Mirel Giugaru

The plaintiffs brought a second status hearing motion to extend the time to set their wrongful dismissal action down for trial.

The defendants opposed, arguing the action should be dismissed for delay after the plaintiffs missed the court-ordered set down date.

The court found the plaintiffs provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, noting that an intervening appeal by the defendants had significantly shortened the time available to complete mediation.

The court held that the plaintiffs' counsel reasonably relied on the defendants' apparent cooperation and that the defendants would suffer no actual prejudice if the action proceeded.

The motion to extend the set down date was granted.

The defendant Dufferin Aggregates appealed Associate Justice McGraw’s decision extending the time for the plaintiffs, Uzelac and G. Uzelac Trucking, to set the action down for trial.

The court reviewed the history of the litigation, including periods of delay, and considered whether the plaintiffs had provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and whether the defendants would suffer non-compensable prejudice.

The court found that Associate Justice McGraw had properly exercised his discretion, applied the correct legal test, and made no palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to Uzelac.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Justice Chalmers dated November 5, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered costs payable to the responding party in the amount of $5,593.50.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash an appeal brought by the respondents (defendants in the original action) on jurisdictional grounds.

The appellant (plaintiff) sought to appeal an interlocutory order from the Superior Court of Justice that removed his counsel of record.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that an order for the removal of counsel is interlocutory and must be appealed to the Divisional Court with leave, not directly to the Court of Appeal.

Consequently, the motion to quash the appeal was granted, and costs were awarded to the moving parties.

This appeal concerned a dog bite injury where the appellants sued the dog owners and the landlords of the property.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the landlords (Crisols), dismissing the action against them, based on an interpretation of the Dog Owners' Liability Act (DOLA) s. 3(1) that it entirely ousted the Occupiers' Liability Act (OLA) for non-dog owners when a bite occurs on the dog owner's premises.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in this interpretation, clarifying that DOLA s. 3(1) only determines the liability of the dog owner under DOLA, not precluding OLA or common law claims against other parties.

However, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissal against the landlords on the alternative ground that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding their liability under the OLA or common law, as absentee landlords who had no prior knowledge of the dog's temperament and no responsibility for the dog or its behaviour, and where the injury was not causally linked to any failure in property maintenance or repair.

The TEC defendants brought a motion to admit evidence from the criminal trial of Christopher Husbands (who committed a mass shooting at the Eaton Centre) into the upcoming civil trial, and to strike the plaintiffs' jury notices.

The defendants argued the evidence was necessary to establish Husbands' mindset and the spontaneity of his actions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Husbands' specific mindset and reasons for the shooting were not relevant to the core issue of whether the defendants breached their duty of care regarding security under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

As the criminal evidence was not admitted, the court also declined to strike the jury notices, finding that a jury is capable of handling the anticipated expert evidence on security standards.

The plaintiffs appealed case conference orders directing that the defendants' liability be determined by summary judgment motions involving viva voce cross-examination of five expert witnesses.

The Divisional Court held that while a case conference judge has jurisdiction to make orders involving powers under Rule 20.04, such jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly.

The court found the case conference judge erred in principle by making the orders without an evidentiary record and by inverting the proper analysis.

The appeal was allowed, the orders were set aside, and the liability case against the Eaton Centre defendants was directed to proceed to trial.

The self-represented plaintiff sought leave to amend his statement of claim in a solicitor negligence action to add new allegations, add a new defendant lawyer, and increase his damages claim to $100 million.

The court granted leave to amend the claim against the existing defendants, finding a triable issue on whether the new allegations were statute-barred and that they disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

However, the court denied leave to add the new defendant, as the claims against her were clearly statute-barred and no reasonable cause of action was pleaded.

The plaintiff was permitted to increase the damages claim and continue in the ordinary procedure.

The plaintiffs brought motions for leave to appeal the October 9, 2020 and November 6, 2020 orders of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court granted the motions for leave to appeal and fixed costs of the motions at $10,000, payable at the discretion of the panel hearing the appeal.

The defendants, the Toronto Police Services Board and the Eaton Centre, sought to schedule summary judgment motions to determine their liability in four related civil actions arising from a 2012 shooting at the Toronto Eaton Centre.

The plaintiffs opposed the motions, arguing they were entitled to a full jury trial on all issues.

The court held that there is no absolute right to a civil trial and that a summary judgment process is a legitimate alternative.

Finding that the liability issues would likely turn on legal concepts and expert evidence rather than disputed facts, the court directed that the summary judgment motions be scheduled.

This endorsement addresses two motions in a motor vehicle accident claim.

First, The Co-Operators General Insurance Company successfully moved to be added as a third party under s. 258(14) of the Insurance Act, having denied liability to its insured, the defendant driver, for failing to disclose his Uber driving activities.

Second, the plaintiff successfully moved to amend his statement of claim to increase his loss of income claim and add Uber Canada Inc. as a defendant.

The court found the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in discovering his claim against Uber, rejecting arguments that the claim was time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, but reserving Uber's right to plead a limitations defence at trial or summary judgment.

The defendants, Krylov & Company and Devry Smith Frank LLP, successfully obtained summary judgment against the plaintiff, Zaka Ullah Khan, who had alleged fraud and conspiracy.

This endorsement addresses the costs of that motion and the action.

The court declined to award costs to Krylov & Company, finding their failure to provide the plaintiff with requested documents was instrumental in precipitating the unnecessary action, and instead ordered them to pay the plaintiff's disbursements.

Devry Smith Frank LLP, having no responsibility for the action's commencement, was awarded partial indemnity costs from the plaintiff.