Dale Brawn

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the respondent father's motion for summary judgment and addressed the issue of costs.

The successful applicant, self-represented and residing outside the region, sought costs for lost income and travel expenses totaling $2,001.48.

The respondent opposed costs, citing the applicant's unpreparedness and overestimation of lost work time.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and relevant case law, including Mattina v. Mattina, to determine costs.

The court found some inefficiencies attributable to the applicant but overall reasonable conduct during the summary judgment motion.

Considering the respondent's unreasonable conduct in bringing a duplicative motion, the court awarded costs of $2,000 payable monthly, emphasizing the need to discourage repetitive litigation.

The respondent father brought a motion for summary judgment on his own motion to change, seeking to retroactively and prospectively reduce his child support obligations due to an alleged inability to work following an injury.

The court found that the father failed to provide cogent medical evidence connecting his health condition to an inability to work, relying instead on inadmissible hearsay and an Ontario Social Benefits Tribunal decision that was heavily redacted and based on evidence not fully before the court.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the father's evidence fell short of the threshold required to vary support.

The father's motion to change was summarily dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful Motion to Change brought by the respondent, Marcel Marriott, with the exception of spousal support.

The applicant, Kim Marriott, failed to submit her cost outline or submissions despite multiple reminders, leading to the respondent's costs request proceeding unopposed.

The court found that the respondent's formal offers to settle would have placed the applicant in a better position than the motion's outcome.

The applicant's conduct regarding increased transportation costs was deemed unreasonable.

The court reviewed the respondent's Bill of Costs and, considering the factors in s. 24(12) of the Family Law Rules, fixed costs at $9,500 to be paid by the applicant to the respondent.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a final consent order regarding child and spousal support, and sought reimbursement for travel expenses incurred due to the applicant mother's unilateral relocation with the children.

The court denied the termination of spousal support, upholding the original order's terms.

However, child support was retroactively adjusted based on updated incomes and the children's status as dependants.

The court ordered the applicant to reimburse the respondent for past travel expenses, offsetting the respondent's child support arrears to nil, and mandated the applicant to share future travel responsibilities for parenting time.

John David Wickie brought a motion seeking an order to refrain the Family Responsibility Office (F.R.O.) from suspending his driver's license due to $94,801 in support arrears.

The motion was dismissed because it was not properly before the court, as Mr. Wickie failed to serve and file a Financial Statement and proof of income as required by the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act and the Family Law Rules.

The court declined to overlook these procedural shortcomings, noting no compelling evidence of inequity.

Additionally, Mr. Wickie failed to establish a prima facie case for his related Motion to Change a Final Order, having not filed responding material in the original application, voluntarily left employment without disclosing reasons, and provided no evidence of seeking new employment.

Costs of $250 were awarded against Mr. Wickie.

The respondent brought a motion for an order naming her the owner of a jointly owned embryo, seeking its implantation after an acrimonious divorce.

The applicant opposed, preferring donation.

The court held that the dispute was governed by valid contracts.

The Ontario contract stipulated that the patient's (respondent's) wishes were to be respected in the event of separation.

While a Georgia contract indicated court determination in divorce, the court prioritized the Ontario contract's specific provision.

The motion was granted, allowing the respondent to use the embryo, and the applicant was awarded reimbursement for his financial interest in half of the embryo.