Introduction

[1] This was the trial of two motions to change brought by each of the parties concerning the parenting of the parties’ child, C.P., who was, at the time of trial, nearly five years of age.

[2] Pursuant to a consent order made by Eberhard J. on November 25, 2019, the parties had been, until November, 2023, sharing care of C.P. on a week about schedule. They also had agreed to joint decision-making. Unfortunately, that parenting plan proved to be spectacularly unsuccessful. It was continued notwithstanding seven extremely serious criminal charges against the Respondent, a subsequent reconciliation, a move by the Applicant from Barrie to Woodville and a history of serious disagreements between the parties that put the health and best interests of C.P. in jeopardy.

[3] The charges have resulted in an untenable situation. C.J.P. is subject to bail conditions which prevent him from communicating with M.A.J. Since the charges were laid on December 29, 2019 and the parties separated a second time in May, 2020, they have been unable to communicate between one another, yet are expected to share decision-making. C.J.P. ignored the direction by Justice Eberhard to change those bail conditions to permit communication notwithstanding the fact that he was seeking a continuation of shared care and decision-making at this trial. Because of this, for the past four years, M.A.J. has had to communicate about C.P. through C.J.P.’s sister, Michele Boileau. That was not much better than communicating directly as Ms. Boileau was clearly a strong advocate for C.J.P. as was demonstrated by her role as a “McKenzie Friend” at this trial at the request of C.J.P. However, any communication between the parties through a third party has its share of difficulties as something always gets lost in the translation. C.J.P. is largely responsible for this situation continuing as he failed to change his criminal undertaking.

[4] As well, on June 1, 2023, M.A.J. had to leave her parents’ home in Barrie where she had lived for the years subsequent to the May, 2020 separation of these parties. Her parents sold their home because they could not afford a home in both Arizona (where they are retiring) and Barrie. She moved in with her boyfriend and his mother who lived in the village of Woodville near Lindsay. She said that she gave notice and asked for C.J.P.’s consent to the move which was not forthcoming. She did this without permission by the court and, considering the fact that it made the shared arrangement more difficult, she should have done all she could to do to obtain the court’s permission. However, she has been living in Woodville since then with her boyfriend, his mother and C.P.’s stepsister, Ava, M.A.J.’s daughter from another earlier relationship. At trial, C.J.P. has asked for an order for C.P.’s return to Barrie.

[5] This matter was set down for a three day hearing by Justice Gunsolus by endorsement dated June 2, 2022. It was not reached during the sittings in either November, 2022 or May, 2023.

[6] In the meantime, C.P. was due to start junior kindergarten in September, 2023. The parties could not agree as to where C.P. would attend school and as a result, C.P. had missed more than two months of school before this matter was called for trial in November, 2023. C.J.P. requested an adjournment of the trial and a lawyer, Ms. Carol Allen, attended to say that she would be acting as trial counsel for C.J.P. if the trial was adjourned. C.J.P. said that there was no possible way that he could do the trial on his own and was extremely emotional. I was not willing to adjourn the trial if arrangements could not be made to ensure that C.P. attend at school as any child was entitled to do. The matter was adjourned to the May, 2024 sittings on terms that C.P. could attend school in Woodville and that he would live primarily with the Applicant Mother during the school year. C.J.P. testified at trial that he felt that he was forced into this consent but he really was not. He was not ready to proceed to trial notwithstanding the fact that the matter had been originally set down by Gunsolus J. on June 2, 2022 for argument of the motions to change, and was not reached over several sittings until November, 2023. I note that when C.J.P. showed up for this trial on May 21, 2024, he still did not have counsel and was as unprepared as he was in November, 2023, claiming that every lawyer in Barrie who took legal aid (including the Family Law Advice Counsel at the Family Law Information Centre) was conflicted out because they had all seen M.A.J. at one point or another. Ms. Allen was nowhere to be seen and never went on the record.

[7] In their respective motions to change, each party requested primary care and decision-making concerning C.P. with supervised parenting time to the other. However, when trial opened, the positions had changed substantially. C.J.P., the original moving party and the first to file a motion to change, asked that M.A.J. be made to move back to Barrie so that the parties could resume the shared arrangement that they originally had under the order of Eberhard J. He abandoned his claim for supervised parenting time but asks for an order for sole decision-making concerning C.P. in his favour.

[8] M.A.J. maintained that she should be able to remain in Woodville and have primary care and decision-making concerning C.P. She also abandoned her claim for supervised parenting time to C.J.P.

[9] There was an OCL investigation which was completed on May 28, 2021. That investigatory report was generally critical of M.A.J. and more complementary to C.J.P. but made no recommendations on the crucial matters before the court, decision-making and parenting time. It is fairly dated and was nearly three years old at the commencement of the trial. Notwithstanding attempts by the court and the parties to re-engage the OCL for an update to the report, there was no response by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

[10] Pursuant to the trial scheduling endorsement of Justice Gunsolus, the evidence of the parties was to be provided by affidavits filed by the parties. Both parties filed updating affidavits and also entered previous affidavits filed in the course of the proceedings as their evidence in chief. Both parties were cross-examined and provided brief oral evidence in chief as well. The OCL investigator, Stephanie Kuiak, also testified.

[11] A further issue before the court is child support, which is dependent on the placement of the child and the relocation issue. Both parties seek an order imputing income to the other pursuant to s. 19(1) of the Child Support Guidelines.[^1] However, C.J.P. failed to file a financial statement or provide any proof of his income. The court was left with little or no evidence to determine what child support was payable by him.

Result

[12] For the reasons set out below, I have determined that the final order shall be varied as follows:

a. The Applicant shall have sole decision-making authority concerning C.P.

b. C.P. will have his primary residence with the Applicant in Woodville. The request by the Respondent that M.A.J. and C.P. return to Barrie is dismissed.

c. The Respondent shall have parenting time as he receives at present.

d. The Respondent shall pay child support to the Applicant in the amount of $461 per month based upon his income which I find to be $50,000 per annum.

Analysis

[13] The issues in this matter are as follows:

a. Should M.A.J. be ordered to return to Barrie to resume the week about shared care schedule? Or should she be allowed to remain in her present situation and have primary care of C.P.?

b. Should the provision in the order for joint custody (decision-making) be varied to give one or the other of the parties sole decision-making.

c. What child support is payable and by whom?

[14] As the parties have presented seriously divergent versions of the facts, especially regarding family violence, I am first going to address the credibility of both of the parties. Then I will address the parenting issues in the context of the best interests of the child. Finally, I will address child support which is, of course, dependent on the residency of the child.

Credibility of the Parties

[15] As noted above, both parties testified at the trial.

[16] The first person to testify was the Respondent, whose case went first as he filed the initial motion to change. I found his evidence to be less than credible for a number of reasons.

[17] Firstly, he was extremely evasive and inconsistent during cross-examination. For example, when he was being questioned about a set of criminal charges being withdrawn when M.A.J. was pregnant with C.P., he said that he did not remember that far back. Then when asked if he had gone with M.A.J. to have her recant those charges, he suddenly had a good memory “that far back”, denying that he had gone with her and had waited down the street while she met with the police.

[18] He also testified that he was concerned about seven absences noted on C.P.’s February, 2024 report card, suggesting that the Applicant was not getting C.P. to school. Immediately after that statement, he was confronted by counsel regarding a bout with Scarlet Fever that C.P. suffered from in 2023; he acknowledged that he was aware of this (although he said that he did not know that it was Scarlet Fever) and had also had a make up weekend as a result of that illness. He was disingenuous when he said that he was “concerned” about seven absences noted in the report card when he very well knew why C.P. had been absent from school.

[19] His evidence was also simply unbelievable. When testifying about the consent to the final order made by Eberhard J. in November, 2019, he was asked if he and M.A.J. had fought that day about a ring that M.A.J. alleged was a family heirloom that he refused to return. He denied that there was any fight about the ring, stating that it was lost in a vehicle and never recovered and that M.A.J. was aware of this. He suggested that there was nothing to fight about as the ring was already lost by then. Paragraph 24 of the consent order states that “The parties shall return to each other any outstanding property (including ring).” It is unbelievable that the ring was mentioned in the order as property to be returned when he was asserting that the ring was lost for good. I do not believe that the Respondent was telling the truth in this exchange.

[20] He also testified as to a set of text messages that was submitted into evidence by the Applicant Mother.[^2] Those text messages included insulting and vulgar statements made to the recipient by an individual named “Calvin”. C.J.P. said it was not him who sent these messages, asserting that they must have come from another individual also named “Calvin”. That is notwithstanding the fact that this other person said in the messages that M.A.J. was “just like the other Melissa”. C.J.P. admitted in testimony that an individual named Melissa Dubois, who was a former partner, had complained to the police about an assault for which he was later convicted. His statement that these messages did not come from him but another individual also named Calvin is simply unbelievable and I find, that on the balance of probabilities, the Respondent was lying when he said this. I also find that it is plain that the Respondent was the author of the text messages; otherwise, how else would the Applicant have had them to submit to the court?

[21] C.J.P. also asserted to the court that he was unable to find a lawyer in Barrie because any lawyer who took legal aid had previously consulted with M.A.J. Considering the fact that it was Ms. Gendron who filed M.A.J.’ response to the motion to change as early as October 15, 2020 and who also represented her at trial, it is extremely improbable that the Applicant saw numerous other lawyers in Barrie, thereby preventing C.J.P. from obtaining legal representation. She had the same lawyer throughout (other than a period of months when she was without representation) and there would have been no reason for her to consult with every other legal aid lawyer in Barrie. Again, I simply do not believe C.J.P. when he said that every other lawyer in Barrie was conflicted out of this case.

[22] C.J.P.’s unwillingness to tell the truth on cross-examination and to the court leads the court to find that his credibility may very well be lacking on other issues that he deposed to or testified to in his evidence.

[23] Furthermore, in giving his testimony, C.J.P. failed to take responsibility for his actions, choosing to blame someone else. As noted above, he said that he was forced to sign the consent which placed C.P. in the Applicant Mother’s care in November, 2023, essentially blaming the court for forcing that result. He fails to take responsibility for his role in C.P. not attending junior kindergarten between September and November, 2023. He failed to take responsibility for not being ready for trial in November, 2023 and needing an adjournment when the matter had been set down for trial since June, 2022, more than a year earlier.

[24] He also blamed his lawyer for bringing an ex parte motion before McCarthy J. on July 24, 2020. He testified that he could not understand why his lawyer did this, when it may very well have been done on his own instructions.

[25] On the other hand, I found the evidence of M.A.J. more credible and direct. Although at times, defensive and argumentative, I am cognizant that she has alleged family violence and was being cross-examined by the perpetrator of the abuse suffered by her. However, when questioned about her reconciliation, she readily admitted that she did reconcile with the Respondent days after complaining to the police about family violence. She made admissions against her interest during her cross-examination, answering only the questions, but directly and without making excuses. I found her delivery and her answers to the questions responsive and honest even though being cross-examined by an individual she blames for family violence that she says was inflicted on her.

[26] In short, based upon his cross-examination and the obvious untruths by the Respondent, I find that C.J.P. is not a credible witness. When his evidence is in conflict with the evidence of M.A.J., and subject to corroboration, I prefer the Applicant’s evidence to that of the Respondent.

OCL Investigation

[27] On November 27, 2020, Justice Jain of this court requested that the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (the “OCL”) become involved to assist in this case. The OCL determined that a social work investigation under s. 112 of the Courts of Justice Act[^3] was an appropriate use of their resources. On May 28, 2021, the investigative report completed by Social Worker Stephanie Kuiack was issued.

[28] By the time that this matter was set down for a hearing by Gunsolus J. on June 2, 2022, the report was only about a year old; even then Justice Gunsolus was concerned about the OCL investigator testifying. The matter was not reached in November, 2022 or May, 2023; it was adjourned at the request of the Respondent in November, 2023 by which time the report was more than two years old. An update was requested when the trial was adjourned in November, 2023. I was told that the OCL had accepted this engagement. However, that update was never commenced or completed. There was no reason given for this. By the time the matter was reached for trial in May, 2024, the report was nearly three years old.

[29] Ms. Kuaick testified at trial. Unfortunately, by inadvertence, the report was not made an exhibit at trial; however, it is Tab 58 in the Trial Record and identified as such. As well, there can be no objection to referring to it in this endorsement in light of the fact that it was identified by Ms. Kuiack and both parties had a full opportunity to question her at trial. Notwithstanding the failure to make the report an exhibit, I consider it to be trial evidence which I have considered in coming to my decision.

[30] Although extremely critical of M.A.J., the report makes no recommendations as to the major issues before the trial, decision-making and residency. The social worker said that no recommendations could be made on decision-making because the criminal charges against C.J.P. had not then been resolved (they still are not). She also did not make any recommendations regarding parenting time as M.A.J. was living with her parents who provide “support and supervision”. Implicit in this statement is the suggestion that Ms. Kuaick might otherwise have acceded to C.J.P.’s suggestion that M.A.J.’s parenting time be supervised.

[31] As noted, the report is extremely dated. It is no longer relevant. It was issued prior to M.A.J.’s move to Woodville. C.J.P. has abandoned his claim for supervised parenting time (as did M.A.J.). The report was critical of M.A.J. because it says that “in all circumstances it has been M.A.J. who has called or caused the police to be involved.” However, when the parties could not agree on a third party for a parenting time exchange on May 3, 2024, C.J.P. was the one who got the police involved, and then filmed it and boasted about it on the internet. Moreover, it was C.J.P. who got Kawartha Haliburton C.A.S. involved on March 26, 2024 when C.P. attended on parenting time with a small scratch on his face. If M.A.J. was badly behaved leading up to the preparation of the report, it is C.J.P. who has most recently needlessly gotten the police or C.A.S. involved to no purpose. C.P. is older now and more aware of what is going on, especially when the C.A.S. or the police is involved. Although this behaviour is similar to the concerns expressed by Ms. Kuaick about M.A.J. in her report, it now appears to be C.J.P. and his sister who are needlessly contacting the police and child protection authorities.

[32] As well, the report appears to be relying on the myth and stereotype that a subsequent reconciliation affects the credibility of complaints by a spouse as to domestic or family violence. In I.A. v. M.Z., 2016 ONCJ 615, the court stated (at para. 57):

The father submitted that the mother’s facilitation of access and her reconciliation with him shows that she did not fear him. The court disagrees and does not draw this inference. The mother’s ambivalence to separating from the father is a common reaction this court sees in victims of domestic violence. It is often difficult for victims of domestic violence to extricate themselves from abusive relationships. It is complicated when a child is involved, the victim’s self-esteem has been damaged and the victim feels a sense of responsibility (often disproportionate) for the breakdown of the family.

[33] Notwithstanding the fact that the courts have determined this to be a stereotype, Ms. Kuiack was critical of M.A.J. for reconciling with C.J.P. in December, 2019. She stated at one point:

When we distill the multiple complaints it may be that M.A.J. creates the very circumstances that she rails against. Of concern is that M.A.J. agreed to the November, 2019 Order for shared decision-making and a week-about access schedule and lived this schedule with her son at C.J.P.’s home despite a No Contact Order. She claimed that she violated this No Contact Order to keep her son safe, yet she makes no accusation to police or CAS in regard to specific concerns between C.J.P. and C.P.[^4]

[34] Earlier in the report, Ms. Kuiack states:

There is a history of this couple disregarding No Contact Orders and maintaining their relationship regardless. Yet M.A.J. has made multiple reports to police of a breach in the No Contact Order despite engaging with C.J.P. Barrie Police Services advised both M.A.J. and C.J.P. to have no contact except through court and “five minutes after the police left the residence [M.A.J.] contact (sic.) [C.J.P.]”[^5]

[35] The implication in the report is that M.A.J.’s complaints about domestic violence lack credibility because of the subsequent reconciliation with C.J.P. for a six month period until June, 2020. Family violence contraindicates a shared care and shared decision-making parenting plan precisely because it involves coercive control by one party over another. As suggested in I.A. v. M.Z., that dynamic often results in multiple returns to an abusive partner until things finally become sufficiently intolerable to cause the spouse to end the relationship. To suggest that M.A.J.’s inconsistency in continuing in the abusive relationship reflects on her credibility is a conclusion that continues that stereotyping, which is a factor that I choose to ignore.

[36] As well, the report is inconsistent in one important aspect. Ms. Kuiack, in coming to her conclusions, relies upon the fact that “There are no reports however of C.J.P. having a contentious relationship with any other persons, even with M.A.J.’s friends and family.”[^6] The social worker concludes from C.J.P.’s past and present relationships that he is not responsible for the conflictual relationship between the parties. In extrapolating conclusions from past and present behaviour, however, nowhere does Ms. Kuiack mention that M.A.J. has successfully co-parented and has shared care of her other child, Ava with her former partner over a number of years without incident or problem.

[37] Ms. Kuiack testified at trial as ordered by Justice Gunsolus. She acknowledged that the report was out of date. She also, surprisingly said in testimony that joint decision-making could continue even if C.J.P. was incarcerated for the presently outstanding criminal charges. She spoke of the logistics of doing so; however, she failed to mention the issue of the family violence which might have led to those convictions. She did not seem to have the family violence issues at heart when making her recommendations and was willing to continue the shared decision-making that she was unwilling to comment on in the report. This is notwithstanding the fact that she held back on recommendations because the outstanding criminal charges were unresolved and might change any recommendations that she might make at that time. Those charges remain unresolved.

[38] The report is outdated as are the incidents that the investigator relied upon in coming to her conclusions. The report also appears to be grounded on stereotypes concerning domestic violence. It is inconsistent in its treatment of the parties and fails to take into account the family violence issues between these parties. I give the report little or no weight in determining the parenting issues between these parties.

Parenting Issues

[39] These parties never married and lived in a common law relationship. The parenting issues are therefore governed by the provisions of the Children’s Law Reform Act.[^7] Section 24(3) of the CLRA sets out the best interests criteria concerning any parenting plan for the child or children as follows:

(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child’s care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to co-operate on issues affecting the child; and

(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

[40] Family violence has been alleged in this case. The provisions in the CLRA regarding family violence are therefore relevant to this inquiry.

[41] Section 18 of the CLRA contains several provisions regarding family violence. Firstly, “family violence” is defined in s. 18(1) as being “any conduct by a family member towards another family member that is violent or threatening, that constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, or that causes the other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person, and, in the case of a child, includes direct or indirect exposure to such conduct.” Moreover, s. 18(2) clarifies and particularizes that definition:

(2) For the purposes of the definition of “family violence” in subsection (1), the conduct need not constitute a criminal offence, and includes,

(a) physical abuse, including forced confinement but excluding the use of reasonable force to protect oneself or another person;

(b) sexual abuse;

(c) threats to kill or cause bodily harm to any person;

(d) harassment, including stalking;

(e) the failure to provide the necessaries of life;

(f) psychological abuse;

(g) financial abuse;

(h) threats to kill or harm an animal or damage property; and

(i) the killing or harming of an animal or the damaging of property.

[42] Section 24(4) sets out the factors concerning family violence which are as follows:

(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under clause (3) (j), the court shall take into account,

(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;

(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;

(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;

(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve the person’s ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and

(h) any other relevant factor.

[43] The Applicant’s relocation to Woodville is also an issue in this case. There are specific provisions regarding the relocation of a child under the CLRA. Section 39.4(3) provides for the criteria regarding relocation as follows:

(3) In determining whether to authorize the relocation of a child, the court shall take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with section 24, as well as,

(a) the reasons for the relocation;

(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;

(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child, and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;

(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child has complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 39.3 and any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award and agreement;

(e) the existence of an order, family arbitration award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;

(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new residence and the travel expenses; and

(g) whether each person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child has complied with their obligations under any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.

[44] The relocation provisions in the CLRA require the person who is moving to give notice of the intended move to the other party. As well, based upon the equal time sharing of the child, the burden of proof regarding the relocation lies on the Applicant: see s. 39.4(5) of the CLRA.

[45] There is nothing in the CLRA requiring the Applicant to obtain the consent of the Respondent or a court order. However, that ignores para. 18 in the final order sought to be changed which provides as follows:

The parties shall be required to provide the other party with at least 30 days advance written notice of a planned change of residence more than 30 kilometres from their current residence(s). The parties may apply to the court for a judicial determination if they are unable to agree on whether the residence of the child should change.

[46] Although the Applicant Mother provided the required notice, the father objected to the relocation. The Applicant failed to obtain the approval of the court for her move to Woodville as contemplated by paragraph 18 of the order and the mother remains technically in breach of the order to this day.

[47] The issues in this case are defined by the opposing parenting plans of the parties which can be summarized as follows:

The Father’s Parenting Plan

[48] Based on his submissions at trial, the Respondent wishes the Applicant to move back to Barrie and reside there as she had prior to the Woodville relocation. He wishes to return to the shared care arrangement and for C.P. to go to school midway between himself (in Dundalk) and Barrie. He says that the Applicant is unable to make reasonable decisions for the child and therefore he should be ordered to have sole decision-making authority respecting C.P.

The Mother’s Parenting Plan

[49] The mother says that she has provided a stable residence for C.P. for more than a year and that C.P. is thriving in Woodville and in the Woodville school. She proposes remaining in Woodville and that C.P. live in her primary care. She says that the father is guilty of family violence and is only trying to exert coercive control over her in forcing her to move back to Barrie. She also says that, considering the fact that communication is impossible between the parties and because of the family violence and criminal charges, the father cannot be allowed to have decision-making concerning the child and that the only option is to give her sole decision-making authority.

Issues

[50] Under s. 29 of the CLRA, the court cannot vary an earlier parenting order “unless there has been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the best interests of the child who is the subject of the order.” Therefore, the court must first make a finding that there is a material change in circumstances prior to considering whether a change in the order is in the best interests of the children.

[51] Once that is done, the best interests issues to be considered in this case are as follows:

a. The level of communication between the parties and the ability of the parties to encourage and foster the other’s relationship with the child: see s. 24(3)(c), (h) and (i) of the CLRA;

b. The history of family violence between these parties: see ss. 18(2), 24(3)(j) and (k) and (4) of the CLRA;

c. The status quo and the respective abilities of the parties to meet the needs of the child: see s. 24(3)(a), (b) and (d) of the CLRA; and

d. The relocation of the child to Woodville: see s. 39.3(4) of the CLRA.

[52] Regarding the relocation issue, this is at least in part dependent upon the parenting plan that is in C.P.’s best interests. If, for example, it is determined that shared care is best for C.P., then that would result in it also being best for C.P. to be physically closer to the residence of C.J.P. The reasons for that are obvious; at the moment, the driving distance between his residence in Dundalk and Woodville (more than two hours) makes it difficult for him to attend school activities or parent teacher interviews or for the child to go to the same school. Otherwise, if it is best for C.P. to reside primarily with one party or the other, the location of the Applicant’s residence becomes less important because the child will then be mostly living with one party with the other exercising weekend parenting time, at least during the school year.

Material Change in Circumstances

[53] There is little doubt that there has been a material change in circumstances affecting C.P. and his best interests since the Eberhard J. final order dated November 25, 2019. Since that date, the Respondent was charged on December 26, 2019 with seven extremely serious offences against the person of the Applicant Mother. There was a reconciliation of about six months which immediately followed on the heels of the criminal charges.

[54] Since then, the parties initially litigated this matter through numerous without notice motions brought because of the last relationship breakdown between the parties in May, 2020. At one point, in considering a motion brought by the Respondent without notice on October 8, 2020, I counted six different motions brought by the parties ex parte in the five month period between the parties’ date of separation (May, 2020) and the motion on October 8, 2020. I therefore made an order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act that no further motions without notice could be brought by either party without leave of the court.

[55] All of these factors would constitute a material change in circumstances within the meaning of s. 29 of the CLRA. However, even if not, the Applicant’s relocation to Woodville also constitutes a change in circumstances: see s. 29(2) of the CLRA as well as Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27.

[56] There is no issue that there has been a material change in circumstances; indeed, it is sufficiently clear that neither party made any sort of issue as to whether the child’s circumstances had changed since the final order made on November 25, 2019.

Communications Issues

[57] The courts in Ontario have made it very clear that to successfully co-parent a child with an order for shared decision-making, as the present order provides for, there must be a history of reasonable communication between the parties concerning the child: see Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, 2005 1625 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 275 (C.A.).

[58] However, communication is not only essential to the continuation of shared decision-making; it is also, in my view, essential to a successful shared care arrangement concerning the child. In their respective motions to change, both parties are seeking primary care of C.P., and based upon the abysmal communications exhibited by the parties, it is correct that C.P. needs to live with one party or the other. Otherwise, C.P. will continue to go between two households that are blind to one another. The failure to communicate makes consistent discipline between the two households impossible; neither does it allow for shared activities for C.P., something that will become increasingly important to him as he grows older. Sherr J. stated in J.T.R. v. L.L.M., 2017 ONCJ 455 (at para. 79):

Similar to joint custody, a higher degree of cooperation and mutual respect is needed to make an equal parenting arrangement work effectively. See my comments in P.J. v. T.J., 2017 ONCJ 166. Parents need to be able to coordinate extra-curricular activities and communicate effectively about other important aspects about the child’s welfare. The necessary degree of cooperation and respect is no longer present in this case.

[59] I agree with and adopt those comments.

[60] I characterized the parties’ level of communication in this case as “abysmal” and I was not exaggerating when I said this. Rarely have I seen parties who are less able to talk to one another about their child in order to act together in his best interests. There have been struggles over the child’s health care and schooling which have not only reflected badly on the parties but also have resulted in potential or actual harm to the child.

[61] Many of the communications difficulties can be laid at the feet of the Respondent. The Applicant filed a number of text messages authored by the Respondent and sent to her in an exchange which took place between July and August, 2019, soon after the birth of C.P. I have already found that these text messages were authored by the Respondent and the Applicant. In those text messages, C.J.P. tells the mother of his child that she is a “cunt” more than once. He also calls her a “Useless money hungry cumdumpster” and also wishes her a “good night you lying b***”. He tells her to “go fuck yourself you stupid cunt” near the end of he exchange.

[62] I realize that these messages pre-date the final order of November 25, 2019 and the court cannot go behind the final order that is being sought to be changed. However, the Applicant testified that the Respondent used language like this almost daily both prior to and after the final order. She also testified that when she agreed to the final order, she did it because the Respondent had withheld a ring, a family heirloom, unless she signed the Minutes. She also said that she did not have a lawyer and that duty counsel could not assist her that day; the Respondent had counsel at that time. She implies that she consented to the order notwithstanding the fact that it was not in C.P.’s best interests and that she did this because she did not have legal advice, because the Respondent withheld property that was valuable to her (she never got that property) and because she felt pressured to do so.

[63] Since then, there are few examples of the communications between the parties as they have not been able to speak with one another or communicate in any manner since the charges were laid against the Respondent on December 26, 2019. The text messages are only one example of very few as to how the parties were able to communicate with one another as there has been no direct contact because of C.J.P.’s bail conditions.

[64] The parties have not been able to directly communicate with one another since the charges were laid as the Respondent was made subject to bail conditions preventing communication between the parties. Since then, all communication between the parties has been borne by the Respondent’s sister who also attends on pickups and deliveries of the child for parenting exchanges.

[65] That this has been a clear impediment to the parties was recognized early on by Justice Eberhard when she considered an urgent motion brought by the Applicant Mother when the parties separated after their December 29, 2019 reconciliation. Eberhard J. said, in the May 28, 2020 endorsement as follows:

I directed that once we completed this motion, my valid family court order post-dating the charges which currently prevent all communication which could lead to resolution of the parenting issues – through counsel, counsellors or controlled written communication with each other – should be taken to the crown attorney for the purposes of bail variation. The Respondent Father has criminal counsel, so this is quite doable.

[66] This direction was reflected in the interim consent order made on June 2, 2020, which provided that the parties would participate together in a co-parenting program and exchange a parenting journal “[o]nce the Respondent Father has had his criminal undertaking varied.”[^8]

[67] Unfortunately, complying with this direction was not a priority of the Respondent. These were his bail conditions and his to change. However, he acknowledged in testimony that he never took steps to vary his release conditions. He said that he did not change them because he understood that the parenting course could be taken separately. The Respondent’s sister also made excuses about the Respondent’s failure to change the bail conditions: when confronted on this point by the Applicant, she is dismissive of this legitimate concern of the Applicant (and the court):

You’re ridiculous. That’s not what I said. It was suggested he have the undertaking amended and order states when he does. Doesn’t mean he could or would. That was up to lawyers. Not my business nor is it yours with what they do in the criminal proceedings. This conversation is done.[^9]

[68] This exchange indicates that the Respondent’s sister is as capable of excusing the breach of Justice Eberhard’s direction as is the Respondent. She is also no stranger to the demeaning language that the Respondent indulged in according to the Applicant’s testimony.

[69] The failure of the Respondent to change the release conditions shows that he is not interested in communication with the Applicant as is required for shared parenting and decision-making. This is surprising when he stated during his submissions that he wished M.A.J. to move back to Barrie in order to facilitate a continuation of the shared parenting order of November 25, 2019.

[70] There are numerous examples of the parties’ failure to communicate in this case. The Applicant alleges that the Respondent cut the child’s hair without consulting with her. The Applicant is also guilty of failing to communicate; she cancelled doctor’s appointments set by the Respondent without consultation with him. The parties have argued about penile infections that they blame on each other and, in April, 2024 on treatment for a “bum rash” and the failure of the Applicant to provide the cream to treat that rash during parenting time.[^10]

[71] The bum rash eventually resulted in C.J.P. and his sister visiting Markdale Hospital with C.P. There was some confusion as to when this took place; C.J.P. said it took place on April 12, 2024 but the Markdale hospital records indicate that the visit that weekend was about a broken arm. It appears that the child went to Markdale for both of these issues on the same weekend. C.J.P. recorded an unknown doctor discussing the bum rash; this was an attempt to present opinion evidence to the court from an unknown emergency room doctor without complying with the rules concerning expert reports; I refused to allow that recording into evidence. However, in attending the Markdale Hospital, it appears that C.J.P. was attempting to obtain evidence against M.A.J. rather than addressing C.P.’s medical needs. This was not an emergency and the rash was being treated by C.P.’s family doctor. It appears, however, that this incident was yet another failure to communicate by both parties: M.A.J. refused to provide any details about the rash to C.J.P.’s sister, stating that she would only provide that information to the clinic that she was told the child was going to. Ms. Boileau on behalf of the Respondent refused to advise the Applicant as to where the child was going for treatment that weekend. The parties were continuing to argue about the rash on April 26, 2024, when M.A.J. refused to provide the prescription cream during a weekend parenting time visit. She said that the C.A.S. told her not to provide the cream but that was untrue.[^11] However, it was to be administered every 48 hours and based on the length of the visit, the cream need not have been provided and M.A.J. told this to Ms. Boileau .[^12]

[72] These arguments have continued throughout since the parties separated in May, 2020 to the present day. The most egregious example, however, is when C.P. was taken by the Respondent and his sister to the Markdale Hospital on April 13, 2023 for a broken arm suffered while in the Respondent’s care. C.J.P.’s sister refused to tell the Applicant what hospital C.P. was in, and she was forced to resort to calling numerous hospitals in the area to determine where C.P. was. She finally discovered from the OPP that he was in Markdale Hospital.

[73] The Applicant reacted badly to not knowing where C.P. was. She called the hospital demanding that C.P. be moved to Royal Victoria Hospital in Barrie. The hospital refused and accepted that the Respondent had shared decision-making and accepted instructions from him. There were calls from both the Applicant and her lawyer. The hospital records indicate that M.A.J. was aggressive in demanding that C.P. go to Barrie. It does not appear that she was just trying to get a second opinion as testified to by M.A.J. at the trial and it also does not appear that she was acting in C.P.’s best interests in trying to move him to another hospital in Barrie.

[74] Neither party can be particularly proud of their behaviour on April 13 and 14, 2023. The Respondent took the parties’ child to the hospital and refused to tell the Applicant where. The Applicant demanded that the hospital move the child to another hospital when there was no reason to do so; the Applicant’s suggestion that all she wanted was a second opinion does not look good on her as no one should move a child when he has a broken bone and it needs to be set. Neither of these parties exercised good judgment in this situation and the only one who could potentially suffer from their behaviour is C.P. The actions of both parties put C.P. at risk and neither parent was able to put their own needs and fears after C.P.’s best interests.

[75] There is also a history of involving the child protection agencies and the police concerning C.P. As noted by the OCL investigator, early on M.A.J. managed the parenting of C.P. by the frequent use of the police and child welfare agencies, complaining about the condition of the Respondent’s home and withholding parenting time because of supposed health issues. This behaviour has continued more recently at the behest of the Respondent. When C.P. fell and injured his head at school on March 26, 2024, the Respondent called the police reporting that the Applicant Mother had abused C.P. C.J.P.’s sister contacted the Applicant about the injury which was a small mark on C.P.’s face and M.A.J. refused to provide any information. The police attended and determined there was no concern. Later, C.J.P. called the Kawartha Haliburton Children’s Aid Society which investigated and they also found no concerns. C.J.P. says he was just acting in the best interests of C.P.; however, the injury was minor and the police had no concerns. It appears to me that these reports to the police and to the local C.A.S. had more to do with his animosity towards M.A.J. than to act protectively for C.P.

[76] Finally, the inability of the parties to agree on C.P.’s schooling is an indication of the inability of these parties to communicate or to set aside their own interests to address C.P.’s. M.A.J. moved from Barrie to Woodville on June 1, 2023 because she had been living with her parents and they had to sell their home in Barrie because they intended to spend their retirement in Arizona and could not afford two homes. M.A.J. gave evidence that she attempted to negotiate schooling for C.P. and even got permission from the Woodville school, Lady McKenzie Public School, for C.P. to attend at that school during her parenting time every second week. C.J.P. refused his consent to that. Because of that, C.P. did not go to school for September, October and much of November, 2023 for his junior kindergarten year. It was only when C.J.P. was facing a trial that he consented to C.P. going to school and that was only because I was not willing to adjourn the trial if C.P. was not going to school somewhere; otherwise the trial would go ahead. C.J.P. was bitter about this, complaining about being forced to agree to C.P.’s attendance at a Lady McKenzie School. However, C.J.P.’s refusal to consent to the schooling was not about C.P.’s best interests but more about his being prejudiced in this litigation; this appears to have been all about C.J.P.’s needs rather than C.P.’s.

[77] Incidents such as this as well as the high conflict nature of the parties’ relationship, as well as the Respondent’s failure to change the bail conditions to at least attempt to co-parent this child, leads me to conclude that shared decision-making and care cannot be in C.P.’s best interests.

Family Violence

[78] Gone are the days when judges and lawyers assumed that family violence committed between the parents was irrelevant to parenting issues. The amendments to the CLRA noted above make that clear.

[79] The Respondent Father is facing a number of criminal charges for assault and sexual assault. These on their own are not conclusive and were presumably based upon statements made by the Applicant to the police on December 26, 2019, the day the charges were laid. The Respondent is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty. Notwithstanding s. 13 of the Charter (the right against self incrimination from compelled testimony in another proceeding), C.J.P. refused to testify about the charges or the events leading up to the charges because he did not want to jeopardize his criminal defence. Suffice to say that counsel for the Applicant did not insist upon an answer to her questions about the alleged offences.

[80] The charges are being pursued in Owen Sound Superior Court. It has been nearly five years since the charges were laid without resolution.

[81] Because of the presumption of innocence, there must be some independent evidence of the offences in question before making a finding of family violence. The charges alone do not prove family violence although they are evidence that the police felt that there were reasonable and probable grounds that the offences occurred when they laid the charges. They are further evidence of family violence in view of C.J.P.’s criminal record for domestic assault, harassing telephone calls and mischief acknowledged in his form 35.1 affidavit.[^13]

[82] One piece of evidence which became part of the record was a recording of the assault on December 26, 2019 which was attached as an exhibit to the Applicant’s affidavit sworn on May 3, 2022[^14] entered as part of her evidence in chief. The recording, of a physical altercation in July, 2019, is not surreptitious; the Applicant tells the Respondent early in the recording that he is being recorded. The recording is also compelling; it records an altercation between the parties and the Applicant cries out that the Respondent to stop what he is doing to her. She is obviously in distress. The Children’s Aid Society records show that the Applicant showed up on that day with “superficial abrasions on her neck”.[^15] She tells him not to touch her and this is ignored by the Respondent. The Respondent later exclaims that the Applicant has punched him in the nose. It is clear from the recording that this was in response to the initial assault by the Respondent. During the incident, the Respondent tells the Applicant not to call the police because they will both be in trouble. I find that on the balance of probabilities that this is a recording of family violence perpetrated against the Applicant by the Respondent. This recording was, according to the evidence of the Applicant, provided to the police when the charges were laid.

[83] The Respondent refused to testify about the recording or the charges even though this testimony would not have been compellable evidence at the criminal trial.

[84] There is also family violence in the demeaning and abusive text messages provided in evidence by the Applicant.[^16] I have outlined these above. C.J.P. calls her a “a “Useless money hungry cumdumpster” and also wishes her a “good night you lying b***”. He also says in the exchange that the Applicant should “go fuck yourself you stupid cunt”.

[85] Family violence is not only physical violence as displayed in the recording. It can include demeaning or abusive language. In Ammar v. Smith, 2021 ONSC 3024, Kraft J. was not able to find physical abuse by the putative perpetrator of family violence. However, she did find that:

I accept Vivian's testimony that she was psychologically and verbally abused by Michael, particularly since September 6, 2016. Given Michael's conduct since September 6, 2016, I find that his ability to care for and meet the needs of Clair and Nicholas are impacted by his anger and hostility toward Vivian, such that he cannot stop himself from involving the children in the dispute between him and Vivian.

[86] She noted in her analysis that s. 18(2)(f) includes “psychological abuse” in the definition of family violence and found, as a result of the father’s demeaning conduct, that family violence was a factor in that case.

[87] The same applies in the present case. We only have one example of C.J.P.’s abusive language in the texts submitted at trial and those texts predate the order sought to be changed by both parties. However, M.A.J. testified that this language was often used by the Respondent in his interactions to her and these text messages were only one example. Neither party has been able to communicate with one another since the second set of charges were laid against C.J.P. and it is not surprising that there are few if any examples of psychological abuse since 2019 because C.J.P. was not able to do so.

[88] There are, however, concerning behaviours since the charges were laid. C.J.P.’s proxy, his sister, called the Applicant “ridiculous” when she expressed a concern about compliance with the Eberhard J. direction to C.J.P. to amend his bail conditions. However, more concerning is the event that occurred on May 3, 2024, just weeks prior to trial. On that date, the Respondent’s sister was unavailable due to a family emergency and M.A.J. offered an alternative third party in another location. Instead of taking her up on this offer, C.J.P. insisted upon the agreed upon pick up spot and invoked the police assistance clause in the final order. More concerning than this intransigence, however, was the video that he posted on TikTok of the OPP officer leading C.P. out of the Tim Hortons with a posting which says, in part, as follows:

Well, the weekend started off not being cooperative and coparenting, but that’s OK because at the end of the day, I always make a bad situation and do (sic.) a good one. He was smiling from the minute. I picked them up saying that I missed you. I miss you so much that’s why I keep going no matter how much I get gaslighted, dried down pushed around. I’m still a father. I’m still standing.[^17]

[89] He posted this video to several hashtags, including #fathersmatter and #fathersrightsmatter.

[90] If C.J.P. thinks this made a bad situation into a good one, he is sadly mistaken. M.A.J. tried to negotiate another third party and pick up point and C.J.P. responded by invoking police assistance and then took a video of the event for public consumption on the internet. His judgment in doing so is questionable and the gist of the comment is that the mother of his child gaslights him and pushes him around but notwithstanding his bad treatment, he keeps on going. It is not only the pictures of his son being led from a Tim Hortons by a police officer; it is also the comments about M.A.J. that are offensive. That is presumably why Justice Jain ordered on November 2, 2020 that the parties not post on social media about each other.

[91] This is not the only time that C.J.P. has posted about M.A.J.; there was also evidence that he had taken pictures of M.A.J. at a Tim Hortons and posted those pictures. Apart from the fact that these were probably breaches of the order of Justice Jain dated November 2, 2020 which prohibited the parties from posting about each other on social media, these are also indicia of psychological abuse. I find that C.J.P. will, most probably, continue the psychological abuse that he perpetrated on M.A.J. in 2019, more than four years ago.

[92] I find that there was both physical and psychological abuse of M.A.J. which constitute family violence within the meaning of s. 18(2) of the CLRA. I also find that this will continue to affect the willingness of the Respondent to foster a relationship between C.P. and M.A.J. as required under s. 24(3)(c) of the Act.

Status Quo

[93] Past history is usually an indicator, to some extent, of the future. This is recognized by s. 24(3)(d) of the CLRA. In the present case, there is evidence of an extensive history of the care of this child because this matter has been outstanding for so long.

[94] In this portion of the endorsement, the court will examine the history of the separation and the parenting provided by both of these parties to C.P. since the last order. The court will also review the present status quo, which involves the child living in the primary care of the Applicant Mother during the school year in Woodville, Ontario.

[95] These parties have suffered through the difficulties and stress of attempting to co-parent C.P. during a high conflict separation where there is little communication. But more importantly, so has C.P. His experience is that of going between two households, each of which treated him differently with each parent making decisions about him without consultation with the other. That has resulted in him returning to the other parent and dealing with that parent’s anger and upset at the decision that was made.

[96] It is not surprising that C.P. may be going through behavioural issues as he grows older. In 2021, the OCL investigator warned that, “It is true that C.P. is very young yet and likely unaware of most of this, but if this continues until he is not much older what will C.P. have to say about his experiences?”[^18]

[97] M.A.J. commented about this in her affidavits. She moved to Woodville in June, 2023. She attempted to negotiate schooling but was unsuccessful. She gave evidence that C.P. had suffered from behavioural issues. On September 18, 2023, in the midst of the fight over schooling, C.P. choked his stepsister, Ava. He has had two events requiring discipline on the bus and was suspended from the bus on April 3, 2024. True to form, M.A.J. blamed the Respondent for this, stating that this behaviour only took place after parenting time with C.J.P. and she also says that C.P. said he learned to strangle Ava from his “daddy”.[^19] She says that C.P. misbehaves when he is going to see his father, and says on April 12, on his way to a parenting time exchange, C.P. grabbed the back of M.A.J.’s hood and choked her. She outlines in another affidavit that C.P. spat on her after after parenting time with the Respondent and also hits and kicks animals and his sister.[^20]

[98] However, M.A.J. also says that there has been improvement. She relies upon C.P.’s latest report card (now called a “Communication of Learning”) dated February 16, 2024 as evidence of this. The report card stated that, “C.P. has shown considerable growth in his ability to self-regulate over the course of the year so far” and that “We will continue to work on finding the strategies that work best for C.P. so that the tools are available to him when he needs them most.”[^21] The report card is positive in nature. C.P. is noted as improving in his behaviour and is doing well in school.

[99] C.J.P.’s response to the report card is instructive. When asked by Applicant’s counsel on cross-examination as to whether he thought the report card was positive, he responded “not overly.” When he was directed to the portion regarding C.P.’s improvement in his self-regulation, he took credit for this, stating that he had been working on that in his home. When asked about his “reservations”, he pointed to the seven absences noted in the report card. However, he was confronted with the fact that the absences resulted from a bout of Scarlet Fever from December, 2023 that he was well aware of and received makeup parenting time for. He acknowledged that he was aware of the illness in December, 2023 and was only able to say that he was not aware that it was Scarlet Fever. It is concerning that he could not find anything to say that was positive about the report card and if there was something positive about it, that was because he (and not M.A.J.) was responsible for that. As with M.A.J. and her complaints about C.P.’s behaviour before and after parenting time with his father, C.J.P. had nothing good to say about M.A.J.’s parenting.

[100] I choose to disagree with both parents when they blame the other for C.P.’s behavioural issues. There were, and continue to be, concerns about C.P.’s behaviours as he ages. He still has difficulties in self-regulation as indicated by his behaviour on the bus on April 3, 2024. C.P.’s parents continue in their high conflict ways and they refuse to communicate in any meaningful fashion with each other. C.P. is in the middle of this conflict and it is not abating. We know that children react to stress by acting out, and this is most probably C.P.’s reaction to the conflictual relationship between his parents. It is further evidence of the failure of the shared decision-making that governs the relationship between these parents.

[101] That being said, there is improvement. C.J.P. gave M.A.J. no credit for this. However, there is little doubt that the primary residence situation and the stability this offers to C.P. has to be seen as beneficial to him. The present status quo appears to be resulting in improvement to C.P.’s ability to self-regulate as suggested by the school. There is no other independent evidence of C.P.’s improvement other than the report card noted above; the OCL did not come through to update its report. The Respondent’s suggestion that M.A.J. be forced to move back to Barrie to return to the shared care arrangement cannot be in C.P.’s best interests as this will create more instability and more opportunities for conflict which has resulted in the past, in my view, in C.P.’s behavioural issues.

[102] The present status quo of C.P. living in Woodville in the primary care of the Applicant appears to be providing stability for C.P., removing him from at least some of the conflict between the parties and resulting in behavioural improvement as noted in the report card.

[103] The evidence also indicates that when these parents co-parent, they continue their poor behaviour which is not in the best interests of C.P. Neither parent, when involved with the other, is able to set aside their own needs and interests and put those behind those of C.P. His best interests are, for both parents, secondary to the fight between them. They are, when attempting to co-parent (or, more accurately, parent on their own without regard to the other), unable to C.P.’s needs ahead of their own.

Relocation Issue

[104] In June, 2023, M.A.J. relocated to Woodville, ON, near Lindsay. She moved in with her boyfriend and his mother in her boyfriend’s home. C.J.P. says that this move was without his consent and that M.A.J. should be made to move back to Barrie so that the parties can renew the shared care arrangement that was in place prior to November, 2023 when C.J.P. consented (under protest) to C.P. living in Woodville and going to school there. He says that he checked with the Simcoe Muskoka District School Board and an unknown official told him that if the parties agreed, they could place C.P. in a school midway between the parties which was not necessarily in either of their catchment areas.

[105] M.A.J. had good reason to move in June, 2023. She had been living with her parents and they sold their home because of affordability issues. She was, at the time, receiving Ontario Works (she now receives Ontario Disability Income). The court can take judicial notice of the fact that she would have had difficulty obtaining suitable housing in Barrie due to the fact that rents are extremely high in South Central Ontario and there are lengthy waiting lists for subsidized housing. She did not have very many options when she went to Woodville. C.J.P. seems to believe that this is not his problem and proposed no solution to M.A.J. housing issues.

[106] That addresses s. 39.3(3)(a) of the CLRA which permits the court to review the reason for the move in determining whether to permit the move. However, many of the of the other criteria in that section would militate against the court permitting the move. Section 39(3)(e) directs the court to take into account any geographic restriction on the residence of the child. M.A.J. did not seek the permission of the court to move and this was important in light of the fact that para. 18 of the final consent order dated November 25, 2019 states that the party seeking to relocate would give 30 days’ notice of any move more than 30 kilometres from their present residence (that notice was given) and that if the parties could not agree, “the parties may apply to the court for judicial determination… on whether the residence of he child should change”. In fact, the order as taken out was incomplete because the Final Minutes of Settlement had provided that the “consent of the Respondent” had to be obtained for the move failing which the parties could go to court to determine residency of the child. That provision was not carried through to the order as taken out. The Applicant says that she did not bring a motion because she gave notice in February, 2023 and the matter was scheduled for trial in May, 2023 when she presumed the issue would be addressed. However, it was not reached and M.A.J. moved without obtaining the judicial determination required by the final order or the consent of the Respondent. It is safe to say that C.P. was moved to Woodville contrary to the order.

[107] Moreover, the court is to take into account under s. 39.3(3)(c) “the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting …, and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons” This provision is intended to address the effect the move might have on the time sharing arrangement between the parties.

[108] It is without a doubt that the shared arrangement has ended up being severely curtailed as far as C.J.P. is concerned. He says that the loss of his time with the child is not in C.P.’s best interests. He said that he used to take C.P. to events during his weeks with the child such as monster truck shows, something C.P. enjoys. He says that he cannot attend school activities or easily involve himself in C.P.’s education because of the distance to Woodville, about two hours. It is also without a doubt that C.J.P. was, prior to the move and the placement of C.P. in the Woodville school, an involved parent who was involved in C.P.’s health and education. The move to Woodville negatively affected both C.J.P.’s parenting time with the child as well as his involvement in C.P.’s life.

[109] Moreover, there was no proposal made by the Applicant within the meaning of s. 39.4(f) of the CLRA as to the Respondent’s parenting plan. As C.J.P. did not care about M.A.J.’s housing, neither did M.A.J. seem to care about C.J.P.’s parenting time or his involvement in the child’s life. I heard no such proposal made by M.A.J. other than her ultimate goal of primary residence and decision-making. It is obvious that she is not interested in reinstating the shared care and decision-making in the final order.

[110] These provisions suggest that C.P. should be returned to Barrie as requested by the Respondent. This is especially so when the onus for proving that the relocation is in the child’s best interests lies with the Applicant as care of the child was substantially shared equally at the time of the move: see s. 39.4(5) of the CLRA.

[111] However, s. 39.4(3) of the CLRA directs the court to also have regard to the best interests of the child in addition to the criteria intended to address relocation in that subsection. As well, s. 39.4(b) directs the court to determine the impact that the move has on the child, again, in my view, requiring the court to review the best interests of that child in the context of the move.

[112] In the present case, the Respondent says that he wants the court to force M.A.J. to return to Barrie, where she moved from nearly a year prior to trial. That would obviously be disruptive to the child. C.P. would have to change schools and M.A.J. would have to find a residence in Barrie in a very tight rental market. The child’s stability would be threatened by a forced return to Barrie.

[113] I was extremely concerned, as well, by C.J.P.’s rationale for the child changing schools if he is made to move back to Barrie. C.P., by all accounts, is doing well in his present school. If he moved, he would be put through a change in schools with new teachers and staff and friends. When I asked C.J.P. whether this was in C.P.’s best interests, he said it was because that would allow him to attend school activities and go into the school to meet the teacher. That is, however, not something that is necessarily in C.P.’s best interests; it is in C.J.P.’s. He seems to be over emphasizing his own importance in the schooling issues at the expense of C.P.’s stability. I am doubtful that he is putting C.P.’s needs before his own when he says that C.P. should be put in a new school so that he can attend activities and events at his son’s school.

[114] Moreover, the only objective evidence that I have of how C.P. is doing is contained in the February, 2024 report card spoken of earlier. That report card indicates that C.P.’s self-regulation had improved, and notwithstanding C.J.P.’s “reservations”, I find this report card to be a positive one. C.P. is doing well in Woodville and has, at long last, stability in his home with the Applicant in that location. I am concerned about the disruption to C.P. that a return to Barrie would entail.

[115] C.J.P. says that C.P. could be placed in a school midway between himself and M.A.J. in Barrie and that the school board told him this. He did not provide anything further than the results of a phone call, which is clearly hearsay evidence. Although the evidence was unobjected to and therefore became part of the record, I was not told who the individual was who gave C.J.P. this information. I was also not told that individual’s position in the school board. I do not know whether the information is accurate as it is the child’s residence in a catchment area that usually dictates the child’s school. Schooling often disrupts shared care arrangements for this reason. I am not clear that this evidence reflects the regulations of the Simcoe County District School Board and I give this evidence very little weight as a result.

[116] Finally, C.J.P. wants to return to the shared care arrangement and shared decision-making that the parties have had for the past four years. I have outlined above the challenges that these parties have had in making that work. I dare say that one of the reasons that C.P. is doing well is because he has one home, not two warring residences. The shared arrangement has not worked in the past and I do not find that it has met C.P.’s needs or his best interests.

[117] I am therefore unwilling to force C.P. to move back to Barrie to return to an arrangement that is not the best one for C.P. M.A.J. has met her onus to prove that C.P. is doing well in Woodville in her primary care and that the move is in C.P.’s best interests. That claim by the Respondent is dismissed.

Conclusion

[118] Neither of these parents have a lot to be proud of. The evidence is clear that they have mismanaged their care of C.P. throughout. The frequent disagreements, the inconsistencies in medical care, the arbitrary haircuts, the Respondent’s videos posted to TikTok and the general interactions between the parties confirm that this is a high conflict case and not suitable for shared decision-making: see Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, supra. The fact that the Respondent failed to follow the directions of Eberhard J. concerning his bail conditions is especially concerning as it shows that the Respondent is not really interested in co-parenting C.P. with the Applicant.

[119] As well, the failure to communicate contraindicates continuation of a shared care arrangement. Shared care involves some interaction between parents even if they do not have joint decision-making. Joint care requires at least some cooperation and if that is not present, C.P. would go between two homes which are blind to each other. I outlined above case law that confirms that a shared care arrangement requires a degree of cooperation and communication that these parties do not possess.

[120] In fact, perhaps as a result of the ongoing and continuous conflict between the parties, C.P. has ended up with behavioural issues and an inability to self-regulate. Each parent attempted to blame the other for C.P.’s problems as he ages, but the evidence is insufficient for me to make a finding of responsibility for those issues. It is as likely that the conflict between these parties, noted by the Children’s Aid Society[^22] as well as the OCL social worker,[^23] has resulted in C.P.’s inability to regulate his anger and outbursts. He has learned to be defiant and non-compliant from his parents and may very well be emulating the behaviour of both his parents rather than only one of them.

[121] As I said, neither parent appears to be better than the other. The Respondent’s behaviour on April 13 in not telling the Applicant where C.P. was hospitalized, and then the Applicant’s behaviour in trying to remove C.P. to another hospital is only the latest of numerous incidents where the parties were contentious with one another, resulting in neither party acting in C.P.’s best interests. If the parties are unable to co-parent sufficiently to set a broken limb in an urgent situation, it is hard to see them acting together in C.P.’s best interests in other less urgent aspects of his upbringing.

[122] The telling feature, however, is the family violence between these parties, for whom I hold C.J.P. totally responsible for. I have found that, on December 26, 2019, C.J.P. assaulted M.A.J., and left marks on her neck indicating strangulation. He is facing seven criminal charges, as yet unresolved. He engaged in stalking behaviour in 2019 as well as psychologically abusive language in his communications with the Applicant. None of this appears to have been important to the OCL investigator. But it is without a doubt that family violence is, at law, an important factor in determining best interests of the child.

[123] Moreover, although neither party has been particularly respectful of court orders, the breaches of these orders on the part of the Respondent have had to do with the continuing family violence. He posted on social media contrary to a court order stating that M.A.J. had “gaslighted, dried down, pushed around” the Respondent. He also took pictures of M.A.J. at a Tim Hortons and again posted that on social media. There are indicia of a disrespect of family court orders when it comes to his feelings about M.A.J., again resulting in a concern of continuation of coercive control and family violence on his part.

[124] C.J.P.’s plan is also ill founded. He wants the shared arrangement to be reinstated and that M.A.J. be forced to move to Barrie in order to achieve that. He said that his own attendance at school activities was more important than was the stability of the child remaining at his present school, where things are going well. He is not willing to even admit that C.P. is doing well in school because that might just reflect positively on the Applicant. He wants shared care and decision-making, but was not invested enough in this to follow Justice Eberhard’s direction to have the bail conditions changed to allow communication. I have found that the shared care and decision-making that is in the final order is not in the child’s best interests. Although neither parent is an ideal parent, I find that the best interests of C.P. would be better met by him remaining in the care of the Applicant in Woodville and in his present school.

[125] I am therefore going to vary the order of Justice Eberhard dated November 25, 2019 so that the child remain in the care of the Applicant and that the Applicant have sole decision-making on the terms set out in the draft order filed at the beginning of the trial. Parenting time shall be as set out in the final order, provided that the summer months shall involve both parents sharing care of the child throughout the summer.

[126] I note that much of this has been drawn from the Applicant’s draft order. Two were filed by the Applicant, one in November, 2023 and one in May, 2024; the major difference between the two is that the November, 2023 draft order provided for shared care in the summer and the May, 2024 draft order only offered two weeks in the summer as parenting time for C.J.P.

[127] C.J.P. did not provide a draft order.

[128] C.J.P.’s position was that the child be returned to Barrie and the shared care arrangement continue. He had no Plan B to address his parenting time if the Applicant was given primary care and I have defaulted to the arrangement from November, 2023 whereby C.P. lived with the Applicant and the Respondent received his parenting time every second weekend. This was reflected in both draft orders supplied by the Applicant. I have also decided to order shared care during the summer months as contained in the November, 2023 draft order with the last week of the summer being with the Applicant so that she can prepare the child for school.

Child Support

[129] The Applicant claims child support from the Respondent, who works driving a tow truck.

[130] C.J.P. says that he can only work part time because of the criminal charges. He said that, because of those criminal charges, he cannot work on accidents where police attendance is necessary, a large part of the job. He has filed a letter from his employer dated May 10, 2024 which says that “unfortunately we are unable to have Calvin subcontract for us on a full-time basis as he is not TSSEA [Towing and Storage Safety and Enforcement Act, 2021[^24]] approved. Once Calvin has been approved, we are more than happy to hire [C.J.P.] as a full-time subcontractor for our business.”[^25]

[131] The letter does not inform us of C.J.P.’s actual annual income.

[132] It was C.J.P.’s evidence that the charges laid by the Applicant were what prevented his licensing for full time work. Assuming the bail conditions or his release conditions contain a weapons prohibition, this may very well be true (the release conditions were not made an exhibit at trial).[^26]

[133] The Respondent agreed that, if necessary, he would pay child support based only on his part time income. However, I have no idea what his part time income is. The Respondent failed to file or serve an updated finance a statement as required by r. 13(12) of the Family Law Rules. In fact, the index to the Continuing Record indicates that the Respondent has not filed a financial statement since April 6, 2022, more than two years prior to the trial. The Respondent has not filed or served any up-to-date financial information for this trial. In contrast, the Applicant filed and served an updated financial statement both on February 1, 2023 and on November 6, 2023 as well as a confirming affidavit concerning her financial situation as required by the rules.[^27]

[134] M.A.J. seeks to impute income to C.J.P. She says that it is his fault that he is not working full time as he is responsible for the charges that have been laid against him. However, C.J.P. has not made any meaningful financial disclosure since 2022. He filed nothing for this trial. It is difficult to lay an evidentiary foundation to prove imputation of income without a starting point. In M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2022 ONSC 7207 at para. 478, Chappell J. stated:

I emphasized that in light of this problem of information asymmetry, the court must when considering the onus issue in imputation of income claims be mindful of the fundamental principle that every party in a support case must disclose and adduce the evidence required to allow the other party and the court to undertake a proper assessment of their income for support purposes. Further to this principle, if a party identifies issues respecting the other party's income that could support an imputation of income argument during the course of the proceeding, the party whose income is in question cannot simply make bald assertions regarding their financial circumstances and hope that the other party will not uncover evidence to support an imputation of income claim. Rather, that party has a positive obligation to proactively disclose information and evidence in support of their position respecting their income, including why income should not be imputed to them. The nature and extent of the disclosure required in response to imputation of income issues will depend on the questions and concerns raised by the other party and the facts of each case (A.E. v. A.E., at para. 259). If the party whose income is in question does not disclose information in response to reasonable concerns and questions raised by the other party that could support an imputation of income argument, the trial judge may draw an adverse inference against them (Meade v. Meade, 2002 2806 (ON SC), 2002 CarswellOnt 2670 (S.C.J.), at para. 81). It may also impute income pursuant to section 19(1)(f) of the Guidelines, on the basis of the party's failure to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so.

[135] I note that a negative inference can be drawn where a party has not provided financial disclosure as he or she may be obligated to provide under the rules: see Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548 and Woofenden v. Woofenden, 2018 ONSC 4583. This has been codified in s. 19(1)(f) of the Child Support Guidelines which provides that:

(1) The court may impute such amount of income to a parent or spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include,

(f) the parent or spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so;

[136] Because of the Respondent’s failure to disclose, both parties filed statistical evidence of the average income of a tow truck driver in Ontario obtained on the internet. The Applicant filed information from Indeed.com showing the average salary of a tow truck driver was $87,242.[^28] The Respondent filed information from ZipRecruiter which showed a range of income for tow truck drivers as being between a low of $39,667 in Nepean, Ontario to a high of $41,251 in Scarborough, Ontario. The salary for a tow truck driver in Owen Sound, nearest to the Respondent’s home in Dundalk, was shown to be $40,717.[^29] There was no objection by either party as to the admission of this evidence.

[137] No information was provided by either party as to the veracity of this income. Sherr J. reviewed this type of evidence in Rodriguez v. de Sousa, 2008 ONCJ 807 and stated (at para. 23):

Although these salary publications are admissible, I am treating them with considerable caution. It is unsworn, hearsay evidence and has not been tested by cross-examination.

[138] I note that Sherr J. was dealing with evidence on a motion and had determined that r. 14(19) permits evidence on a motion obtained from “someone else”. That is not the test for trial, which permits hearsay evidence only on the basis of relevance, necessity and reliability: see R. v. Mohan (1994), 1994 80 (SCC), 89 CCC (3d) 402 (S.C.C.). Relevancy to the Respondent’s income is obvious. The necessity arises from the failure of C.J.P. to prove his own income as he is obliged to do under the rules and at common law. There was, however, no information as to the reliability of either of the websites used by the parties.

[139] It is, however, the only evidence I have of C.J.P.’s income. His employer has provided correspondence indicating that he is not working full time, again hearsay evidence and not objected to by the Applicant’s counsel.

[140] The best that the income information provides is a range of income for tow truck drivers in Ontario. I take into account that the Respondent is not working full time because of the criminal charges (which may be his responsibility in light of the fact that I have found family violence which led to the charges being laid). I don’t know what working part time or full time means in this case because that has not been quantified by either his employer or C.J.P. I am going to find that his income is closer to the lower ranges filed by C.J.P. but I am not going to discount the amounts lower because of C.J.P.’s responsibility for the charges being laid and his own criminal record.

[141] The Applicant seeks imputation of income to C.J.P. in the amount of $60,000 per annum. I find that C.J.P.’s income for support purposes is $50,000 per annum which is lower than the highest income submitted by the Applicant and takes into account C.J.P.’s evidence that he works part time. It also takes into account the travel expenses resulting from the child’s move to Woodville. This would mean that his support would be $461 per month. The Applicant seeks an order that child support commences on December 1, 2023 when C.P. began to reside with the Applicant on a full time basis and I am going to accede to that request.

[142] There was no evidence as to section 7 expenses. M.A.J. is receiving disability income and there is no day care. I heard no evidence of extra-curricular activities or of educational costs. In light of C.J.P.’s travel costs due to M.A.J.’ move to Woodville, I decline to order or apportion s. 7 expenses at this time.

Order

[143] There shall therefore be a final order varying the final order of Eberhard J. dated November as follows:

a. The Respondent’s claims in his motion to change, including the claim made at trial to have M.A.J. and C.P. return to Barrie, are dismissed.

b. The Applicant, M.A.J., shall have sole decision-making authority for the parties’ child, C.P., born July 16, 2019 on the following terms:

i. The Applicant shall have day to day decision-making authority concerning C.P.;

ii. The Applicant shall have the authority to make major decisions concerning the health, education and general welfare concerning C.P. Provided that the Applicant shall advise the Respondent of her intention to make a major decision and reasonably consult with him as to any major decision, but if the parties cannot agree on that decision, the Applicant shall have the final say.

c. Both parties shall have the same rights to make inquiries and be given information by the child's teachers, school officials, doctors, dentists, health care providers and summer camp counsellors or others involved with the children. Each party shall obtain their own school calendar and school notices. The parties shall sign any consents required.

d. The Respondent father shall have regular parenting time with the child, C.P., born July 16, 2019 every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.

i. Exchanges shall be effected through a third party in Barrie, Ontario at either of the Supervised Access Centre or alternatively the Barrie Public Library located at 60 Worsley Street in Barrie, as agreed to by the parties.

ii. If the Respondent’s parenting time falls on a holiday Monday or if there is a PA day on Monday, he shall have that extra day and parenting exchange shall be Monday evening at 6:00 p.m. If there is a holiday Friday or PA day leading up to the Respondent’s parenting time, the parties shall exchange C.P. on the Thursday evening.

e. C.P., born July 16, 2019, shall continue to attend Lady Mackenzie Public School in Kirkfield, Ontario.

f. Both parties shall sign all necessary consents for the child to attend counselling and any programs as recommended by the Children’s Aid Society and/or the child’s school.

g. The parents shall share the child’s Christmas vacation equally as follows:

i. In even years, the Applicant shall have the child for the first half of the child’s Christmas school holidays and the Respondent shall have the second half of the child’s Christmas school holidays and in odd numbered years the schedule will reverse with the Respondent having the first half of the child’s Christmas school holidays and the Applicant having the second half.

ii. Provided that the parties shall alternate Christmas Eve and Christmas Day annually such that in even years the Applicant shall have the child on Christmas Eve and Respondent shall have the child on Christmas Day from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. In odd years, the schedule shall reverse with the Respondent having the child on Christmas Eve and the Applicant shall have the child on Christmas Day from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.

h. The parents will alternate Thanksgiving and Easter every year. If C.P. is with the Applicant for Thanksgiving, C.P. will be with the Respondent for Easter for that same year. The schedule will reverse in the following year.

i. The parents shall share March break with the Respondent having 4 days of March Break and the Applicant having 3 days. The Respondent’s March break parenting time shall fall either before or after his regular weekend parenting time to minimize travel for C.P.

j. During the summer, the Applicant and the Respondent shall have week about parenting time with the child, C.P., born July 16, 2019, such that they will exchange the child each and every Friday at 6:00 p.m. at the police station in Barrie, Ontario. The parents shall plan their vacation trips with C.P. during their summer scheduled weeks. The summer week about schedule shall be structured so that the child will spend the week immediately prior to the commencement of school with the Applicant so that she can get him ready for school.

k. No party shall remove the child from the regional municipality of Kawartha Lakes, or the Dundalk area without the written permission of the other, which shall not be unreasonably withheld.

l. Neither party shall apply for a passport for the child without the written consent of the other party.

m. If any party plans a vacation with the child during their parenting or contact time, that party shall give the other party a detailed itinerary at least 30 days before the vacation begins, or as soon as is practical if plans are made less than 30 days before the vacation begins, including the name of any airline carrier and flight times, accommodation, including address and telephone numbers, and details about how to contact the child during the trip.

n. Once the Respondent’s criminal charges are finalized, the parties shall only communicate via AppClose. All communication is to remain civil and child focused. No party shall use AppClose to harass, belittle, or mistreat the other.

o. Pending resolution of the Respondent’s criminal charges, he shall forthwith request that his criminal undertaking be varied to allow for direct communication with the Applicant by way of AppClose or communication book.

i. In the event that the criminal court will vary the Respondent’s criminal undertaking, the parties shall immediately notify the other when there is a medical emergency involving C.P., including but not limited to, the details of the injury and the location of the medical facility where C.P. is being treated.

ii. If the criminal court refuses to vary the said undertaking, the Respondent shall continue to communicate concerning the child through the Respondent’s sister, Michele Boileau.

p. Commencing December 1, 2023 and every month thereafter, the Respondent shall pay child support in the amount of $461 per month in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97 based on the Respondent’s annual income of $50,000.

[144] If the parties cannot agree on the costs of trial, the parties shall provide written costs submissions on a ten day turnaround, the Applicant first and then the Respondent. Costs submissions shall be provided to the judicial assistant and no reply costs submissions shall be entertained. Costs submissions to be no more than five pages in length not including offers to settle or bills of costs.

Justice J.P.L. McDermot

Released: September 26, 2024

[^1]: O. Reg 391/97 [^2]: Trial Ex. 20. [^3]: R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 [^4]: OCL investigatory report, Tab 58 of the Trial Record, p. 18. [^5]: Ibid., p. 17. [^6]: Ibid., p. 19. [^7]: R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 [^8]: See paragraph 18 of the Eberhard J. order dated June 2, 2020. There is similar wording in paragraph 16 of the same order. [^9]: AppClose message from Michele Boileau to the Applicant dated October 9, 2023, Ex. H to the Affidavit of the Applicant sworn November 8, 2023 (Trial Ex. 16) [^10]: The Applicant excused this behaviour, stating that the cream only had to be used every two days and because the visit was only two overnights, she did not have to provide the cream. C.J.P. says that he was never told this and brought the child to the hospital to address the rash. M.A.J. said that the rash was worse after the weekend with the father (possibly because there was no cream provided by M.A.J.). [^11]: See Ex. K to the affidavit of the Respondent sworn May 13, 2024, Trial Ex. 4. [^12]: See Ibid., Ex. J. [^13]: Trial Ex. 7. [^14]: Trial Ex. 15. [^15]: CPIN Disclosure from December 26, 2019, Trial Ex. 6 [^16]: Trial Ex. 20. [^17]: Ex. C to the affidavit of the Applicant sworn May 9, 2024, Trial Ex. 5. [^18]: OCL Investigative report, op cit., p. 17. [^19]: Paragraph 21 of the Applicant’s affidavit sworn November 8, 2023, Trial Ex. 16. [^20]: See the affidavit of the Applicant sworn May 15, 2023, para. 36 and 37. [^21]: Ibid., Ex. A [^22]: See Ex. “L” to the affidavit of the Respondent sworn April 6, 2022, which is correspondence dated May 26, 2020, from Simcoe Muskoka Family Connexions. In that letter, worker Sandra Bullock confirms that the Society had verified that “due to the exposure to partner violence, the children [presumably both Ava and C.P.] were at risk of emotional harm”. In the CPIN disclosure from Simcoe Muskoka C.A.S. (trial Ex. 6), “ongoing conflict” between the parties is noted as a problem in the notes from June 10, 2020. The records further indicated in October, 2019, the Society worker had included “Emotional Harm / Exposure to Conflict” as a “moderate” issue; this again was related to partner violence. The correspondence from Grey Bruce C.A.S. dated February 26, 2021 indicates that they were initially involved in this case by Simcoe Muskoka C.A.S. because of partner conflict: see Trial Ex 10. [^23]: In her report, dated June 4, 2021, the OCL Social Worker, Stephanie Kuiack, says that the relationship between the parties is high conflict, but implies that the responsibility for this rests with M.A.J., when she points out at p. 19 of the report that “There are no reports however of C.J.P. having a contentious relationship with any other persons, even with M.A.J.’ friends and family.” [^24]: S.O. 2021, c. 26 [^25]: Affidavit of Respondent sworn May 13, 2024 (Trial ex. 4), Ex. Q. [^26]: See O. Reg. 167/23, ss. 2 and 15. [^27]: See Trial Ex. 23. [^28]: Trial Ex. 8. [^29]: Trial Ex. 9.

M.A.J. v. C.J.P., 2024 ONSC 5300

Case Summary

Introduction

Result

Analysis

Credibility of the Parties

OCL Investigation

Parenting Issues

The Father’s Parenting Plan

The Mother’s Parenting Plan

Issues

Material Change in Circumstances

Communications Issues

Family Violence

Status Quo

Relocation Issue

Conclusion

Child Support

Order

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Issues

Statutory Provisions 5

Legal Tests 3

Legislation 5