate period was 15 years.
30Having regard to the location of the shooting – inside a crowded nightclub – and the number of shots fired, as well as the identity of the victim, it is arguable that the murder in Danvers was further along the seriousness spectrum than the case at bar. But whether it was or was not, the defendant in Danvers was a worse offender. Although he was only 19, he had fourteen prior convictions, which included two convictions for drug trafficking, six for weapons offences, one for assault with intent to resist arrest, and five for failing to comply with court orders. Mr. Suthakaran, on the other hand, has no prior criminal record.
31In Doucette, the Court of Appeal upheld the imposition of a 15-year period of ineligibility. The 20-year-old offender was angry with the victim as a result of an altercation between them in a bar. When the victim left the bar, the offender approached him, pulled a gun, and shot him three times. A fourth shot wounded a friend of the victim. On those facts, the shooting was somewhat more cold-blooded than the shooting in the case at bar. Further, unlike this case, it involved the firing of multiple shots. In addition, at paragraph 62 of his reasons, Justice Doherty stated: “The appellant acknowledged in his evidence that he routinely carried a loaded handgun on the streets of Toronto. He was on bail at the time he shot [the deceased] and the terms of his bail prohibited him from possessing a firearm. He was also in violation of a curfew term of that bail. The appellant has a criminal record that includes an assault and a threatening charge.” In other words, once again, Mr. Doucette was a worse offender than Mr. Suthakaran.
32In Hayles-Wilson, Justice Code imposed a period of ineligibility of 15 years after a thorough review of the Ontario authorities. Mr. Hayles-Wilson was 23 years of age, and, like Mr. Suthakaran, he had no prior criminal record, although Justice Code noted that he was associated with members of a street gang, who had assisted him in his ten-month long effort to avoid arrest. What significantly elevated the situation for sentencing purposes, however, and what clearly distinguishes that case from this one, is Justice Code’s finding that the murder was planned. Mr. Hayles-Wilson was tried on a charge of first degree murder but he was convicted instead of second degree. Justice Code interpreted the jury’s verdict as reflecting a doubt on the issue of deliberation, not in relation to whether the killing was planned. He characterized it as “a targeted planned murder”, and “a near first degree murder”. Neither of those descriptions can fairly be applied to the murder committed by Mr. Suthakaran. In addition, the particular circumstances of the shooting were more serious in Hayles-Wilson. The offender had fired eight shots at the victim as he stood in the midst of a crowd of people outside a community centre on the evening of a basketball tournament at which children were in attendance. It should be noted as well that seven of the jurors in that case recommended an increased period of ineligibility: two recommended 15 years, two recommended 18 years, and three recommended 20 years. As I have said, none of the jurors in the case at bar recommended any increase in the period of ineligibility.
33In Badiru, the murder occurred in the basement of an after-hours club. The victim became involved in a fist fight with the offender’s brother in law. As the owner of the club and a bouncer were separating the combatants, the offender walked into the room with a handgun and fired 3 or 4 shots at the victim. One of the shots struck the victim in the neck, killing him instantly. The utility of this case as a sentencing precedent is somewhat limited in that it contains no information in relation to the offender’s antecedents. In any event, the trial judge imposed a 13-year period of parole ineligibility. A Crown appeal seeking to increase that period was dismissed.
34The case that I find to be of the greatest assistance is Zekarias. Like the case at bar, it was a case where the offender’s liability for murder was based on the principle of transferred intent. The offender and a friend had been evicted from a tavern on Yonge Street in downtown Toronto. The offender, who was armed with a loaded handgun, was angry at this, and after being ejected he pulled out the gun and fired a shot at the bouncers. The shot missed its targets but killed a pedestrian who had the misfortune to be simply walking along the street at the time. One juror recommended that the period of parole ineligibility be increased to 12 years. None of the remaining jurors recommended an increase. The trial judge ordered that the offender serve 15 years before becoming eligible for parole. On appeal, Justice Doherty acknowledged that the need to denounce and deter gun violence justified some extension of the period of parole ineligibility. He then stated, at paragraph 45:
There are however features of this case which distinguish it from the vast majority of crimes involving gun violence, particularly homicides. The appellant had a licence for the gun and had purchased the gun lawfully, although his possession of the loaded gun in the bar was itself a serious crime. Most significantly, the appellant who was 22 years old at the time of the offence had no criminal record and no prior involvement with the criminal law or illicit gun use. This offence was very much out of character for the appellant. Bearing in mind the appellant's age, his antecedents and his strong family support, there is good reason to think that the appellant could one day be a responsible and productive member of the community.
35In the result, Justice Doherty held, a 12-year period of parole ineligibility would be appropriate.
36There are many parallels that can be drawn between Zekarias and the case at bar, both in relation to the circumstances of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. One distinction, which the Court of Appeal specifically mentioned, was that the offender in that case had acquired the handgun lawfully and had a license for it. Further, the offender in that case acknowledged that he was guilty of an illegal and dangerous use of a handgun. To that extent, there was an acceptance of responsibility: what was in issue was whether he intended to shoot anyone when he fired the gun. There is no indication in this case that Mr. Suthakaran accepts any responsibility for what happened to Anik Stewart. On the other hand, it appears that by his misbehavior in the tavern, which had led to his ejection, the offender in Zekarias had instigated the chain of events that led to the fatal firing of the gun. The same cannot be said of Mr. Suthakaran.
F. Conclusions
37Bearing in mind, then, the nature and circumstances of the offences, the character of the offender, and the recommendations of the jury, what is the total period of parole ineligibility that would be appropriate for Mr. Suthakaran? In answering that question, all of the principles and objectives of sentencing must be taken into account, including the principle that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.
38Mr. Suthakaran has no criminal antecedents, he has significant family support, and he is still a young man. His prospects for rehabilitation, therefore, are very strong. However, the circumstances surrounding the murder he committed – which involved gun violence in a public place with 9 other persons present – fully engage the need repeatedly recognized by the Court of Appeal for denunciation and deterrence. In my view, that is a pressing need, and in all of the circumstances of this case it leads inexorably to the conclusion that an increase in the period of parole ineligibility is required. In coming to that conclusion I bear in mind that all ten of the jurors who made a recommendation recommended that the period be left at ten years. Seeking the input of the jury in relation to parole ineligibility is not a mere exercise in public relations. As the members of the community selected to sit in judgment of the offender, their opinions are a valuable insight into the degree of his moral culpability and I am statutorily bound to take those opinions into account. It must be said, however, that the jury had no information that would enable them to take into account, as I must, the principle that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. As a review of the sentencing authorities demonstrates, in order to comport with that principle a period of ineligibility beyond the statutory minimum is required.
G. Disposition
39On the count of second degree murder, Mr. Suthakaran is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life without eligibility for parole until he has served 12 years of the sentence. On the basis of the record before me I do not propose to reduce that period on account of the lockdowns due to the Covid 19 pandemic.
40Because Mr. Suthakaran has been convicted of an indictable offence involving the use of violence that is punishable by imprisonment for 10 years or more, an order under s. 109(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is mandatory, although the duration of the order is discretionary. In the circumstances of this case I direct that the order be for life.
41Murder is an offence listed in paragraph (a) of the definition of “primary designated offence” in s. 487.04 of the Criminal Code and accordingly a DNA order is mandatory. Pursuant to s. 487.051(1), I authorize the taking of the number of bodily samples reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis.
MacDonnell, J.