Danielle Gendron

This is a costs endorsement following a successful Motion to Change brought by the respondent, Marcel Marriott, with the exception of spousal support.

The applicant, Kim Marriott, failed to submit her cost outline or submissions despite multiple reminders, leading to the respondent's costs request proceeding unopposed.

The court found that the respondent's formal offers to settle would have placed the applicant in a better position than the motion's outcome.

The applicant's conduct regarding increased transportation costs was deemed unreasonable.

The court reviewed the respondent's Bill of Costs and, considering the factors in s. 24(12) of the Family Law Rules, fixed costs at $9,500 to be paid by the applicant to the respondent.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a final consent order regarding child and spousal support, and sought reimbursement for travel expenses incurred due to the applicant mother's unilateral relocation with the children.

The court denied the termination of spousal support, upholding the original order's terms.

However, child support was retroactively adjusted based on updated incomes and the children's status as dependants.

The court ordered the applicant to reimburse the respondent for past travel expenses, offsetting the respondent's child support arrears to nil, and mandated the applicant to share future travel responsibilities for parenting time.

The parties brought competing motions to change a 2019 consent order that provided for shared care and joint decision-making of their five-year-old child.

The mother had relocated to Woodville and sought primary care and sole decision-making, citing a history of family violence, criminal charges against the father, and a complete breakdown in communication.

The father sought an order forcing the mother to return to Barrie to resume the shared parenting arrangement.

The court found a material change in circumstances, noting the father's abusive conduct and the unworkable communication dynamic.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making and primary residence in Woodville, and ordered the father to pay child support based on an imputed income.

The applicant father sought to change a final parenting order to obtain primary care and decision-making for the parties' two children.

The children had been living with the applicant since the respondent mother suffered a mental health breakdown in 2019.

The applicant subsequently relocated with the children to Orillia without the respondent's consent.

The court found that the applicant had perpetrated family violence against the respondent and acted in bad faith by relocating.

However, the court determined it was in the children's best interests to remain in the applicant's primary care, as they were stable, doing well in school, and expressed a strong preference to stay with him.

The applicant was granted final decision-making authority, and his request to impute income to the respondent for child support was dismissed.

Following a 10-day family law trial regarding parenting and financial issues, the successful applicant sought full recovery costs of $137,432.

The court found that the respondent's litigation behaviour was unreasonable and included instances of bad faith, particularly concerning financial disclosure and malicious actions regarding daycare subsidies.

However, the court disallowed the costs of the applicant's second counsel as the matter was not extremely complex.

The court ordered the respondent to pay costs fixed at $90,000.

The respondent sought an order for costs against the applicant's counsel under Rule 24(9) of the Family Law Rules, alleging that counsel had caused unnecessary costs by advising the applicant to breach a temporary parenting order and withhold parenting time.

The court found that counsel's actions did increase costs and constituted ethical breaches, including advising a client to disobey a court order and attempting to act as both witness and advocate.

However, given counsel's recent call to the bar, contrition, and the absence of dishonest or bad faith intent, the court declined to award costs against him, emphasizing that such orders are to be made sparingly and require an element of mala fides beyond mere incompetence.

The two accused were charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching in relation to a 15-year-old complainant.

The complainant had run away from a group home and arranged to meet the accused, presenting herself as 17 years old.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activities, or that she lacked the capacity to consent due to intoxication.

Furthermore, the court held that the Crown failed to prove that the accused did not honestly believe the complainant was at least 16 years old, or that they failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain her age under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

Both accused were acquitted on all counts.

The accused, charged with trafficking in heroin and possession of the proceeds of crime, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of the trial was approximately 32 months.

The court analyzed the delay using the Morin framework and concluded that the institutional delay was 14 months and 3 days, which fell short of the 18-month guideline for Superior Court cases.

Finding that the prejudice suffered by the accused stemmed from being charged rather than the delay itself, the court dismissed the application.

The accused was tried for three counts of robbery using a firearm and one count of breach of probation arising from a home invasion robbery.

The evidence established that the accused and an accomplice attended the victims’ apartment intending to steal property and assault the occupant, while another participant wielded a sawed‑off shotgun.

The court rejected the accused’s claim that he was unaware of the firearm and accepted evidence from multiple witnesses that the firearm had been displayed and discussed beforehand.

Applying party liability under s. 21 of the Criminal Code, the court held that the accused knowingly participated in a common plan to commit a robbery in which a firearm would be used.

The accused was therefore convicted of three counts of robbery with a firearm and breach of probation.