M. Roefe

The creditor brought two motions to enforce a restitution order against a former employee convicted of theft.

The first motion sought to compel the debtor to reattend a judgment debtor examination after she evaded service and failed to appear.

The second, brought without notice, sought leave to issue a writ of seizure and sale more than six years after the original order.

The court granted both motions, permitting service via social media and mail, and confirming that a restitution order entered as a civil judgment attracts post-judgment interest by operation of law.

In a long-running dispute over a solicitor's account, the solicitor objected to the client's late delivery of a supplementary expert report regarding alleged spoliation of computer files.

The case management judge found that the client's counsel breached prior case management directions by serving the report late and in an obscure manner.

However, because the solicitor had also been granted an extension to file her own expert report, the court admitted the client's late report to ensure procedural fairness, while adjourning the trial and setting strict new timelines.

This decision addresses claims of privilege over documents in an ongoing action for the assessment of a solicitor's account.

The applicant solicitor sought full disclosure of a draft report from SB Partners Corporate Finance, a memorandum from W. Grant Buchan-Terrell, and accounts of Ray Niejadlik, which the respondent client had redacted.

The court found that the client had waived privilege over the SB Partners report by intending to use disclosed portions to challenge the solicitor's work, and ordered its full disclosure.

For the Buchan-Terrell memorandum, some redactions were maintained due to litigation strategy or unrelated advice, while others were ordered disclosed.

Most of Ray Niejadlik's invoices were ordered disclosed, as claims of solicitor-client and litigation privilege failed, and the Wigmore criteria for case-by-case privilege were not met, except for the April 2009 invoice which was protected by solicitor-client privilege due to counsel's involvement.

The client's request for a sealing order was denied.

The client brought an assessment of the solicitor's account, which had been ongoing for ten years.

The parties sought further production and particulars from each other.

The client argued the solicitor should be estopped from seeking production due to delay, which the court dismissed, noting ongoing preservation obligations.

The court applied the principle of proportionality to limit the scope of discovery and ordered both parties to provide specific documents and particulars to ensure each side knew the case to meet, despite the solicitor bearing the ultimate burden of proof.

In an ongoing assessment of a solicitor's costs, the client sought to introduce evidence of an allegedly improperly commissioned 2015 affidavit and the solicitor's counsel's disciplinary history in Tennessee to attack the solicitor's credibility regarding a 2008 affidavit.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible, enforcing a prior agreement between the parties not to litigate the 2015 affidavit.

The court also found the evidence failed the test for similar fact evidence and its admission would be highly prejudicial as it would force the solicitor's counsel to become a witness and remove himself from the record.

The appellant, a self-represented litigant with extensive litigation experience, sought to review a decision by Justice Nordheimer declining to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing his appeals for failure to perfect.

The appellant had filed seven appeals in response to a single order and failed to provide adequate reasons for the delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to review, finding no error in Nordheimer J.A.'s discretionary decision.

The court also denied the appellant's last-minute request for an adjournment based on medical grounds and Charter arguments.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity scale.

The client brought a motion to permanently stay the assessment of its former solicitor's accounts, alleging the solicitor intentionally deleted relevant electronic files from her laptop in breach of a preservation order.

The court found that the allegations involved significant credibility issues and conflicting expert evidence regarding the spoliation of evidence.

Applying principles analogous to summary judgment, the court concluded that a stay was a draconian remedy that could not be granted without a full hearing with viva voce evidence.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice to the client's right to renew the arguments at a full hearing before a Superior Court judge.

The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing a claim seeking payment under two 1988 certificates of deposit that allegedly remained unpaid.

The plaintiffs commenced the action in 2011, more than two decades after the certificates matured.

The court held that the certificates constituted demand obligations and promissory notes within the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Act.

Applying the transitional provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002 and the former six‑year limitation period, the court found the claim arose no later than 1988 or 1989 and was therefore long statute‑barred.

The court also held the equitable doctrine of laches applied due to the plaintiffs’ 23‑year delay and resulting prejudice to the defendant.

The plaintiff, a meat processing company, brought a motion for a Mareva injunction against its former purchasing agent and related corporate and individual defendants.

The plaintiff alleged the purchasing agent engaged in a fraudulent scheme to receive secret commissions on meat purchases by funnelling money through a third-party corporation.

The court found an overwhelming prima facie case of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

Given the defendants' failure to produce relevant financial documents and evidence of asset dissipation, the court concluded there was a real risk of assets being removed or disposed of, and granted the Mareva injunction.