Kerry Lea Benzakein

The accused, charged with drug trafficking offences, brought applications to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging violations of their rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The police obtained search warrants for a condominium and a vehicle based on information from a confidential informant.

Prior to executing the warrants, police discovered the accused's vehicle at a different condominium, arrested him, and made a warrantless exigent entry into the unit to prevent the destruction of evidence.

The court found the initial warrants were validly issued and that the exigent entry was lawful under s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court also dismissed challenges to a strip search and an alleged delay in facilitating the right to counsel.

The applications were dismissed.

The defendant, Leon Bookal, was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, stemming from a search warrant executed at his residence.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession, while the defendant claimed the cocaine belonged to a friend who was staying at his condominium and had access to his locker.

The court found the police officers' note-taking inadequate and their independent recollections unreliable.

Despite some inconsistencies in the defendant's testimony, the court found his evidence compelling and was left with a reasonable doubt regarding his knowledge of the cocaine and the origin of the cash.

Consequently, the defendant was found not guilty on both counts.

The defendant brought an application to exclude evidence (crack cocaine) found in his condominium, arguing a section 8 Charter breach due to an unlawful strip search conducted at the police station subsequent to his arrest.

The court found a section 8 breach occurred due to the blatant lack of record-keeping regarding the reasons for and the manner in which the strip search was conducted, despite finding reasonable and probable grounds for the search itself and general compliance with most *Golden* guidelines.

However, the court dismissed the application to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding no temporal, contextual, or causal connection between the strip search breach and the evidence, which was obtained hours earlier under a valid search warrant.

The accused, charged with trafficking in heroin and possession of the proceeds of crime, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of the trial was approximately 32 months.

The court analyzed the delay using the Morin framework and concluded that the institutional delay was 14 months and 3 days, which fell short of the 18-month guideline for Superior Court cases.

Finding that the prejudice suffered by the accused stemmed from being charged rather than the delay itself, the court dismissed the application.

The accused applied to vary his bail recognizance to permit him to resume producing medical marijuana at an industrial premises while facing charges for drug production and related offences.

He argued that his prior personal-use production licence remained valid due to the Federal Court’s interlocutory injunction in Allard v Canada preserving certain licences under the former Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

The court held that the applicant did not meet the criteria for protection under the Allard injunction or Health Canada’s transitional administrative policy because his authorization to possess had expired before the relevant injunction date.

As a result, he could obtain medical marijuana through lawful sources but could not personally cultivate it.

The application to vary the recognizance was dismissed.

In a judge-alone criminal trial, the accused pleaded guilty to simple possession of crack cocaine but contested the allegation that the drugs were possessed for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought to rely on a police expert to establish that the quantity seized was inconsistent with personal use, despite the absence of common trafficking indicia such as packaging materials, scales, debt lists, or significant cash.

Applying the Mohan and Abbey admissibility principles, the court held that the proposed opinion evidence, even taken at its highest, could not eliminate the reasonable inference of personal use and risked shifting the burden of proof.

The Crown therefore failed to prove the purpose element beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trafficking charge was dismissed and a conviction was entered only on the included offence of simple possession.

Sentencing for possession of large quantities of heroin and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, together with possession of proceeds of crime.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, particularly specific deterrence, given the respondent's otherwise strong family support, business success, and lack of criminal record, but found those same circumstances showed the offences arose from greed rather than need.

A 10-year sentence was found fit in light of the scale of the drugs and the harm associated with heroin and cocaine trafficking.

The court granted 6 months' credit for restrictive bail conditions over approximately four years, resulting in a net global sentence of 9 years and 6 months, together with forfeiture of seized funds, a DNA order, and a s. 110 prohibition.

The accused was charged with drug-related offences following a police search warrant executed at his residence.

The Crown sought to rely on the "step six" process from R. v. Garafoli to have the court consider redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO) that were excised to protect the identity of a confidential informant.

The defence opposed this request, arguing that the Crown's summary of the redacted material did not provide sufficient information to mount a proper challenge to the warrant's validity.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of whether the summary adequately disclosed the nature of the redacted information under the three Debot criteria: credibility of the informant, corroboration, and compellability.

The court found that the step six process could be applied on a partial basis, allowing the Crown to rely on the unredacted ITO for certain paragraphs where the summary provided sufficient detail, while restricting the Crown to the redacted version for other paragraphs where the summary was inadequate.

The accused applied for disclosure relating to police protocols for informants, procedures for after-hours search warrant access to judicial officers, and production of a confidential informant file.

The application was brought to support a proposed Garofoli challenge to search warrants and to explore potential abuse of process allegations including alleged judge shopping and possible police agency by the informant.

The court held that the requested materials were irrelevant to the merits of the prosecution and unsupported by any evidentiary foundation.

The court further held that confidential informant files are prima facie privileged and cannot be compelled absent the innocence-at-stake exception.

The application was characterized as a fishing expedition and dismissed.

Police conducted surveillance on a residence linked through confidential informants to a suspected large‑scale cocaine trafficker.

Officers observed an individual leave the residence carrying a shoebox, meet briefly with the accused in a vehicle, and transfer the box before the accused drove away.

The accused was arrested shortly afterward and police discovered a kilogram of cocaine in the shoebox during a vehicle search.

The accused argued the arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds and that the search violated ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court held that the informant information, combined with police surveillance and the officer’s experience in drug investigations, established objectively reasonable grounds for arrest and justified the search incident to arrest.

The Charter application was dismissed and the seized cocaine was admitted as evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and the finding that he was a dangerous offender.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on evidence of his assault on police officers at the time of arrest and failed to properly summarize the defence's position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misdirection and noting the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge gave undue weight to an expert's opinion that relied on other experts not called as witnesses.

The Court dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the expert was entitled to rely on the material and the dangerous offender finding was fully supported by the evidence.