Zohaib I. Maladwala

Two class action proceedings—one against TELUS Communications Company and related entities, and one against Bell Mobility Inc.—were brought by plaintiffs alleging that the defendants engaged in similar practices of rounding up seconds to minutes on cell phone bills.

The defendants moved to consolidate the two actions for trial or summary judgment.

The court granted the motion to hear the two summary judgment motions consecutively in a single three-week block of hearing time, finding that the common issues were identical and that separate proceedings would create an unnecessary multiplicity of litigation and risk inconsistent findings.

However, the court determined that the case management judge would not preside over the summary judgment motions, as the principles underlying Rules 37.15(1) and 77.06(2)—which prohibit a case management judge from presiding at trial without consent—apply equally to summary judgment motions.

The moving parties, comprising various social media companies including Meta, Snap, and TikTok entities, brought motions for leave to appeal the substantive and costs orders of Leiper J. The Divisional Court granted the motions for leave to appeal without costs and directed the parties to provide an agreed schedule for the exchange of appeal materials.

This costs endorsement addresses the Plaintiff's entitlement to costs following an unsuccessful motion by the Defendants to amend the certification of a class action.

The court awards the Plaintiff $150,000 in costs, finding the Defendants' objections unpersuasive, particularly in the absence of their own Bill of Costs for comparison.

The court commends Plaintiff's counsel, especially Ms. Nayerahmadi, for effective advocacy.

The court dismissed TELUS’s motion to amend the certification order in a class action regarding alleged systematic overbilling of mobile phone customers.

TELUS sought to decertify aggregate damages as a common issue and to require individual inquiries into class membership, arguing that business and consumer customers could not be reliably distinguished.

The court found that TELUS’s arguments and evidence were not new and had already been addressed at certification.

The court reaffirmed that TELUS’s internal records and account types provide a sufficiently reliable basis for distinguishing between business and consumer customers, and that any residual issues can be managed administratively after the common issues trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered appeals and cross-appeals from a certification decision in a proposed class action regarding alleged defects in BMW vehicles equipped with N20 engines.

The court found that the certification judge erred in certifying causes of action for negligent design/manufacturing resulting in repair costs and in defining the class to include persons who incurred such costs.

The court held that neither of the proposed representative plaintiffs had a valid cause of action and set aside the certification order.

The plaintiff, Toronto District School Board, brought an action in negligence and public nuisance against several major social media corporations, alleging that their products were intentionally designed to be addictive to children and caused widespread mental health and behavioral issues among students.

The Board claimed it suffered direct economic damages in responding to these student harms, including increased costs for mental health services, security, and staff training.

The defendant corporations brought a motion to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the claims had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, allowing the Board's novel claims in negligence and public nuisance to proceed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an appeal and cross-appeal, along with motions to quash.

The parties agreed that the appeal and cross-appeal were sufficiently interrelated to be heard together to avoid duplication and ensure consistency.

Consequently, the court, on consent, dismissed both motions to quash without costs, ordering the consolidated appeal and cross-appeal to proceed.

The appellants sought to certify a class proceeding against pharmaceutical companies for negligently manufacturing valsartan, alleging contamination with NDMA and NDEA, which are potential carcinogens.

The claim was for damages related to an increased risk of cancer, costs of medical services and monitoring, refunds for drugs, and psychological damages.

The motion judge dismissed the certification, finding no viable cause of action based on concrete injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that claims for genotoxic injury (molecular changes without perceptible effect), psychological harm (not meeting the 'serious and prolonged' or 'ordinary fortitude' thresholds), and pure economic loss (as the product was discarded and not imminently dangerous) were not compensable in tort.

The court also upheld the dismissal of claims for battery, consumer protection breaches, Competition Act breaches, and unjust enrichment, concluding that the pleadings did not disclose viable causes of action or meet commonality criteria for certification.

This is a motion to discontinue a proposed class action concerning automobile airbags that had been recalled.

The action, which had not been certified, sought compensation for pure economic loss.

Due to developments in case law, particularly the Supreme Court of Canada's clarification on pure economic loss for defective products, the litigation risk increased, and the prospects for certification and substantial economic recovery diminished.

Class Counsel sought leave to discontinue the action with prejudice and without costs.

The court granted the motion, finding that the action was commenced for a proper purpose, the test for discontinuance was satisfied, and putative class members were not prejudiced, as limitation periods remained suspended.

This is a class action certification motion concerning allegedly defective N20 engines in BMW vehicles.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of owners/lessees of BMW vehicles with these engines, alleging design and/or manufacturing defects causing sudden loss of power.

The court analyzed the five certification criteria under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

While a cause of action in negligence was found, it was significantly narrowed to exclude claims for pure economic loss, limiting recovery to repair costs for actual damage or to avert imminent damage.

The proposed class definition was also narrowed to include only those who incurred such repair expenses by the judgment date.

One of the two proposed representative plaintiffs was deemed unsuitable as she had no recoverable loss.

The motion for certification was granted, but with substantial limitations on the scope of the class and the recoverable damages, and with only one representative plaintiff.

The defendants Mercedes-Benz and Mitsubishi brought a motion to dismiss the proposed class action for delay pursuant to s. 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The plaintiffs argued that the court had discretion not to dismiss the action and that all defendants must join the motion.

The court held that s. 29.1 is mandatory and does not require all defendants to join.

The action was dismissed against the moving defendants, but the court exercised its jurisdiction under s. 12 to order that the dismissal be set aside if the plaintiffs file a complete certification motion record within thirty days.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a class action against the defendant pharmaceutical companies for manufacturing and distributing valsartan contaminated with NDMA and NDEA, which are probable human carcinogens.

The plaintiffs claimed damages for psychological harm and pure economic losses (medical bills, medical monitoring, refunds, and wasted pills) arising from the increased risk of being diagnosed with cancer, but explicitly did not claim damages for actually developing cancer.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the law does not recognize a cause of action for the mere creation of risk or for pure economic loss from shoddy but not imminently dangerous goods, and therefore the claims failed to satisfy the cause of action, common issues, and preferable procedure criteria.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a Supreme Court of Canada costs order.

The motion judge had found the plaintiff was only required to repay $12,180, while the defendants argued the order required repayment of $200,000.

Rather than deciding the appeal, the Divisional Court ordered the parties to jointly apply to the Supreme Court of Canada for clarification of its own order, finding this to be the most efficient and proportionate method of resolving the ambiguity.

The plaintiff sought court approval to dismiss his proposed class action regarding the recalled drug Valsartan.

Following a carriage agreement with another class action and discovering that one defendant did not manufacture the active ingredient, the plaintiff sought to dismiss the action against all defendants without costs.

The court approved the dismissal under section 29 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, finding no prejudice to putative class members as other actions were proceeding across Canada.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for certification of a class proceeding regarding emissions 'defeat devices' in certain diesel vehicles.

The motions judge had denied certification on the basis that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure, as the vehicles had been recalled and repaired, and there was no evidence of compensable loss.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motions judge's conclusion that a class action was not the preferable procedure.

The plaintiffs sought judicial approval of a $25 million settlement in two pharmaceutical class actions alleging that the diabetes drug PIO caused bladder cancer and that the defendants failed to warn of this risk.

The court initially raised concerns about the settlement amount compared to a $2.4 billion U.S. settlement, but approved it after class counsel provided evidence of recent scientific studies undermining causation and differences in market size and litigation risk.

The court also approved class counsel's 30% contingency fee and awarded a reduced honorarium of $1,500 to each representative plaintiff.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

The entitlement to costs of the motion was reserved to the panel hearing the appeal, with the quantum fixed at $5,000.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' motion for certification in an emissions defeat device class action, the successful defendants sought costs totaling $965,012 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs argued for a maximum award of $125,000, noting their own costs were $550,263.

The court fixed costs at $560,000 all-inclusive on a partial indemnity scale, finding this amount fair and reasonable given the complexity of the issues, the number of defendant groups, and the costs reasonably incurred by the plaintiffs themselves.

The defendants brought a motion to enforce a costs order made by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court had ordered that the parties bear their own costs in the Superior Court, based on a misdescription of the procedural history as involving two separate motions (one for certification, one for a stay).

The Superior Court interpreted the Supreme Court's ruling to mean that the plaintiff must repay the costs associated with the stay of proceedings argument, but could retain the costs awarded for the certification motion, which was not appealed to the Supreme Court.

The plaintiff was ordered to repay $12,180 to the defendants.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the defendants regarding an alleged emissions defeat device in certain diesel-engine vehicles.

The defendants had already initiated a recall to repair the defeat device at no cost, rendering the vehicles compliant with emissions regulations.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence of compensable harm, such as paying a premium price or experiencing reduced fuel economy post-repair.

Without compensable harm, the court held that a class action would not advance the goals of access to justice, behaviour modification, or judicial economy.