Kelsey Flanagan

A reference to the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning whether legal online gaming and sports betting would remain lawful under the Criminal Code if users were permitted to participate in games and betting involving individuals outside of Canada.

The majority (Tulloch C.J.O., Gillese, Hourigan and Dawe JJ.A.) answered affirmatively, finding that section 207(1)(a) of the Criminal Code permits Ontario to conduct and manage a lottery scheme with international pooled liquidity, provided Ontario continues to conduct and manage the Ontario-based aspects of the scheme in accordance with provincial law.

The majority rejected the application of the real and substantial connection test and distinguished the Earth Future decisions.

Van Rensburg J.A. dissented, arguing that the Proposed Model would contravene the Criminal Code because it would require Ontario to conduct and manage aspects of the lottery scheme outside Ontario's territorial boundaries, contrary to the plain meaning of "in that province" in section 207(1)(a).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard motions for leave to adduce evidence and for a confidentiality order in the context of a reference regarding the legality of an online provincial lottery scheme permitting international play.

The court granted leave to the Attorney General of British Columbia and the Canadian Lottery Coalition Members to file their proposed evidence, finding it potentially helpful for the reference panel.

The court dismissed the Canadian Gaming Association's motion for a confidentiality order, ruling that alleged reputational harm was a private interest insufficient to override court openness, especially as the information was largely public.

The appellant, a former police officer, appealed his convictions for bribery, attempting to obstruct justice, breach of trust, and trafficking cocaine, as well as his 13-year sentence and a $250,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The convictions arose from a corrupt relationship with a drug trafficker, from whom the appellant accepted bribes for protection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's jury instructions on reasonable doubt and credibility, admission of evidence, or handling of late disclosure.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the 13-year sentence fit given the gravity of the police corruption.

The fine in lieu of forfeiture was upheld, but the time to pay was varied to one year from the date of the appellant's release from custody.

The Mohawk Council of Kahnawà:ke sought a declaration that Ontario's iGaming scheme, enabled by specific provincial legislative provisions, was inoperative.

The Council argued that these provisions impermissibly allowed private operators to "conduct and manage" lottery schemes, which, under the Criminal Code, is reserved for provincial governments, thus violating the division of powers and triggering the doctrine of paramountcy.

The respondents, iGaming Ontario and the Attorney General of Ontario, challenged the Council's standing and argued that Ontario, through iGO, properly conducts and manages the scheme.

The court granted the Council public interest standing but ultimately dismissed the application, finding that Ontario, through iGO, maintains sufficient control to be considered the "operating mind" of the iGaming scheme, thereby complying with the Criminal Code and avoiding paramountcy.

The Crown brought an application before the Ontario Court of Justice seeking an order to compel two lawyers to disclose confidential and/or privileged information related to a deceased complainant, for use in a criminal prosecution under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The lawyers had refused to provide statements without a court order, citing the Law Society of Ontario's Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, holding that the Ontario Court of Justice lacked the express or implied jurisdiction to grant such an order, which was deemed to be in the nature of declaratory relief.

The court emphasized that its jurisdiction is limited to the criminal proceeding itself and does not extend to pre-trial investigative orders concerning non-parties, a function reserved for the Superior Court.

Two appellants were convicted of murder arising from a shooting in Toronto allegedly motivated by street gang rivalries.

The appellants appealed their convictions on four grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting expert opinion evidence on street gangs from a Toronto Police Service detective; (2) the trial judge erred in admitting handwritten rap lyrics seized from an apartment; (3) the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification evidence; and (4) the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge committed an error in principle regarding expert evidence bias analysis, the evidence was properly admitted.

The court also found the jury instructions on eyewitness identification were adequate and fair, and that the trial judge's conduct, though at times harsh, did not demonstrate bias when viewed contextually.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on drug and firearm charges following a trial judge's finding that police violated the accused's s. 8 Charter right by obtaining a search warrant based on insufficient information, and the subsequent exclusion of evidence.

A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown appeal, affirming the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons of the Court of Appeal judge who found there was no breach of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on drug and firearms charges.

The trial judge found that police violated the respondent's Charter rights under section 8 by obtaining a search warrant based on stale information.

The warrant was issued on February 26, 2016, to search the respondent's vehicle for cocaine and related items, based on information that the respondent had allegedly delivered drugs to a target of investigation on February 3, 2016, and possibly on December 18, 2015.

The trial judge concluded that the 23-day delay between the last alleged transaction and the warrant execution rendered the information insufficient to establish reasonable grounds to believe evidence would be found in the vehicle.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis of the staleness of the information or the application of the section 24(2) factors.