Mindy Caterina

The applicant sought the appointment of state-funded counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for his appeals from convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm.

He argued that the trial judges erred by failing to inquire into potential s. 11(b) Charter breaches due to delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to prove he lacked the means to hire counsel privately and failed to establish arguable grounds of appeal, as he had been represented by counsel for much of the proceedings and provided no evidence regarding the reasons for the delay.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of ketamine for the purpose of trafficking, producing ketamine, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

He appealed his convictions, seeking to set aside his guilty pleas to challenge a pre-trial ruling under s. 11(b) of the Charter, and appealed his 15.5-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the guilty pleas were voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the original sentence demonstrably unfit and disproportionate for a first-time offender who pleaded guilty.

The total sentence was reduced to 10 years.

The applicant, charged with sexual offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the 40-month and 19-day delay in bringing him to trial was unreasonable.

The Crown argued that the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 global pandemic and the time it took the applicant to secure funding for counsel.

The court agreed, deducting 10 months and 12 days for the pandemic and 3 months for the funding delay, bringing the net delay to 28 months and 8 days, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The appellants, Orville Campbell and Stanton David, appealed their convictions for first-degree murder.

They argued the verdict was unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation and alleged errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal found the first-degree murder verdict unreasonable, concluding that the evidence did not establish planning and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly given the rapid sequence of events.

The court substituted the convictions with second-degree murder.

It dismissed all grounds for a new trial on second-degree murder, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct, the Vetrovec warning for a key witness, pathology evidence, or the use of the deceased's criminal record.

The appellant appealed her conviction for attempting to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking and her sentence of 9 years imprisonment (less 36 days credit for pre-trial custody).

The conviction arose from the appellant's pickup of a shipment containing 3.3 kilograms of heroin that had been intercepted at Pearson International Airport and replaced with a control sample by police.

The appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of misapprehension of evidence and unreasonableness of verdict, and sought sentence reduction based on alleged errors in principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge's findings of fact and sentencing decision to be reasonable and fit.

The accused, charged with multiple domestic violence offences including assault and forcible confinement, brought an O'Connor application seeking third-party records relating to the complainant.

The requested records included extensive banking, cell phone, and social media data.

The court found that the request was overly broad and amounted to a fishing expedition.

However, the court ordered a limited temporal scope of banking records to be produced for a stage two review, as they were potentially relevant to the complainant's credibility regarding text messages allegedly sent by the accused from her phone.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown consented to the admission of fresh evidence and conceded that a new trial should be ordered.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of producing marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Police executed a valid search warrant at a bungalow where a grow-op was operating and seized a large quantity of marijuana.

The appellant was arrested as she approached the bungalow, and a house key was seized from her incident to arrest.

The appellant was delayed over three hours in accessing counsel in breach of s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded the s. 10(b) breach.

The appellant argued the breach tainted not only the seizure of the house key but also the drugs seized under the search warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the seizure of drugs under the valid search warrant was causally, temporally, and contextually distinct from the arrest and subsequent s. 10(b) breach.

Regarding the house key, while subject to potential exclusion, the Grant factors favoured admission as the breach was not strategic or serious, the impact was minimal given other admissible evidence, and society had an interest in trial on the merits.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking based primarily on a police officer's identification of the appellant as the driver of a minivan that sped past the officer at 50 km/h from a distance of 15 feet.

The officer's fleeting observation lasted only seconds and was limited to describing the driver as an Asian male with dark hair.

The appellant's wallet containing an OHIP card with photograph and an inhaler were found in the vehicle, along with seven large garbage bags of marijuana.

The trial judge found these items, combined with the officer's identification, sufficient to establish the appellant's guilt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the conviction unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.

The appellant, Manpreet Sohal, appealed his conviction for impaired driving, challenging the trial judge's finding that he was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident.

The appeal raised five grounds, including alleged failures by the trial judge to properly instruct himself on eyewitness identification frailties, misapprehension of evidence, failure to consider collusion, erroneous treatment of absence of embellishment, and improper inferences drawn from video evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the first four grounds.

While the trial judge erred in drawing certain inferences from the video footage without seeking submissions from counsel, this error was deemed to be of negligible weight and did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted at trial of producing methamphetamine and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking following a fire at an industrial complex containing a clandestine drug lab.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellant's fingerprint on a pop can found in the unit and a cell phone found in the lab that the trial judge concluded belonged to the appellant.

The phone contained incriminating evidence including photographs of equipment used in methamphetamine production.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: improper reliance on certified court documents to link him to the phone, misapprehension of evidence regarding photographs on the phone, and that the conviction on the possession for trafficking count was unreasonable or insufficiently reasoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning and that the circumstantial evidence cumulatively supported the convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with fraud and BIA offences arising from her voluntary assignment in bankruptcy.

During her trial, she brought an application to exclude statements she made to the Official Receiver during a mandatory examination under s. 161 of the BIA, arguing the Official Receiver was a 'person in authority' and the statements were involuntary.

The court held that the Official Receiver was not a person in authority, as she had no influence or control over any criminal prosecution and was merely fulfilling her regulatory duties.

Furthermore, even if she were a person in authority, the statements were voluntary as there were no threats, promises, or oppressive conduct.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The plaintiff, N.M. Davis Corporation Limited, moved for a further and better affidavit of documents from the defendant, Marshall Stuart Ross, specifically seeking a detailed Schedule B regarding the Crown disclosure brief from a related criminal matter.

The plaintiff sought this information to determine when the co-defendant, Eva Jacqueline Wower, might have anticipated Ross's conviction for murder, which is relevant to the plaintiff's claim that Ross fraudulently conveyed properties to Wower under the guise of a divorce to defeat a judgment.

The defendant Ross resisted, arguing irrelevance and disproportionality given the 13 boxes of documents.

The court, applying principles from D.P. v. Wagg and Rule 29.2, found that while the timing of disclosure was relevant, requiring a full cataloguing of the entire Crown brief was disproportionate.

The court ordered Ross to amend his affidavit to identify transmission documents (e.g., covering letters) indicating when portions of the Crown brief were received by his counsel, without requiring a full Wagg screening process for these transmission documents.

Costs were awarded in the cause.

The defendant was found guilty of possession of MDMA and possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine, marihuana, and psilocybin.

The court considered the large quantities of drugs, including 4.7 kilograms of cocaine, and the commercial nature of the enterprise as aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's lack of a criminal record, employment history, and family ties.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8 years imprisonment, reduced to 6 years and 6 months after applying 18 months of credit for pre-trial custody and strict bail conditions, along with various forfeiture and prohibition orders.

The accused, a registered confidential informant, was charged with serious drug offences after receiving a package containing illicit drugs via a controlled delivery.

The accused testified they did not know the package contained drugs and had attempted to contact their police handler about their suspicions.

The court acquitted the accused, finding the Crown failed to prove knowledge or wilful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alternatively, the court granted a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, finding the police committed an egregious abuse of process by breaching informer privilege, involving the accused's handlers in the arrest, and releasing the accused into a dangerous situation to further the investigation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and aggravated assault arising from a gunfight on Yonge Street that resulted in the death of Jane Creba by a stray bullet.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on how armed persons conceal firearms, by inadequately instructing the jury on the mutual gunfight theory of causation, and by refusing to leave self-defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or conclusion that self-defence lacked an air of reality.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained during a Canada Revenue Agency audit of his company and subsequent search warrants, alleging breaches of sections 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant contended that the CRA auditor's predominant purpose was to investigate his alleged criminal tax liability rather than conduct a civil compliance audit.

The court found that the audit remained a bona fide compliance audit until the auditor received answers to the first query on July 14, 2010, at which point the auditor's predominant purpose shifted to a penal investigation.

The court excluded evidence obtained through the second query but admitted evidence from the first query and the search warrant execution.

During a blended voir dire in a prosecution for possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, the Crown sought to admit a videotaped police interview with the accused.

The court assessed whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary under the common law confessions rule.

The evidence showed the interviewing officer repeatedly suggested that providing information was required for the accused’s bail report and failed to provide a police caution informing the accused that statements could be used against him at trial.

Considering the inducement relating to bail and the absence of a caution, the court found a reasonable doubt about voluntariness.

The statement was ruled inadmissible.