Avrum David Slodovnick

The applicant, Roman Kulyk, as Estate Trustee of Nicholas Kulyk, sought various orders to manage and sell two estate properties where the respondents (Andrew Kulyk, Jonathan Kulyk, and Elyse Kulyk) were residing or using without authorization.

The respondents, beneficiaries of a trust share, had ignored the proceedings.

The court confirmed that an executor's authority derives from the will, not probate, and granted orders for the respondents and unauthorized tenants to vacate both properties, granting leave for writs of possession.

It also ordered the respondents to provide leases, account for rents received, and directed tenants to pay rent to the applicant.

The court dismissed requests for vesting orders, possession orders, and orders for cooperation, deeming them unnecessary or difficult to enforce.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the applicant against the respondents, to be taken from their share of the estate.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of a motion brought by the defendants, Paul Kennedy and Leanne Kennedy, to set aside a prior judgment.

The court found the defendants' motion to be vexatious, based on manipulation of facts, regurgitation of previously rejected issues, and defiance of court orders.

Citing a long history of such litigation conduct, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs, emphasizing that such costs serve as a chastisement and deterrent for improper and unnecessary litigation.

The court ordered the Kennedys to pay $70,000.00 in all-inclusive costs.

The Kennedys (Defendants) brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2) to set aside a default judgment rendered nearly 11 years prior, arguing that their former representative, Trent Bridger, sabotaged their defense through misrepresentation and that the damages calculation was faulty due to the Plaintiffs' incomplete disclosure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Kennedys were aware of Bridger's communications, that Justice Frank had already rejected the "stolen records" excuse, and that the significant delay in bringing the motion was unjustified.

The court also held that the Kennedys could not now demand a full accounting given their persistent failure to comply with prior disclosure orders.

The plaintiff moved to set aside an administrative dismissal of its action.

The court considered the factors for setting aside such dismissals, including explanation for delay, promptness of the motion, inadvertence, and prejudice.

While there were periods of unexplained delay, the court found the overall delay explained, particularly given a consent timetable order.

The motion was brought promptly, and the alleged prejudice due to a witness's age was not directly attributable to the delay.

The court exercised its discretion to restore the action to the trial list, subject to an aggressive timetable, but denied costs to the plaintiff due to its significant prior inaction and non-compliance with the timetable.

The Kilislian parties brought a motion for leave to vary a consent timetable to permit the late delivery of an expert damages report.

The court had previously ordered all expert reports by September 30, 2016, an order made on consent.

The Kilislian parties failed to deliver the damages report by the deadline, and their explanations for the delay were found to be contradictory and indicative of a conscious decision not to comply, rather than an error or inadvertent omission.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing that court orders, especially in case-managed proceedings, must be respected.

Costs were awarded to the responding Shuster parties on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff, Andreas Haas, sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully resisting a motion to stay his action in favour of arbitration.

Haas argued for substantial indemnity based on a Rule 49.10 offer to settle.

The court found that Rule 49.10 did not apply to a successful responding party in a motion and that there was no egregious conduct by the moving parties to warrant substantial indemnity under Rule 49.13 or 57.01.

Considering factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity of issues and a party's initial refusal to admit, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at an all-inclusive amount of $25,500.00, to be divided evenly among the three defendants.

Following a motion concerning the defendants’ failure to comply with disclosure and non‑dissipation orders, the plaintiffs sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

Although the plaintiffs did not obtain dismissal of the defence, they succeeded in obtaining strict disclosure terms and relief advancing the litigation.

The court found that the defendants deliberately failed to comply with prior disclosure orders and advanced false allegations that the plaintiffs had stolen business records.

The defendants’ claims of impecuniosity were rejected as unsupported by the evidence.

Substantial indemnity costs were warranted as a sanction for the defendants’ conduct and to denounce false allegations and non‑compliance with court orders.

Following a successful motion removing a litigation guardian and counsel due to conflict of interest, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful defendants sought approximately $19,500 in costs.

The court considered whether costs should be ordered personally against the litigation guardian who defended the motion rather than against the incapable plaintiff represented by the guardian.

Relying on jurisprudence concerning the role and protection of litigation guardians, the court held that personal cost consequences should generally not be imposed absent bad faith or frivolous conduct.

The motion had been defended unsuccessfully but not improperly, and costs were therefore awarded against the plaintiffs rather than personally against the litigation guardian.

The moving party sought certification of a proposed class proceeding on behalf of present and former franchisees of a pizza franchise system alleging excess advertising contributions, excessive order‑processing fees, and failure to share supplier rebates.

The proposed claims included breach of contract, breach of statutory duty of fair dealing under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, misrepresentation in disclosure documents, and related equitable remedies.

The court held that the pleadings disclosed viable causes of action, that an identifiable class and common issues existed, and that a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure.

However, the proposed representative plaintiff was found unsuitable due to evidence of serious contractual breaches, insolvency, and potential conflicts with the class.

The certification motion was adjourned to permit substitution of a new representative plaintiff.