Alexander Hamilton

The defendants moved to strike or stay the Canadian action brought against them by the plaintiffs, arguing it was an abuse of process or should be stayed due to a parallel U.S. action commenced by related plaintiffs against related defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the U.S. action involved different defendants, different causes of action, different laws, and different jurisdictions.

The court held that the plaintiffs' conduct was not vexatious or oppressive, and the defendants failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice to justify a permanent or temporary stay.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' Statement of Defence due to their failure to produce documents, comply with a previous court order, and fulfill undertakings given during cross-examinations.

The defendants argued that the requested productions, including text messages and voicemail audio files, were disproportionate and inaccessible.

The Master found that the defendants had breached their disclosure obligations and undertakings, but declined to strike the Statement of Defence immediately.

Instead, the Master ordered the defendants to comply within 90 days, failing which the plaintiff could move again to strike the pleading.

The plaintiff, a meat processing company, brought a motion for a Mareva injunction against its former purchasing agent and related corporate and individual defendants.

The plaintiff alleged the purchasing agent engaged in a fraudulent scheme to receive secret commissions on meat purchases by funnelling money through a third-party corporation.

The court found an overwhelming prima facie case of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

Given the defendants' failure to produce relevant financial documents and evidence of asset dissipation, the court concluded there was a real risk of assets being removed or disposed of, and granted the Mareva injunction.

The defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court after a motion judge dismissed their motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs’ statement of claim alleging intentional interference with economic relations.

The action alleged that the defendants disseminated defamatory communications to customers and stakeholders and intimidated customers in an effort to disrupt business relationships.

The court considered the test under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing leave to appeal.

It found a conflicting decision regarding the sufficiency of pleadings and whether material facts may be supplied only after examinations for discovery.

Concluding that the issues raised a serious question about the correctness of the order and warranted appellate consideration, the court granted leave to appeal on all issues.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of a Charter section 11(b) delay application and challenged the conviction for failing to comply with section 159(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The respondent was charged with failing to slow down, proceed with caution, and change lanes when approaching an emergency vehicle with flashing lights on a multi-lane highway.

The trial justice dismissed the delay application and convicted the respondent.

On appeal, the court upheld both the dismissal of the delay application and the conviction, finding that the delay was largely attributable to the respondent's actions and that the respondent failed to comply with all three obligations under section 159(3).

The defendant was charged with failing to move over, if safe to do so, contrary to section 159(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was operating a motor vehicle in Lane 1 of a three-lane highway when he approached a police cruiser parked on the left shoulder with emergency lights activated.

The defendant did not reduce his speed while passing the police vehicle.

The court found that the defendant breached section 159(3) by failing to reduce speed and proceed with caution, which are mandatory requirements under the statute.

The court did not need to consider whether the defendant could have safely moved to another lane, as the failure to slow down was sufficient for conviction.

Following reasons on motions and cross-motions, the court addressed costs submissions in a commercial dispute involving enforcement issues and procedural dismissal arguments.

The defendants argued divided success and relied on an offer to settle, but the court found the offer irrelevant because the judgment amount substantially exceeded it.

The court held the plaintiff was substantially successful, particularly regarding outstanding costs awards and resisting dismissal of the claim under Rules 48.14 and 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although a Mareva injunction was vacated, the court held that this occurred on the court’s own initiative and did not alter the overall success analysis.

The plaintiff was awarded partial-indemnity costs fixed at $20,000 payable forthwith.

The defendants moved for a declaration that the plaintiff’s action was deemed dismissed as abandoned under Rule 48.15(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff brought a cross‑motion seeking declarations that the action was not abandoned, recovery of unpaid costs with interest, and related relief concerning a Mareva injunction.

The court held that Rule 48.15(6) does not apply to defended actions and therefore the action was not deemed dismissed.

The court also found that interest continued to accrue on unpaid costs and ordered payment of the outstanding amount, with the defendants’ defence and counterclaim to be struck if payment was not made.

The Mareva injunction was ordered vacated following payment or dismissal of the defence and counterclaim.