Frances M. Wood

This decision addresses complex parenting issues including choice of dentist and school, holiday parenting time, travel consent, attendance at extracurricular activities, contempt allegations, and child support with s.7 expenses.

The court emphasizes the best interests of the child, Charlotte, born 2019, and resolves disputes over dental care by appointing Dr. Kevin Dann, and school attendance by ordering Charlotte to attend the local public school rather than private school due to insufficient evidence of need and financial concerns.

The court declines to find the mother in contempt for a missed parenting time weekend but orders make-up time.

Regarding child support, the court imputes income to the father based on expert valuations, finds significant arrears, and orders proportionate sharing of special expenses including capoeira classes and dental costs.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking to compel the respondent mother to undergo a mental health assessment under s. 105(3) of the Courts of Justice Act, alleging she suffered from schizophrenia.

He also sought the release of police records.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the applicant's evidence was based on conjecture and speculation, and that the request was an unjustified intrusion on the respondent's privacy rights.

The court also found the motion was brought to intimidate and embarrass the respondent, awarding her full indemnity costs.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a divorce order regarding parenting time and child support.

The respondent mother filed a cross-motion seeking similar relief and other orders.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the respondent's permanent relocation to British Columbia, rendering the previous 50/50 parenting schedule unworkable.

The applicant's motion was granted, establishing primary residence with him, ordering the respondent to pay child support based on imputed income, and dispensing with the respondent's consent for the children's surname change.

The respondent's cross-motion was dismissed, including requests for Office of the Children's Lawyer involvement or a Voice of the Child report, and recalculation of her child support.

This motion concerned an applicant's request for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a family law order concerning custody, access, and child support.

The applicant had prepared the notice within the prescribed period but failed to effect service in time.

The respondent opposed the extension, citing lack of merit and prejudice to the child.

The court, applying the well-known factors for extending time to appeal, found that while the applicant had a bona fide intention, the proposed appeal lacked merit, particularly as it sought to overturn factual findings justified by the record, including breaches of prior orders and abusive communications.

Considering the child's best interests, the court dismissed the motion for an extension of time.

The applicant mother brought a motion for a stay of a lower court order that directed the return of the parties' child to Milton and established Milton as the proper venue for their family law proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the appeal did not raise a serious issue because the underlying order was interlocutory, and the mother failed to demonstrate irreparable harm to the child's best interests.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her request for a case conference to determine a repayment schedule for support arrears.

The appeal court found that the motion judge had misunderstood the request.

At the appeal hearing, the parties agreed to a repayment schedule of $500 per month towards the arrears.

The appeal was granted and costs of $2,000 were awarded to the appellant.

This is a costs endorsement following the court's approval of a settlement in an estate matter.

The Applicant (David Grier) and Respondent (Janet Grier, represented by the Public Guardian and Trustee) sought court approval for a settlement, which was opposed by a non-party, Sandra Grier.

Due to Sandra Grier's unreasonable, deliberate, improper, and vexatious conduct, including failure to follow court orders and making unsubstantiated fraud allegations, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs against her, to be paid from her share of the estate.

The court also approved the legal fees for the Applicant and Respondent, with portions paid by the estate and their respective shares, finding them reasonable given the complexity and duration of the litigation.

The applicant and respondent, both persons under a disability, reached a settlement in a protracted estate litigation dispute regarding their late father's will and power of attorney accounting.

They brought motions for court approval of the settlement.

A non-party sibling opposed the settlement, alleging unaccounted funds and lack of capacity of another beneficiary.

The court approved the settlement, finding it was in the best interests of the disabled parties, and dismissed the non-party's motion.

The court also ordered the settlement funds to be paid directly to the respondent and to the applicant's attorney for property, rather than into court.

A non-party in an estate litigation matter brought a motion seeking the recusal of the presiding judge, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The non-party argued that the judge breached natural justice by disclosing an ex parte Mareva injunction motion to opposing counsel and dismissing it without reading the materials.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding no cogent evidence to overcome the strong presumption of judicial impartiality, noting that the materials were reviewed, written reasons were provided, and the existence of the motion was public information.

The applicant brought an ex parte motion seeking a restraining order against the respondent and the suspension of existing access terms, alleging escalating abusive behavior and non-compliance with bail conditions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to meet the threshold tests for urgency and for dispensing with notice to the respondent.

The court emphasized the objective standard for assessing risk when determining urgency, distinguishing it from the subjective fear standard for issuing a restraining order, and highlighted the fundamental principle of notice in such proceedings.

The father applied under the Hague Convention for the immediate return of his three children from Canada to Israel, alleging wrongful removal by the mother.

The mother opposed the application, asserting that returning to Israel would expose her and the children to a grave risk of physical and psychological harm, and would place them in an intolerable situation, thereby invoking exceptions under Article 13(b) and Article 20 of the Hague Convention.

The court found a history of domestic abuse by the father against the mother, suspicious circumstances surrounding a grenade attack at the grandparents' home, and the father's use of intimidation.

The court also considered the mother and children's status as Convention Refugees in Canada, which created a rebuttable presumption of persecution risk if returned.

The court concluded that the mother had discharged her burden to prove the exceptions applied, and therefore dismissed the father's application for the children's return to Israel.

The appellant sought a stay of the provisions of a final matrimonial order requiring her to transfer her interest in the matrimonial home to the respondent and vacate the property pending appeal.

The motions judge granted the stay relating to the disposition of the matrimonial home, residency, and division of household contents, while maintaining the obligation to pay child support.

The court found that the appellant established plausible grounds for appeal, irreparable harm to the status quo of the living arrangements, and that the balance of convenience favoured the appellant.

Appeal from a trial judgment concerning the treatment of a Maher (Islamic marriage contract) in the equalization of net family property under the Family Law Act.

The trial judge excluded the Maher payment from the calculation of net family property and treated it as a separate obligation.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, holding that the Maher payment must be included in the equalization calculation because the parties did not expressly agree to exclude it from net family property.

The court distinguished the case from Khanis v. Noor Mohamed, where the Maher contained express language excluding it from net family property.

The court reduced the equalization payment but confirmed the wife's entitlement to collect the Maher obligation as a debt.

The applicant sought leave to appeal interlocutory orders regarding retroactive child support and the sale of the matrimonial home.

The court denied leave to appeal the child support order, finding no conflicting authority or reason to doubt its correctness.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the motion judge's failure to adjudicate the motion to list the matrimonial home for sale after the applicant amended his pleadings to rely on the Partition Act.

The court held that the failure to determine the issue constituted an error of law, making the correctness of the decision open to serious debate.

Former spouses disputed continued child and spousal support obligations after their adult daughters completed undergraduate degrees.

The court considered whether the children remained “children of the marriage” under the Divorce Act and how their employment income and educational pursuits affected support entitlement.

It held that child support does not automatically end after a first undergraduate degree, but must be assessed based on the children’s circumstances and means.

Child support for one daughter ended in 2011 and for the other in 2013, with partial reimbursement ordered for payments made thereafter.

Spousal support continued beyond the date asserted by the payor but terminated in 2013, with modest retroactive adjustments for underpayment.

The respondent brought a motion for a restraining order and an order requiring the applicant to vacate a residential property he owned, while the applicant brought a cross‑motion seeking interim spousal support based on an alleged common law relationship.

The parties disputed whether they had cohabited in a continuous common law relationship and whether the applicant had any possessory or constructive trust interest in the home.

The court found there was an arguable case that the parties were in a common law relationship but that significant factual disputes remained, including issues relating to income and property interests.

To preserve the status quo pending trial, the court allowed the applicant to remain in the home in lieu of interim spousal support and declined to grant a formal restraining order.

The matter was ordered to proceed to an expedited trial.

Following reasons on motions and cross-motions, the court addressed costs submissions in a commercial dispute involving enforcement issues and procedural dismissal arguments.

The defendants argued divided success and relied on an offer to settle, but the court found the offer irrelevant because the judgment amount substantially exceeded it.

The court held the plaintiff was substantially successful, particularly regarding outstanding costs awards and resisting dismissal of the claim under Rules 48.14 and 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although a Mareva injunction was vacated, the court held that this occurred on the court’s own initiative and did not alter the overall success analysis.

The plaintiff was awarded partial-indemnity costs fixed at $20,000 payable forthwith.

The defendants moved for a declaration that the plaintiff’s action was deemed dismissed as abandoned under Rule 48.15(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff brought a cross‑motion seeking declarations that the action was not abandoned, recovery of unpaid costs with interest, and related relief concerning a Mareva injunction.

The court held that Rule 48.15(6) does not apply to defended actions and therefore the action was not deemed dismissed.

The court also found that interest continued to accrue on unpaid costs and ordered payment of the outstanding amount, with the defendants’ defence and counterclaim to be struck if payment was not made.

The Mareva injunction was ordered vacated following payment or dismissal of the defence and counterclaim.

The parties disputed their date of separation, the validity of a separation agreement, equalization, and spousal support.

The applicant husband claimed separation occurred in 2006, while the respondent wife claimed 2000.

The court found the parties separated in 2000 and lived separate lives under the same roof thereafter.

The court set aside a 2000 separation agreement, finding the husband was only shown the signature page and the agreement was unconscionable.

The wife was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $57,797.33 and indefinite spousal support of $1,500 per month to the disabled husband.