Hugh Alexander Christie

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain their former employee, the defendant, from competing, soliciting clients or employees, and using confidential information.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the plaintiffs failed to establish irreparable harm, as their allegations were based on suspicion rather than clear evidence.

The balance of convenience also heavily favoured the defendant.

The motion was dismissed, and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the defendant's costs of $40,000.

Following a successful summary judgment motion by the plaintiffs in a wrongful dismissal action, the court addressed costs.

One defendant sought costs against the other defendant rather than the plaintiffs, arguing that the other party’s litigation position caused its involvement in the action.

The court rejected that position and held that no costs would be awarded for or against that defendant.

The court found the remaining defendant liable for the plaintiffs’ costs and determined that substantial indemnity costs were appropriate due to the defendant’s unfounded and strategic allegation of termination for cause, which unnecessarily complicated and lengthened the proceedings.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking pay in lieu of reasonable notice following termination of a consulting relationship related to the establishment of a Schedule 1 bank.

The defendant bank argued the individual plaintiff was never its employee but rather a consultant engaged through a consulting company.

The court held that, at minimum, the consultant functioned as a dependent contractor given his exclusive work for the bank, integration into its operations, and representation to regulators as a senior officer.

Applying principles from employment law regarding reasonable notice, the court determined that eight months’ notice was appropriate.

Summary judgment was granted awarding consulting fees equivalent to eight months’ compensation plus HST and contractual interest.

Following certification of a class proceeding alleging unpaid overtime by investment advisors, the court determined the appropriate costs award arising from the certification motion.

The plaintiff sought $575,000 in partial indemnity costs while the defendant argued the award should not exceed $315,000.

The court outlined a structured methodology for certification-motion costs awards emphasizing transparency, historical averages, proportionality, and the Rule 57.01(1) factors.

After reducing the claim for excess fees and disbursements and considering historical cost award data and comparable cases, the court fixed costs at $290,000 all-inclusive payable by the defendant to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, a former investment advisor, sought to certify a class action against the defendant for unpaid overtime under the Employment Standards Act.

The defendant argued that investment advisors were exempt from overtime provisions due to their managerial character or because their compensation provided a greater benefit.

The court found that the plaintiff met all five prerequisites for certification under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including that the applicability of the exemptions could be determined as common issues.

The motion for certification was granted.

The plaintiff, a former investment advisor, sought to certify a class action against his former employer for unpaid overtime under the Employment Standards Act.

The employer argued that investment advisors fall within the managerial or greater benefit exemptions.

The court found that the plaintiff met all five prerequisites for certification under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including that the applicability of the exemptions could be determined as common issues.

The motion for certification was granted.

The applicant filed a human rights application but sent a letter withdrawing it on the morning of the scheduled hearing.

Neither the applicant nor her counsel attended the hearing.

The respondent attended and consented to the withdrawal.

The Tribunal reminded counsel that parties cannot unilaterally decide not to attend a scheduled hearing and noted non-compliance with Rule 10 regarding withdrawals.

Given the respondent's consent, the Tribunal waived strict compliance and granted leave to withdraw the application.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability because sign language interpretation was not provided at an all candidates meeting.

The respondent, the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, brought a preliminary motion to dismiss the application on the basis that it lacked the statutory authority to regulate or fund all candidates meetings.

The Tribunal agreed, finding that the respondent's powers under the Election Act and Election Finances Act are limited to administering the election process and educating the public about voting, and do not extend to all candidates meetings.

The application was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

Two respondents in a human rights complaint regarding the failure to provide Rear Window Captioning technology in movie theatres brought a motion to add a competitor as a respondent to the combined proceedings.

The competitor initially opposed the motion but subsequently withdrew its opposition and consented to being added.

The Tribunal granted the motion, finding it appropriate to add the competitor so that key participants in the film industry could meet the allegations of discrimination together.

The Tribunal also set a schedule for pleadings and directed the parties to mediation.

The respondents brought a motion on consent to correct the spelling of the corporate and personal respondents' names in the complaint and title of proceeding, and to remove the personal respondent as a party.

The Tribunal granted the motion on consent, amending the corporate respondent's name to Universal Studios Canada Inc. and removing the personal respondent as a party.

In an application for certification of a craft unit of projectionists, the union objected to cross-examination regarding the specific skills exercised by the projectionists.

The union argued that the licensing requirement under the Theatres Act was determinative of the projectionists' status as a distinguishable craft under section 6(3) of the Labour Relations Act.

The Board upheld the objection, finding that the mandatory licensing regime under the Theatres Act established that the projectionists were members of a craft by reason of which they were distinguishable from other employees, making further inquiry into their technical skills unnecessary.

The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission ordered several persons to appear before a Hearing Officer to give evidence in an inquiry under the Combines Investigation Act.

The Hearing Officer made rulings limiting the role of counsel, including denying the right to cross-examine witnesses, excluding a potential witness, and ruling that the Director need not disclose his reasons for commencing the inquiry.

The appellants sought to quash these rulings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the inquiry was purely investigatory and that neither the Act nor the common law doctrine of fairness required the Director to disclose his reasons or permitted counsel to cross-examine witnesses at this preliminary stage.