J. Martin

Buyers sought rescission of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property and return of their deposit after discovering water in the basement on their third pre-closing visit.

Sellers sought a declaration of breach, damages, and forfeiture of the deposit.

The court found that the detrimental condition warranty clause in the agreement was limited to the sellers' knowledge and belief at the time of execution, not at closing.

Since the sellers had no knowledge of any water problem before signing the agreement, they did not breach the warranty.

The buyers breached by refusing to close.

The court awarded damages to the sellers totaling $206,703.56, representing the difference in sale price, rental costs, and other incidental expenses.

This decision concerns the allocation of costs following a trial regarding the estate of Edward Malcolm LaFrance.

The court considered submissions from both parties, each seeking costs on different bases, but ultimately determined that no costs should be awarded to any party due to the divided success at trial and the nature of the family estate dispute.

Each party is to bear their own costs.

This addendum corrects a factual error in the reasons for decision released February 5, 2025, regarding the date on which shares were given to the parties.

The court clarifies that the shares were given at Christmas 1996, not Christmas 2019, as previously stated in paragraph 169.

The appellant police officer appealed a decision of the Waterloo Regional Police Services Board to dismiss him due to disability under s. 47(2) of the Police Services Act.

The Commission held a preliminary hearing to determine whether the appeal under s. 47(5) should proceed as a hearing de novo or an appeal on the record.

Applying principles of statutory interpretation, the Commission concluded that the legislature intended for a full evidentiary hearing to take place before the Board, and that the appeal to the Commission must proceed on the record of the Board's proceeding.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his discharge under s. 47(2) of the Police Services Act to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.

The Waterloo Police Association (WRPA) and the Police Association of Ontario (PAO) brought motions to intervene in the appeal, and the Chief of Police sought to confirm his status as a respondent.

The Commission granted intervenor status to the PAO as amicus and to the WRPA with participatory rights to be determined.

The Commission also confirmed the Chief of Police as a respondent on the appeal, noting his full participation in the proceeding below, without deciding whether his participation below was proper.

The accused, James Williamson, was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose after inflicting multiple stab wounds on the complainant, Steven Leclair.

The central issue at trial was Williamson's claim of self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected Williamson's testimony, finding him to be the aggressor and that he did not reasonably believe force was being used or threatened against him.

The court further found that even if such a belief existed, his response of stabbing an unarmed individual four times in the back was unreasonable and excessive.

Additionally, the court concluded that Williamson possessed both the knife and a wooden stick for a purpose dangerous to the public.

The Crown successfully disproved self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt, and Williamson was found guilty on all counts.

The self-represented plaintiff in a medical malpractice action brought motions to strike the defendant physician's Statement of Defence, compel answers to a third set of written discovery questions, and examine non-party witnesses.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to dismiss the plaintiff's motions as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.02.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the defence, finding the defendant had adequately answered nearly 300 questions and fulfilled his production obligations.

The court ordered the defendant to answer two specific questions relevant to the pleadings but otherwise dismissed the request for further answers.

The cross-motion and the motion to examine non-parties were also dismissed or adjourned.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which had dismissed her appeal from the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario's refusal to investigate her complaint against a doctor.

The doctor had attended the applicant's home for an independent medical examination on behalf of an insurer, but the applicant refused to participate.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the complaint to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as the doctor provided no medical services and owed no duty to the applicant.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the defendant Township of Oro-Medonte to answer questions refused at an examination for discovery, produce Standard Operating Procedures, and re-attend discovery.

The defendant argued leave was required because the matter had been set down for trial.

The court found leave was not required as the motion record was served before the trial record, but would have granted leave regardless.

The court ordered the defendant to answer the refused questions, produce the requested documents, and have its representative re-attend discovery at its own expense, finding the requested information relevant to whether the defendant acted reasonably in its response to the downed hydro wires.

The self-represented plaintiff in a medical malpractice action brought a motion seeking leave to amend his Statement of Claim for an eighth time, leave to examine non-parties, and an order compelling the production of documents.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendments had no chance of success, were presumptively prejudicial due to delay, and constituted an abuse of process.

The court also denied leave to examine non-parties and compel document production, as the plaintiff had not yet conducted an examination for discovery of the defendant.

At a case management conference in a medical malpractice action, the self-represented plaintiff sought to bring motions to amend the Statement of Claim and for further documentary discovery, while the defendant sought a motion regarding the mode of discovery and a timetable.

The case management judge established a timetable for the exchange of motion materials and ordered that examinations for discovery be completed by August 31, 2021.

The accused, G.D., was charged with two counts of sexual assault against two teenage male complainants, PT and WV, occurring between 1997 and 2001.

The Crown sought to admit evidence from each count as similar act evidence for the other.

The court found both complainants credible and reliable, despite their substance abuse and the passage of time, noting specific details and corroboration from other witnesses and the accused's own testimony.

The accused's denials were found evasive, self-serving, and unbelievable.

The court granted the Crown's application for similar act evidence, finding a distinctive pattern of conduct.

The judge concluded that the Crown proved the essential elements of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt for both counts, leading to findings of guilt.

The Federal Crown and a court-appointed Receiver applied to vary a forfeiture order that required the destruction of seized electronic devices and documents, as the CRA and the Receiver sought access to them for ongoing investigations into an illegal pyramid scheme.

The court held it lacked jurisdiction to use certiorari to set aside the destruction order made under s. 490.1(1) of the Criminal Code because a statutory right of appeal to the Court of Appeal existed.

However, the court granted the Receiver's application under s. 490.5, declaring its interest unaffected and suspending the destruction order, and allowed the appeal to set aside the destruction order made under s. 490(9).

The plaintiff, a meat processing company, brought a motion for a Mareva injunction against its former purchasing agent and related corporate and individual defendants.

The plaintiff alleged the purchasing agent engaged in a fraudulent scheme to receive secret commissions on meat purchases by funnelling money through a third-party corporation.

The court found an overwhelming prima facie case of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

Given the defendants' failure to produce relevant financial documents and evidence of asset dissipation, the court concluded there was a real risk of assets being removed or disposed of, and granted the Mareva injunction.

In a Commercial List dispute involving the valuation of shares in a pharmacy business and claims regarding termination pay, the parties brought a refusals and production motion relating to documentary disclosure.

During the hearing, the court concluded that the issues required more extensive argument than appropriate for a brief Commercial List refusals motion.

The judge provided guidance regarding production obligations concerning alleged diversion of business and the use of company funds benefiting related entities.

However, the court determined that detailed refusals disputes should be heard by a Master, whose jurisdiction includes such matters.

The motion was therefore referred to a Master for determination, with further case management to follow once the production issues are resolved.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal regarding the interpretation of s. 28(1) of Regulation 470 to the Funeral Directors and Establishments Act, which requires a funeral establishment's corporate name to be 'clearly disclosed to the public' on business signs.

The Tribunal had found that a large discrepancy in font size between the business name and the corporate name meant the corporate name was not clearly disclosed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal erred in law by focusing on relative font size rather than whether the corporate name was readable from the vantage point from which the sign was intended to be read.

The matter was remitted to the Complaints Committee for reconsideration.