Raffaele Sparano

The defendant sought leave from the case management judge to bring a motion extending the time to serve a responding handwriting expert report, just weeks before trial.

The defendant had repeatedly missed deadlines and failed to retain an expert until after the original documents were allegedly lost.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, holding that any request to admit the late report or address spoliation must be brought de novo before the trial judge under Rule 53.08, as further case management intervention would risk treading on the trial judge's role.

Following the release of the Court's decision on the appeal, submissions were received regarding the apportionment of costs.

The Court fixed costs of the appeal payable to the Receiver, the respondent 100 Ontario Inc., and the respondent Issam A. Saad, each in the amount of $15,000.

The appellant entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with a court-appointed receiver to purchase real estate.

The receiver brought a motion for approval and vesting.

However, late-breaking offers emerged, including one 37% higher than the appellant's offer.

The motion judge declined to approve the sale and instead ordered a six-day extension of the bidding process.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge misapplied the principles from Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised discretion in reopening the auction process given the magnitude of the late offer and the receiver's alternative recommendation.

The appellant, principal of a hotel corporation that defaulted on mortgage financing, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding interpretation of a forbearance agreement.

The appellant argued that under the forbearance agreement with the respondent lender, the debt was limited to $8.5 million (the amount paid to discharge the original mortgage), rather than the full $17 million outstanding.

The appellant also sought relief from forfeiture under section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, holding that the forbearance agreement clearly assigned the full $17 million debt and that relief from forfeiture was not warranted as the transaction was not unconscionable and the result was not disproportionate.

The plaintiff obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction against the defendants after alleging misrepresentations in the sale of a business.

The defendants moved to set aside the injunction, arguing the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to compel further financial disclosure, arguing the defendants had not complied with the initial order.

The court stayed the defendants' motion until they provided full financial disclosure, noting that the failure to disclose material facts on an ex parte motion does not automatically require dissolution of the injunction, and the court must balance the interests of both parties.

The plaintiff's motion for further disclosure was granted.

The plaintiff, Andreas Haas, sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully resisting a motion to stay his action in favour of arbitration.

Haas argued for substantial indemnity based on a Rule 49.10 offer to settle.

The court found that Rule 49.10 did not apply to a successful responding party in a motion and that there was no egregious conduct by the moving parties to warrant substantial indemnity under Rule 49.13 or 57.01.

Considering factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity of issues and a party's initial refusal to admit, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at an all-inclusive amount of $25,500.00, to be divided evenly among the three defendants.

The defendants sought a stay of an action under s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 based on an arbitration clause in a shareholders’ agreement relating to a restaurant venture.

The plaintiff alleged fraudulent misrepresentation inducing him to enter the agreement, breach of fiduciary duties, and oppressive conduct.

The court held that the misrepresentation and fiduciary duty claims were tort-based and did not rely on the shareholders’ agreement, placing them outside the arbitration clause.

Although the oppression allegations relied on contractual obligations and fell within the clause, the court declined to order a partial stay because most claims were non-arbitrable and separation would create duplicative proceedings.

The motion for a stay was therefore dismissed.

A co-owner brought a partial summary judgment motion under the Partition Act seeking sale of three jointly held investment properties and payment of the proceeds into court.

The responding co-owner opposed the motion, arguing that a sale was inconsistent with the parties’ long‑term investment plan, that outstanding accounting claims and counterclaims should be resolved first, and that the moving party’s conduct was malicious and oppressive.

The court held that a co-owner has a prima facie right to partition or sale unless the opposing party establishes exceptional circumstances such as malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct.

Disputes over accounting, alleged debts, and disappointment in future investment plans were insufficient to displace that right.

The motion and a related application by trustees holding title to one property were granted, ordering the sale of the properties.

The bankrupt appealed a registrar’s order lifting the automatic stay under s. 69 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to permit a creditor’s civil action to proceed.

The creditor alleged that the debt arose from misappropriation of funds received in a fiduciary capacity, potentially falling within s. 178(1)(d) of the Act such that the debt could survive bankruptcy discharge.

The court held that the registrar properly applied the governing legal principles and correctly concluded that the pleadings disclosed a sufficient basis to lift the stay.

The bankruptcy court’s role was not to determine the merits of the underlying claim but only whether sound reasons existed to allow the action to continue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

A creditor brought a motion seeking relief from the statutory stay of proceedings under s. 69 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to pursue a civil action against an undischarged bankrupt.

The creditor alleged that proceeds from the sale of financed vehicles were required to be held in trust and were misappropriated by the bankrupt while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

The court considered whether the claim could potentially fall within the exception in s. 178(1)(d) of the BIA for debts arising from fraud, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Finding sufficient parallels with cases involving trust breaches and potential fiduciary misconduct, the court concluded that it was equitable to permit the creditor to proceed with its action despite the bankruptcy stay.

The stay was lifted in relation to the creditor’s civil action, with costs reserved to the trial judge.