11 total
Appeal dismissed; appellant's participation in stock secured financings constituted acts in furtherance of trades breaching ban.
The appellant appealed a decision of the Capital Markets Tribunal finding he breached a 15-year trading ban by participating in stock secured financings.
The Tribunal found that the lenders' sales of pledged securities constituted trades, and the appellant's actions, including sourcing financing and analyzing the value of the pledged equities for compensation tied to the sales' profits, were acts in furtherance of those trades.
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal made no palpable and overriding error in its contextual analysis of the appellant's conduct.
The court granted the applicant's faint hope application to empanel a jury for a reduction in parole ineligibility.
Cristian Figueroa, convicted of first-degree murder, applied under section 745.6 of the Criminal Code for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period (a "faint hope" application).
The court, acting as a screening judge, assessed whether the application had a "reasonable prospect of succeeding" before a jury, considering the nature of the offence, the applicant's character, and his conduct while serving his sentence.
Despite the horrific nature of the crime and the applicant's continued denial of full responsibility, his significant rehabilitative efforts, positive institutional conduct, and relatively low risk of reoffending led the court to conclude that a jury could reasonably grant clemency.
The application to empanel a jury was granted.
Appeals from Capital Markets Tribunal decisions on insider trading and tipping dismissed; sanctions upheld.
The appellants appealed decisions of the Capital Markets Tribunal finding they engaged in illegal insider trading and tipping regarding Amaya Gaming Group Inc.'s acquisition of PokerStars, and imposing sanctions including market bans and administrative penalties.
The appellants argued the Tribunal erred in relying on circumstantial evidence, misapplying the law on similar fact evidence, and imposing punitive sanctions.
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the Tribunal's factual findings or inferences, and holding that the sanctions were protective and within the Tribunal's wide discretion.
Motion for stay of securities sanctions pending appeal dismissed for failing to establish irreparable harm.
The moving parties were found by the Capital Markets Tribunal to have committed insider trading and tipping, resulting in market participation bans and significant financial penalties.
They appealed the Tribunal's decision and brought a motion for a stay of the sanctions pending their appeals.
The Divisional Court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the moving parties failed to establish irreparable harm.
The court also held that the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in enforcing securities regulations and maintaining market integrity.
The Court of Appeal stayed a fraud conviction due to unreasonable delay, rejecting the Crown's attempt to replace the mandatory stay remedy for s. 11(b) breaches.
The appellant was convicted of defrauding a business partner and sentenced to 18 months incarceration and restitution.
He appealed his conviction, arguing a s. 11(b) Charter violation (right to be tried within a reasonable time) and an error in the R. v. W.(D.) analysis.
He also sought leave to appeal his sentence.
The Court of Appeal found a s. 11(b) violation, concluding that the trial judge incorrectly applied the presumptive ceiling for delay.
The court dismissed the Crown's request to impose a remedy other than a stay of proceedings, reaffirming that a stay is the appropriate and only available remedy for a s. 11(b) breach.
The conviction for fraud was stayed.
The appellant's other grounds of appeal, including the W.(D.) analysis and the sentence appeal, were dismissed.
Judicial review dismissed; recommendation to remove Justice of the Peace for publishing critical article upheld.
The applicant, a Justice of the Peace, sought judicial review of decisions by the Justices of the Peace Review Council finding her guilty of judicial misconduct and recommending her removal from office.
The misconduct stemmed from an article she published criticizing the bail system and making personal attacks on Crown Attorneys.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Review Council's decisions on misconduct, disposition, and costs compensation were reasonable and did not violate her Charter right to freedom of expression.
The court granted the Crown's application to retain seized materials for another year due to the complexity of the fraud investigation.
The Crown applied for an order to retain seized material for an additional year in a complex criminal investigation involving Fortress Real Capital Inc. and related entities.
The investigation, initiated in 2018, concerned allegations of investor fraud through misrepresentation of property values and investment eligibility.
The court granted the application, finding the investigation to be complex due to the large volume of electronic and hard copy material, the need for professional assistance (computer experts, accountants), and significant delays caused by extensive solicitor-client privilege claims over seized documents.
The court emphasized that while asserting privilege is legitimate, it contributed to the complexity and delay, justifying further detention of the material until June 22, 2021.
The Court of Appeal set aside a stay of proceedings, clarifying that the particularly complex case exception operates outside the presumptive ceiling.
An appeal of a stay of proceedings granted under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in a workplace fatality case.
The respondents were charged with offences under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following the death of a worker at a gold mine.
The trial was scheduled to begin approximately three months beyond the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.
The application judge stayed the charges, finding the Crown had failed to develop and follow a concrete plan to minimize delay in this particularly complex case.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge had misinterpreted the particularly complex case exception by using the presumptive ceiling as a benchmark for assessing the Crown's conduct, rather than assessing whether the Crown reasonably attempted to minimize delay occasioned by the case's complexity.
Similar fact evidence admitted to support the complainant’s account in child sexual abuse prosecution.
On a Crown application in a judge-alone prosecution for historical sexual offences against a child, the court admitted extrinsic similar fact evidence from another alleged victim who attended the same school at the same time.
Applying the similar fact evidence framework, the court held that the live issue was whether the complainant's account reflected real events rather than fantasy, particularly in light of anticipated psychiatric evidence challenging reliability and truthfulness.
The surrounding circumstances of the alleged incidents, including age similarity, school setting, authority relationship, isolated locations, focus on genital touching, and reassuring language, supplied sufficient connectedness despite differences in number and invasiveness of acts.
The court found the risk of prejudice reduced in a judge-alone trial and concluded the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect.
Section 278 regime does not apply to records already possessed by the defence.
In a youth criminal prosecution, the defence obtained medical records relating to the complainant through a parallel civil proceeding and sought to use them for impeachment during cross‑examination.
The Crown objected and argued the defence must bring a production application under ss. 278.1–278.9 of the Criminal Code because the materials were improperly disclosed following a breach of the civil deemed undertaking rule.
The court held that the s. 278 regime governs compelled production of records not already in the possession of the accused.
Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Shearing, the court found the defence’s existing possession of the documents meant the statutory production scheme did not apply.
Questions regarding admissibility and privacy interests would instead be addressed in the ordinary evidentiary analysis at trial.
The section 278 regime does not apply to medical records already in the defence's possession from a parallel civil proceeding.
This is a youth criminal justice matter involving a defence application regarding the proper procedure for using materials obtained from a parallel civil proceeding.
The defence sought a ruling that counsel was properly in possession of materials the complainant produced in civil litigation and that the section 278 Criminal Code regime did not apply.
The Crown objected to cross-examination questions based on medical records obtained through civil discovery.
The Superior Court had previously found a breach of the deemed undertaking rule when civil counsel provided the materials to defence counsel without prior judicial oversight.
The trial judge determined that the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Shearing applied, permitting the defence to proceed with cross-examination on documents already in its possession, subject to admissibility considerations.