Raffaele Sparano

The defendant sought leave from the case management judge to bring a motion extending the time to serve a responding handwriting expert report, just weeks before trial.

The defendant had repeatedly missed deadlines and failed to retain an expert until after the original documents were allegedly lost.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, holding that any request to admit the late report or address spoliation must be brought de novo before the trial judge under Rule 53.08, as further case management intervention would risk treading on the trial judge's role.

Following the release of the Court's decision on the appeal, submissions were received regarding the apportionment of costs.

The Court fixed costs of the appeal payable to the Receiver, the respondent 100 Ontario Inc., and the respondent Issam A. Saad, each in the amount of $15,000.

The appellant entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with a court-appointed receiver to purchase real estate.

The receiver brought a motion for approval and vesting.

However, late-breaking offers emerged, including one 37% higher than the appellant's offer.

The motion judge declined to approve the sale and instead ordered a six-day extension of the bidding process.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge misapplied the principles from Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised discretion in reopening the auction process given the magnitude of the late offer and the receiver's alternative recommendation.

The appellant, principal of a hotel corporation that defaulted on mortgage financing, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding interpretation of a forbearance agreement.

The appellant argued that under the forbearance agreement with the respondent lender, the debt was limited to $8.5 million (the amount paid to discharge the original mortgage), rather than the full $17 million outstanding.

The appellant also sought relief from forfeiture under section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, holding that the forbearance agreement clearly assigned the full $17 million debt and that relief from forfeiture was not warranted as the transaction was not unconscionable and the result was not disproportionate.

The plaintiff obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction against the defendants after alleging misrepresentations in the sale of a business.

The defendants moved to set aside the injunction, arguing the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to compel further financial disclosure, arguing the defendants had not complied with the initial order.

The court stayed the defendants' motion until they provided full financial disclosure, noting that the failure to disclose material facts on an ex parte motion does not automatically require dissolution of the injunction, and the court must balance the interests of both parties.

The plaintiff's motion for further disclosure was granted.

The respondent commenced an action alleging he was induced to enter into a shareholders' agreement by fraudulent misrepresentations.

The appellants moved to stay the action under s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, relying on an arbitration clause in the agreement.

The motion judge refused the stay, finding the pith and substance of the claims were tortious rather than contractual.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by assuming tort claims and allegations of fraud fall outside the scope of a broadly worded arbitration agreement, and by failing to apply the competence-competence principle which requires jurisdictional challenges to be resolved first by the arbitrator.

The plaintiff, Andreas Haas, sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully resisting a motion to stay his action in favour of arbitration.

Haas argued for substantial indemnity based on a Rule 49.10 offer to settle.

The court found that Rule 49.10 did not apply to a successful responding party in a motion and that there was no egregious conduct by the moving parties to warrant substantial indemnity under Rule 49.13 or 57.01.

Considering factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity of issues and a party's initial refusal to admit, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at an all-inclusive amount of $25,500.00, to be divided evenly among the three defendants.

The appellant commenced an action in 2001 against the municipality.

After years of inactivity and failure to set the action down for trial, the motion judge dismissed the action for delay in 2015.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in finding inordinate and inexcusable delay, and failed to accommodate him as a self-represented litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the delay was indeed inordinate and inexcusable, raising a presumption of prejudice that the appellant failed to rebut.

The court noted that while self-represented litigants face challenges, they must still familiarize themselves with relevant procedures.

The defendants sought a stay of an action under s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 based on an arbitration clause in a shareholders’ agreement relating to a restaurant venture.

The plaintiff alleged fraudulent misrepresentation inducing him to enter the agreement, breach of fiduciary duties, and oppressive conduct.

The court held that the misrepresentation and fiduciary duty claims were tort-based and did not rely on the shareholders’ agreement, placing them outside the arbitration clause.

Although the oppression allegations relied on contractual obligations and fell within the clause, the court declined to order a partial stay because most claims were non-arbitrable and separation would create duplicative proceedings.

The motion for a stay was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order granting a stay of proceedings pending arbitration.

The parties had a Services Agreement with an arbitration clause and a survival clause that did not explicitly list the arbitration clause.

After the respondent terminated the agreement, the appellant sued for breach of contract and torts, and sought a declaration that the arbitration clause did not apply.

The motion judge stayed the proceedings, finding it arguable whether the arbitration clause survived, and referred the jurisdictional issue to the arbitrator under the competence-competence principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the competence-competence principle or his decision to defer the jurisdictional question to the arbitrator.

This was a standalone costs decision arising from a partial summary judgment motion under the Partition Act and a related application authorizing sale of one of three disputed properties.

The court declined to award costs on the partition motion, holding that each sibling should bear their own costs in light of their conduct, the interlocutory nature of the dispute, and unresolved merits in the larger litigation.

The court awarded the parents full indemnity costs on their successful application because they had been drawn into a dispute in which they played no part and should not have had to sue their own children to disengage from title.

The unsuccessful daughter was ordered to pay $36,634.81 within 45 days, without awaiting the sale proceeds.

A co-owner brought a partial summary judgment motion under the Partition Act seeking sale of three jointly held investment properties and payment of the proceeds into court.

The responding co-owner opposed the motion, arguing that a sale was inconsistent with the parties’ long‑term investment plan, that outstanding accounting claims and counterclaims should be resolved first, and that the moving party’s conduct was malicious and oppressive.

The court held that a co-owner has a prima facie right to partition or sale unless the opposing party establishes exceptional circumstances such as malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct.

Disputes over accounting, alleged debts, and disappointment in future investment plans were insufficient to displace that right.

The motion and a related application by trustees holding title to one property were granted, ordering the sale of the properties.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment that found her liable on promissory notes and for fraudulent misrepresentation, which included an award for punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, noting that the statement of claim and initial affidavit did not allege fraud or that the appellant signed the notes, and a second affidavit was never served.

The findings of fraud, liability on the notes, and punitive damages were set aside, and the costs award below was reduced.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his former litigation counsel for solicitor's negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The appellant alleged his counsel wrongly consented to default judgment and failed to respond to the bank's counsel, leading to a receivership over his farm properties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual conclusions—that the counsel acted diligently and was not negligent—were firmly anchored in the evidentiary record and free from palpable and overriding error.

The appeal regarding trial costs was also dismissed.

The bankrupt appealed a registrar’s order lifting the automatic stay under s. 69 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to permit a creditor’s civil action to proceed.

The creditor alleged that the debt arose from misappropriation of funds received in a fiduciary capacity, potentially falling within s. 178(1)(d) of the Act such that the debt could survive bankruptcy discharge.

The court held that the registrar properly applied the governing legal principles and correctly concluded that the pleadings disclosed a sufficient basis to lift the stay.

The bankruptcy court’s role was not to determine the merits of the underlying claim but only whether sound reasons existed to allow the action to continue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

A creditor brought a motion seeking relief from the statutory stay of proceedings under s. 69 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to pursue a civil action against an undischarged bankrupt.

The creditor alleged that proceeds from the sale of financed vehicles were required to be held in trust and were misappropriated by the bankrupt while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

The court considered whether the claim could potentially fall within the exception in s. 178(1)(d) of the BIA for debts arising from fraud, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Finding sufficient parallels with cases involving trust breaches and potential fiduciary misconduct, the court concluded that it was equitable to permit the creditor to proceed with its action despite the bankruptcy stay.

The stay was lifted in relation to the creditor’s civil action, with costs reserved to the trial judge.

The respondent, a former bankrupt, brought a motion to dismiss the appellant's appeal of three costs orders.

The appellant cross-moved for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in respect of the first two costs orders, finding they had either been finally disposed of previously or were significantly out of time with no satisfactory explanation for the delay.

The Court granted leave to appeal the third costs order but ordered the appellant to post $75,000 in security for costs within 30 days, failing which the remainder of the appeal would be dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside an order dismissing their action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's application of the usual test for setting aside a dismissal order, nor in the findings that the appellants failed to adequately explain their delay and that the respondents would suffer prejudice.

The appellants appealed a judgment enforcing a settlement under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal assumed jurisdiction on consent of counsel but dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge had jurisdiction and made no error in exercising his discretion.