Virgil Eugen Cojocaru

The applicant sought a declaration that his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms had been breached, and applied for a stay of proceedings under s.24(1).

Although the total delay of 539 days (17.7 months) fell below the presumptive Jordan ceiling of 18 months for Ontario Court of Justice proceedings, the court found a below-the-ceiling breach.

The applicant demonstrated meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings and established that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The delay was primarily attributable to the Crown's failure to provide video statements in a timely manner and the court's inability to offer trial dates earlier than 13 months from the swearing of the information.

The charges were stayed.

The appellant, J.D., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his three-year imprisonment sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds included allegations of reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge, improper use of voir dire testimony, an unreasonable verdict, and the trial judge's failure to grant s. 278 applications for disclosure of the complainant's medical records.

The sentence appeal ground related to the trial judge's alleged misapprehension of the potential immigration consequences of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, no improper use of voir dire evidence, and that the verdict was reasonable given the appellant's admissions.

The court upheld the dismissal of the s. 278 applications, characterizing them as a fishing expedition.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge's error regarding immigration consequences did not impact the fitness of the sentence, which was within the appropriate range for forced penetration.

J.D. was found guilty of sexual assault.

The court considered aggravating factors, including abuse of trust, the victim's vulnerability, and the lasting impact on the victim, and mitigating factors such as no prior criminal record, good character, and collateral consequences related to marital breakdown and potential immigration status.

The defence sought a conditional sentence, while the Crown sought 3.5 years custody.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, and sentenced J.D. to three years' imprisonment, along with a DNA order, a 20-year SOIRA order, a 10-year firearms prohibition, and a no-contact order with the victim.

The accused was tried for sexual assault against his 18-year-old niece.

The Crown alleged the accused touched the complainant's breast and digitally penetrated her vagina without consent while she was drowsy from medication.

The court admitted the accused's out-of-court statements to a friend and expert psychiatric evidence called by the defence.

The court found that the accused touched the complainant's breast before asking if she was uncomfortable, and that any subsequent consent was vitiated by his abuse of a position of trust.

The court also accepted the complainant's evidence that the accused digitally penetrated her while she was asleep.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The Crown applied for testimonial aids for the complainant in a sexual assault trial, seeking remote testimony via closed-circuit television and the presence of a support person.

The court granted the request for a support person, as it was uncontested by the defence.

However, the application for remote testimony was denied.

The court found that while the complainant had a mental disability (post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression), the Crown failed to establish the necessary nexus between this disability and a potential difficulty in communicating evidence, as required by subsection 486.2(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court noted that a privacy screen, an alternative expressly contemplated by Parliament and offered by the defence, was available and deemed sufficient.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and refusing a breath test.

The court dismissed the refusal charge due to significant police failures in implementing the defendant's right to counsel under the Charter, including not assisting in locating a named lawyer and failing to advise about duty counsel or the consequences of refusal.

However, the court found no Charter breach regarding the right to counsel at the roadside for the impaired driving charge, preferring the officer's testimony.

Based on civilian and police observations of erratic driving, signs of alcohol impairment (odour, bloodshot eyes, unsteadiness, slurred speech), and lack of judgment in leaving an accident scene, the defendant was found guilty of impaired driving.

Related Highway Traffic Act charges were also dismissed.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking, brought an application for the disclosure of police disciplinary records relating to two officers involved in the investigation.

The court held that the disciplinary file of an officer who would not be called as a Crown witness was not first party disclosure and did not meet the 'likely relevant' threshold for third party records.

For the undercover officer who would testify, the court ordered the police to ascertain whether specific additional disciplinary records existed, but otherwise dismissed the application.

The accused brought a Charter section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The accused was arrested on April 7, 2016, and charged with assault, firearms offences, and possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

He remained in custody throughout the proceedings.

The trial was scheduled to begin on May 10, 2017, approximately 13 months after arrest.

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that while the case took markedly longer than it should have, the accused failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings.

The application was dismissed.

A young person charged with six sexual offences alleged to have been committed between 1971 and 1976 brought a section 11(b) Charter application claiming his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The accused was 55 years old when charged and 57 at the time of the application.

The total delay from swearing of the Information to the last scheduled trial date was 621 days (21.5 months).

After deducting minimal defence delay and one month for an unavoidable discrete event (judge illness), the net remaining delay was 20 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, having caused significant avoidable delay through failure to provide timely disclosure, unnecessary adjournments during the judicial pre-trial phase for Crown convenience, failure to organize witness lists and police schedules, and failure to prioritize the case until the delay application was heard.

The court granted a judicial stay of proceedings on all counts.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault and the resulting sentence imposed after a domestic altercation in which the complainant alleged that the appellant choked her during an argument.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the test in R. v. W.(D.), misapprehended inconsistencies in the evidence, improperly rejected the defence of de minimis non curat lex, demonstrated bias during trial, and erred by imposing restitution.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, reasonably assessed credibility, and correctly rejected the de minimis defence given the seriousness of choking during a domestic dispute.

Allegations of judicial bias were rejected as unfounded.

While the custodial sentence and probation were upheld, the stand‑alone restitution order was set aside as unnecessary because restitution had already been imposed as a probation condition.

The accused applied for a stay of drug trafficking charges under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial date was approximately 27.25 months.

Applying the framework from Morin, the court analyzed each contested period and concluded that only 12 months constituted Crown or institutional delay, which fell within acceptable institutional delay guidelines.

The court also found that the prejudice claimed by the accused was limited and largely attributable to the stress of being charged rather than the delay itself.

The application for a stay of proceedings was therefore dismissed.