Jonathan Geiger

The defendant was charged with seven counts arising from the execution of Cannabis Act search warrants at two residential properties on November 3, 2021.

The charges included unlawful possession of cannabis for purposes of distribution and sale at both properties, and unlicensed possession of firearms and a prohibited device at the rural property.

The defendant was found present at the rural property when police executed the warrant.

The Crown relied primarily on circumstantial evidence and DNA evidence to establish possession.

The court found that while the Crown established the presence of substantial quantities of cannabis and firearms at both locations, it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed these items.

The court acquitted on all counts, finding reasonable doubts regarding the defendant's knowledge and control over the items, the handling of evidence by police, and the possibility of indirect DNA transfer.

The accused sought leave to cross-examine Detective Constable William Crawford, the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) affidavit used to secure search warrants under the Cannabis Act.

The accused was charged with three counts under the Cannabis Act and six counts under the Criminal Code related to unlicensed cannabis possession and firearms offences.

The court considered five proposed areas of cross-examination: hemp checks conducted, ability to differentiate cannabis from hemp plants, interpretation of monitored conversations, failure to include certain surveillance dates, and alleged failures to be full and frank in specific paragraphs of the ITO.

The court granted leave for cross-examination regarding hemp checks and the basis for belief about plant identification, but denied leave for the other three areas.

The applicants, Mahmoud Al-Ramahi and Atour Paul, sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence under ss. 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging improper interception and handling of solicitor-client privileged communications during a wiretap investigation ("Project Siphon").

Al-Ramahi claimed widespread violations of his ss. 7 and 8 Charter rights due to intercepted audio calls and text messages with his lawyers.

Paul joined the application, arguing the overbroad search and "unfair advantage" to police affected him.

The court found that Al-Ramahi failed to prove improper interception or handling of audio calls but succeeded in demonstrating that his privileged text messages were improperly accessed and handled, breaching his ss. 7 and 8 rights.

The court dismissed the request for a stay of proceedings, finding it too drastic, but ordered the exclusion of all of Al-Ramahi's text messages intercepted after May 29, 2020.

Paul's application was dismissed as he did not suffer a breach of his own Charter rights and lacked standing to claim a remedy based on breaches of another's rights.

The appellant, David Lanktree, appealed his 5-year prison sentence for drug and weapons offences, arguing the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence, treating community drug problems as an aggravating factor, and failing to consider Duncan credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge correctly determined a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the appellant's history of re-offending and breaches.

The court also found the judge did not err in principle by considering the community impact of drug trafficking for denunciation and deterrence, and that the discretion regarding Duncan credit was properly exercised.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of producing marijuana without authorization and two counts of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

He appealed both his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of mens rea, party liability, or credibility.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the original sentence demonstrably unfit due to the duration of house arrest and electronic monitoring, and set aside the probation order.

Djamila Panzo and Jeremy Bailey appealed their convictions related to heroin importation and trafficking.

Panzo appealed convictions for importing, conspiracy to import, possession for trafficking, and conspiracy to possess for trafficking.

Bailey appealed convictions for conspiracy to import, possession for trafficking, and conspiracy to possess for trafficking, having been acquitted of importing.

The appellants argued errors in jury instructions regarding party liability, the co-conspirators’ exception to the hearsay rule, and motive, as well as unreasonable and inconsistent verdicts.

The Court of Appeal found significant errors in the jury instructions that rendered Mr. Bailey's convictions unreasonable and inconsistent, particularly due to a lack of evidentiary foundation for his involvement and improper application of aiding and co-conspirator rules.

Consequently, Mr. Bailey's appeal was allowed, his convictions set aside, and acquittals entered.

Ms. Panzo's appeal was dismissed, as the errors in the jury charge did not directly impact her, and sufficient evidence supported her convictions as a principal.

The appellant was convicted of importing fentanyl and possession for the purpose of trafficking after a controlled delivery of a package from China.

On appeal, she raised several grounds, including errors in jury instructions on importing, circumstantial evidence, and after-the-fact conduct, as well as the unreasonableness of the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds but allowed the appeal based on two errors: the trial judge improperly permitted the Crown to invite an adverse inference against the appellant for testifying after another defence witness, and the trial judge erred in dismissing the appellant's application to adduce evidence of a known third-party suspect.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Justice Okojie, appealed his convictions for importing and possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The primary ground of appeal concerned when the offence of importing is complete, particularly in controlled delivery scenarios, arguing it was complete before his involvement.

The second ground challenged the reasonableness of the verdict, asserting that his knowledge of the package containing a controlled substance was not the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, clarifying that importing is complete when the contraband is no longer under the control of customs authorities, and upholding the trial judge's finding of knowledge based on circumstantial evidence.

This is a sentencing decision for Ms. Trudeau, who was found guilty of importing nearly 3 kilograms of pure cocaine.

The court considered a joint submission for a four-year penitentiary sentence, less pre-trial custody.

The decision extensively details Ms. Trudeau's personal circumstances, including intergenerational trauma from residential schools, physical and sexual abuse, identity issues, and substance abuse, as presented in her Gladue report.

The court applied Gladue principles, acknowledging these factors as "exceptional or extenuating" circumstances that justified a sentence below the usual range for such an offence, while still emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The Attorney General for Ontario and the Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario (CLA) sought leave to intervene in an upcoming appeal concerning the scope of the actus reus of importing contraband.

The Attorney General sought to argue the impact of the definition on provincial prosecutions of importing firearms and child pornography.

The CLA sought to argue that extending the actus reus beyond the immediate entry point disproportionately impacts racialized communities, relying on social context evidence.

The court granted both applications for leave to intervene, finding the proposed arguments and materials relevant and non-controversial.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine into Canada on May 22, 2017, contrary to section 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown alleged that the accused knowingly imported 3,522 grams of liquid cocaine (85% purity) valued between $134,716 and $329,307 in a suitcase upon returning from Brazil.

The accused testified that she was unaware of the cocaine and that her boyfriend may have secretly placed it in her suitcase without her knowledge.

The court rejected the accused's credibility and found that the circumstantial evidence, including the value of the drug, the weight and condition of the suitcase, the accused's handling of the luggage, and the implausibility of the "unwilling dupe" narrative, established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge of the cocaine.

The court convicted the accused.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of 486 grams of heroin for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, and her four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the test for wilful blindness and that the evidence supported his findings.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's difficult background involving serious violence, her rehabilitative potential, and her community involvement.

The Court also found that the trial judge erroneously relied on unrelated criminal conduct as an aggravating factor.

The custodial portion of the sentence was reduced to time served.

The offender was convicted by a jury of three counts related to importing 198 grams of cocaine: possession for the purposes of trafficking, conspiracy to import, and conspiracy to possess for the purposes of trafficking.

Counsel for the offender sought a conditional sentence and challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Criminal Code that preclude conditional sentences for these offences and set a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

The Crown sought 2.5 years incarceration and opposed the constitutional challenges.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenges, finding that the exclusion of conditional sentences was a reasonable legislative choice and that the maximum sentence of life imprisonment was not unconstitutional.

Considering mitigating and aggravating factors, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of two years less a day on each count, with three days credit for pre-sentence custody.

Christopher Bryan was on trial for importing cocaine.

The Crown sought to admit Jennifer McGrath's passport application to corroborate her testimony and to show Bryan acted as guarantor in furtherance of a conspiracy.

The defence opposed, arguing hearsay, late notice under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act (CEA), and prejudice.

The court ruled that Ms. McGrath's statements on the first page of the application were admissible as she adopted them in testimony.

However, the full passport application and affidavit were not admissible under s. 30 CEA due to late notice and resulting prejudice to the defence.

Section 2, the "Declaration of Guarantor" allegedly completed by Bryan, was admissible under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule, with concerns about the unsavoury witness (McGrath) going to weight, not admissibility.

The defence's request for a mistrial was denied.

The defendant was charged with importing cocaine into Canada.

The sole issue at trial was whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the cans in her luggage contained cocaine.

The court considered circumstantial evidence, including the high value of the cocaine and the defendant's exclusive control over the cans.

The court rejected defence theories as speculative, concluding that the only reasonable inference was that the defendant had knowledge of the cocaine.

The defendant was found guilty as charged.

The respondent, facing a first-degree murder charge, subpoenaed a federal Crown counsel who had previously stayed a drug charge against him.

The respondent sought to question the Crown counsel about his reasons for staying the charge to support an abuse of process argument regarding the admission of disreputable conduct evidence.

The Crown counsel brought a certiorari application to quash the subpoena.

The Superior Court held that while the court clerk properly issued the subpoena based on defence counsel's representations, the subpoena must be quashed because the respondent failed to establish that the Crown counsel likely had material evidence to give, as prosecutorial discretion is presumed to be exercised properly absent evidence of bad faith.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana following a search of his vehicle.

The search was initially conducted under section 32(5) of the Ontario Liquor Licence Act after the officer observed open alcohol in the vehicle.

The officer subsequently searched the trunk and opened a shopping bag containing approximately 100 grams of marijuana.

The court found that while the initial search was lawful, the search of the shopping bag exceeded the lawful scope of the search power under the Liquor Licence Act.

Applying the three-factor test from R. v. Grant, the court excluded the evidence of the marijuana, finding that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct, the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests, and the credibility concerns regarding the officer's testimony outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.