R.S. Harrison

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their Amended Statement of Claim to include further particulars regarding the alleged involvement of the Guatemalan police and military in sexual assaults during forced evictions, in addition to private security personnel.

The defendants opposed, arguing the amendments constituted a new cause of action, were unduly delayed, and would cause prejudice.

The court found that the proposed amendments were particulars of existing negligence claims, not a new cause of action, and that no actual or presumed prejudice would result to the defendants.

Leave to amend was granted.

The plaintiff railway company sought interlocutory injunctive relief after former employees joined a direct competitor and allegedly downloaded and circulated confidential commercial information, including customer lists and revenue data, to solicit the plaintiff’s clients.

The parties agreed to an injunction preserving confidential information and restricting its use, but disputed whether an independent court-appointed monitor should oversee compliance with the order.

The court found the defendants had initially fallen short in complying with an earlier undertaking but had taken substantial remedial steps, including forensic searches, employee discipline, and written directives prohibiting use of the information.

The court concluded that appointing a monitor with broad investigative and supervisory powers would be overly intrusive into the defendant corporation’s business operations.

The court held that the contempt power and the existing order sufficiently protected the plaintiff’s interests.

The applicant sought declarations that a life insurance policy issued in 1982 should be enforced according to its original terms, including paid‑up value calculations appearing on the face of the policy.

The respondent insurer alleged that the paid‑up values in the policy were inserted in error and sought rectification to reduce them by a factor of five.

The record contained conflicting affidavit evidence and competing expert opinions regarding the intended structure of the policy and the calculation of paid‑up values.

The court held that the disputes involved material factual conflicts, credibility assessments, and complex issues relating to rectification and limitation periods.

As a result, the matter could not properly be resolved on an application record and required a trial.

Following a successful motion removing a litigation guardian and counsel due to conflict of interest, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful defendants sought approximately $19,500 in costs.

The court considered whether costs should be ordered personally against the litigation guardian who defended the motion rather than against the incapable plaintiff represented by the guardian.

Relying on jurisprudence concerning the role and protection of litigation guardians, the court held that personal cost consequences should generally not be imposed absent bad faith or frivolous conduct.

The motion had been defended unsuccessfully but not improperly, and costs were therefore awarded against the plaintiffs rather than personally against the litigation guardian.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's litigation guardian and her solicitors of record due to conflicts of interest.

The litigation guardian, who is the plaintiff's daughter, was also defending a third-party claim brought by the defendants, creating a conflict between her personal interests and her duties to the plaintiff.

The solicitors of record represented the daughter in both her capacity as litigation guardian and personally as a third party.

The court found that both the litigation guardian and the law firm were in an irreparable conflict of interest and ordered their removal.

The appellant City purchased asset-backed commercial paper notes that subsequently collapsed in value.

The City sued the respondents for negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment more than two years after purchasing the notes but less than two years after the notes matured and defaulted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's summary judgment dismissing the claims as statute-barred.

The Court held that for negligent misrepresentation inducing a transaction, damage occurs when the plaintiff enters into the transaction and receives something less valuable than represented, not when the full extent of the loss is monetized.

The limitation period was not suspended by a standstill agreement or by the involvement of an investors committee.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and issued an order in accordance with the filed draft order.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge regarding an oppression motion and a bank's application.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to address the issues and arguments he was required to decide, including the factors regarding the oppression remedy and whether the bank had valid security in priority to a judgment creditor claim.

The order was set aside and the issues were returned to the Commercial List for determination.

The successful respondent on an appeal sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants argued the costs should be reduced due to the respondent's cross-appeal and the attendance of multiple counsel.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument regarding the cross-appeal, finding it was a reasonable step to defend the trial result.

However, the Court agreed that the respondent should not be compensated for the attendance of four lawyers or for a prior motion.

Costs were fixed at $250,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.