Ryan MacIsaac

The moving defendants sought to strike a claim against the Crown and obtain summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice action against a physician arising from the prescription of Aldara and alleged resulting injuries.

The court proceeded in the self-represented plaintiff's absence after repeated adjournments and non-compliance with peremptory terms.

The claim against the Crown was struck as a nullity because the plaintiff sued a ministry lacking capacity to be sued and failed to provide the mandatory sixty days' notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

Summary judgment was granted to the physician because uncontradicted expert evidence established compliance with the standard of care, and the action was independently barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

No costs were awarded because the successful defendants did not seek costs.

The appellant appealed her conviction for fraud over $5,000, alleging that her guilty plea was uninformed and involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant suffered from a permanent intellectual development disorder with an IQ of 42, spoke limited English, and could not read or write in English or Tamil.

Her counsel met with her primarily in the presence of her father and a Tamil interpreter, and advised her to plead guilty.

The appellant did not understand the implications of the plea, particularly the impact of the restitution order on her future social assistance eligibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant was not informed of the consequences of her guilty plea, constituting a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered, but the court exercised its discretion to enter a stay of proceedings in the interests of justice, considering the appellant's intellectual disability, financial hardship, and personal progress.

The appellant applied for a liquor sales licence for a proposed restaurant and programmable art space in Kensington Market.

The Registrar issued a notice of proposal to review the application after receiving objections from residents, the City of Toronto, and the Friends of Kensington Market.

The objectors argued the licence was not in the public interest due to concerns about noise, disturbance, and increased traffic.

The Tribunal found that the objectors failed to establish that granting the licence was contrary to the public interest, noting the appellant's business model was less likely to cause disturbances than existing problematic establishments.

The Tribunal directed the Registrar to issue the licence but attached conditions restricting hours of service and requiring signage, a contact number for residents, and exterior lighting to address community concerns.

The applicant, a dissident member of a not-for-profit corporation, sought access to the corporation's membership list, including electronic addresses, to requisition a meeting.

The corporation had withheld email addresses, citing privacy concerns.

The court found the corporation's refusal was intended to frustrate the dissident members and ordered the corporation to provide the electronic list, including email addresses.

The court also awarded $20,000 in costs to the applicant, noting that the corporation should not use its resources to place roadblocks in the way of corporate democracy.

The applicants, Midwest Amusement Park, LLC and Dr. R.C. Samanta Roy Institute of Science & Technology, Inc., brought motions for summary judgment in two separate fraud actions (2008-action and 2010-action) against Robert Cameron and Cameron Motorsports Inc. The 2008-action concerned fraudulent inducement to purchase go-karts, leading to a U.S. judgment against Midwest Amusement.

The 2010-action involved fraudulent inducement into a loan and business agreement, including fabricated documents and a $175,000 (USD) advance payment, followed by egregious retaliatory conduct by Cameron, causing reputational and economic harm.

The court lifted the stay of proceedings against Cameron Motorsports (due to bankruptcy) as the claim was for fraud, which is not discharged by bankruptcy.

Summary judgment was granted in both actions, finding Cameron and Cameron Motorsports liable for deceit, fraudulent misrepresentation, and obtaining property by false pretenses.

Damages were awarded for direct losses, damages at large for reputational harm and abuse, and punitive damages for the malicious and high-handed conduct.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a rectification order granted by the Superior Court of Justice that allowed Slate Management Corporation to restructure a single-step amalgamation of three subsidiaries into a two-step amalgamation to obtain a tax bump under the Income Tax Act.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal moot based on the principle established in Norcan Oils Ltd. v. Fogler, as the plan of arrangement had been implemented and third parties had relied on the financial consequences of the rectification order.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal and quashed it, awarding costs to Slate.

The plaintiff, Darren Noddle, a self-represented litigant in a civil negligence action against his former doctor and the provincial government, brought a motion seeking an order for publicly-funded counsel.

He alleged that a prescribed drug, Aldara, caused him significant harm, including cognitive impairment and vision problems, which affected his ability to represent himself.

The Attorney General opposed the motion, arguing that the plaintiff's Charter rights were not engaged in a civil action and that he failed to meet the established legal tests for publicly-funded counsel or an advance costs award.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that civil actions for personal injury do not engage section 7 Charter rights, and the plaintiff did not satisfy the criteria for an advance costs award, particularly regarding the absence of other realistic funding options and a prima facie meritorious case of public importance.

The Uber defendants in a proposed class action moved to disqualify Sutts Strosberg LLP as class counsel, alleging a conflict of interest.

The defendants claimed the firm failed to install adequate internal screens when hiring a lawyer who had previously acted for Uber in related litigation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the lawyer did not acquire relevant confidential information and that Sutts Strosberg had implemented reasonable measures to prevent disclosure, including pre-existing internal safeguards and a prompt full screen upon receiving notice of the alleged conflict.

The court emphasized that removal of counsel is a remedy of last resort and that minor technical errors do not warrant disqualification.