COURT FILE NO.: 2675/09
DATE: 2018 05 11
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Frances M. Viele – and- Gargan Investments Limited
BEFORE: LeMay J.
COUNSEL: B. Teplitsky, Counsel for the Solicitor
M. Roefe, Counsel for the Client
ENDORSEMENT
[1] This case involves an assessment of the Solicitor’s costs by the Client. I am case managing this action, and have set out much of the history in a previous decision (see Gargan v. Viele 2017 ONSC 6685). I will not repeat that history here. Suffice it to say that this action has been going on for nearly ten years and has not made significant progress towards a resolution.
[2] After releasing my previous decision, I convened a case management conference with the intention of establishing a timetable so that this matter could be litigated. However, it became clear that a preliminary issue had to be resolved before a timetable could be established.
[3] Mr. Roefe, on behalf of his clients, alleges that the judge conducting the assessment hearing will have to consider allegations of misconduct against both Ms. Viele, the solicitor, and Mr. Teplitsky who is representing Ms. Viele on this case. Specifically, Mr. Roefe argues that Mr. Teplitsky and Ms. Viele completed an Affidavit on September 23rd, 2015, but were not in the same place when it was sworn. Mr. Roefe wishes to prove this allegation in order to support the Client’s claim that Ms. Viele also had one of the clients, Ms. Katharine Gargarella-Capobianco, sign a blank attestation page to complete an Affidavit back in March of 2008. Mr. Roefe also wishes to use Mr. Teplitsky’s disciplinary history as a lawyer in Tennessee to support this claim.
[4] Mr. Teplitsky, on behalf of the Solicitor, opposes this request. He argues that the information is irrelevant, and that the parties had agreed in a teleconference with me that the issues relating to the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit had been resolved. He also points out that, if Mr. Roefe is permitted to proceed with these allegations, Mr. Teplitsky will have to remove himself from the file as he will be a material witness.
[5] As a result, I directed the parties to provide me with written submissions on a relatively short timetable. Having reviewed those submissions, I have determined that the allegations that the Client wishes to pursue against the Solicitor and her counsel should not be the subject of evidence on this assessment. Only the allegations relating to the 2008 Affidavit may be pursued.
Facts
[6] Although I do not intend to repeat the facts set out in my previous endorsement, some factual background is necessary to understand the issues that have been raised at this stage, and their disposition.
a) The March 2008 Affidavit
[7] An Affidavit was commissioned by Ms. Viele in the action where she represented the various clients sometime in early March of 2008. In 2015, Katharine Gargarella-Capobianco alleged that this Affidavit was not sworn in front of Ms. Viele, contrary to the usual processes for swearing Affidavits. Ms. Viele disputes this version of events, and says that she was present with the client when the Affidavit was sworn.
[8] This factual dispute did not come to light until 2015. The explanation that is proffered for the delay in raising this issue is the fact that a second Affidavit was provided by Ms. Viele, in this proceeding, that looked like the allegedly improperly sworn Affidavit from March of 2008. As a result, Ms. Gargarella-Capobianco allegedly remembers the first Affidavit being improperly sworn. I now turn to the second Affidavit.
b) The September 2015 Affidavit and the Conference Call
[9] An Affidavit was sworn by Ms. Viele on September 23rd, 2015. After receiving a copy of that Affidavit, Mr. Roefe asked to inspect the original. Mr. Roefe took the position that, because the Affidavit had the attestation page as a separate page, it might have been improperly commissioned. He based this assertion on Ms. Gargarella-Capobianco’s evidence, filed in reply to the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit, that the March 5th, 2008 Affidavit had been improperly sworn. It is my understanding that Mr. Teplitsky had originally agreed to produce the original Affidavit, but then advised that it had been lost.
[10] A conference call was scheduled with the parties for November 12th, 2015. It was done in chambers, and was not recorded. Both based on the materials filed beforehand and the submissions made during the course of that conference call, I understood that Mr. Teplitsky wished to have a separate hearing on the issue of the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit. After hearing that position, and having some discussion, Mr. Roefe agreed that this matter would not be pursued. He filed a redacted Affidavit from Ms. Gargarella-Capobianco. The matter was not to be referred to again by the parties.
[11] As I have noted, that conference call was not recorded. As discussed below, there had been reference to the September 23, 2015 Affidavit in both factums. One factum did not mention the agreement between the parties. As a result, in my previous decision on the summary judgment motion, I had decided not to resolve the issue of whether there was an agreement not to refer to any alleged improprieties in commissioning the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit.
[12] However, it is clear from their submissions that both parties acknowledge that there was an agreement respecting this issue. As a result, I am content to resolve the legal issues that are presented by the subsequent events.
c) The Mentions of the September 2015 Affidavit in the Parties Factums
[13] Between September of 2015 and April of 2017, the parties addressed a summary judgment motion brought by the client. This motion was dismissed, for written reasons referenced above, in November of 2017. The parties filed voluminous materials on this motion. Each side filed a factum, and both sides referenced the issue of the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit.
[14] Mr. Teplitsky’s factum states, at paragraphs 12 to 14:
Not only was the issue raised late in the day in this proceeding, it was also the first time the Client had ever made the assertion. The assertion was made at the same time as the Client asserted that the writer had improperly commissioned an Affidavit of the Solicitor in this proceeding.
The long and short of this issue is that, to the Solicitor’s credit, after the allegation was made, she attended at the Commercial Court in Toronto to examine the Court file and as it turns out, the impugned Affidavit in the Court file bears an original signature of the Client as evident from the fact that the Affidavit was sworn in blue ink. A copy of the Affidavit was marked as Exhibit 2 to the cross-examination of the Solicitor.
Was the Client lying when she said the Affidavit was commissioned by facsimile? The Solicitor does not suggest this. Rather, the Solicitor points out that the events at issue transpired many years ago and the Client was obviously mistaken. The notion that the Solicitor improperly commissioned the Affidavit was obviously related to the Client’s assertion that the writer improperly commissioned an affidavit of the Solicitor in this proceeding which likely informed her incorrect recollection of the 2008 commissioning. The nexus between these two “events” is obvious from the fact that they were raised at the same time by the Client in an affidavit in 2015 and that they depict a common alleged occurrence (ie improper commissioning) The writer does not raise the allegation of his alleged improper commissioning to litigate the veracity of this claim but rather to illustrate how it is that the Client may have become confused as opposed to the alternative which is to say that the Client made up the allegation re the 2008 improper commissioning .
[15] Mr. Teplitsky argues that he did not actually breach the agreement by including paragraph 14 in his factum. I disagree. Mr. Teplitsky was attempting to use the late disclosure of the allegations about the 2008 Affidavit, coupled with the allegations about the 2015 Affidavit, in order to undermine the reliability (as opposed to credibility) of Ms. Gargarella-Capobianco. While there may be some merit to this argument, it violated the agreement between the parties.
[16] Mr. Roefe responded to this argument in a much more extensive manner. His factum states, at paragraphs 50 to 54, as follows:
In her factum, at para. 14, the Solicitor has resurrected an issue pertaining to the commissioning of the Solicitor’s own affidavit of September 23, 2015. The Solicitor has raised this issue in attempt to attack the reliability of the Client’s evidence regarding the Solicitor’s improper commissioning of the Client’s affidavit of March 5, 2008 as aforesaid. However, the Solicitor’s raising of this affidavit is in contravention of an agreement reached with the court and counsel to not deal with the issue.
Having been raised by the Solicitor, and since the issue has been addressed by the Solicitor in a manner to attack the Client’s recollections and evidence, the evidence must now be addressed by the Client. There are concerns on the face of the Solicitor’s September 23, 2015 affidavit, particularly the placement of the attestation clause on the last page, that the execution of the affidavit was subject to the same sort of improper procedures that befell the March 5, 2008 affidavit. The September 23, 2015 affidavit was the response of the Solicitor to the Client’s evidence that the Solicitor willfully failed to comply with court orders and destroyed records. It consisted of two page of densely written test and followed by an attestation clause which appeared in the middle of what was otherwise a blank page. Notably, the affidavit’s pages were not numbered.
It is also curious as why there would have been an apparent attendance by the Solicitor at Toronto to have an affidavit commissioned when the solicitor practices in Ottawa and could have had it completed in Ottawa and sent to her lawyer in Toronto for distribution and filing. Furthermore, the affidavit was due on September 11, 2015, but was produced September 24, 2015. The Solicitor was to have filed the original affidavit by October 9, 2015 but failed to do so. She resisted and delayed filing thereafter.
[17] With these submissions, Mr. Roefe argued that the agreement had been breached by Mr. Teplitsky in his submissions as an attempt to attack the reliability of Ms. Gargarella-Capobianco’s evidence. Mr. Roefe then responded to it with his own arguments on what inferences the Court should draw.
[18] Based on these factums, I noted (at paragraphs 53 and 54 of my decision) that these differing positions raised issues of credibility, and I originally determined that did not need to resolve them. However, in light of the issues that have arisen since, I now need to resolve these issues.
d) Mr. Teplitsky’s Disciplinary History
[19] I do not intend to spend a great deal of time outlining this history because it involves the Tennessee bar, and not the Ontario bar and it is hotly contested by Mr. Teplitsky.
[20] Briefly, on the materials that I have, Mr. Teplitsky filed an Affidavit relating to his attendance at professional development events. The Board of Professional Responsibility investigated, conducted a hearing, and determined that this Affidavit was untruthful. As a result, the Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility publicly reprimanded Mr. Teplitsky.
[21] The decision of the Board of Professional Responsibility was upheld on a writ of certiorari brought by Mr. Teplitsky before the Chancery Court of Shelby County. I do not know whether any further appeals were available, or taken.
[22] Mr. Teplitsky stated in his submissions that he is amenable to litigate the issue of the Tennessee discipline proceeding in Ontario and has commenced proceedings to do so, but has not pursued those proceedings. Mr. Teplitsky also filed an excerpt from the transcript of a deposition taken in that disciplinary proceeding, which he alleges demonstrates that the chair of the Hearing Panel had spoken to one of the witnesses about her testimony before that testimony was given.
Issues
[23] The factual matrix that I have set out above requires me to determine the following issues:
a) Was there an agreement between the parties about the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit?
b) Should that agreement be enforced in spite of the comments made by both sides in their factums and the subsequent desire of Mr. Roefe to litigate issues relating to the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit?
c) Should the evidence relating to the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit be admitted as similar fact evidence?
d) Should the evidence relating to Mr. Teplitsky’s disciplinary history with the Tennessee bar be admitted? Is Mr. Roefe’s attempt to rely on that history an interference with Ms. Viele’s choice of counsel?
[24] I will deal with each of these issues in turn.
[25] At the outset, however, I should address the issue of why I am dealing with a question of whether evidence should be admissible in advance of the actual hearing rather than leaving it to the judge hearing the assessment. The answer is that, if this question is not dealt with now, then Mr. Tepliltsky will not know whether he is able to remain as counsel in this case. The Courts place significant importance on not interfering with a party’s choice of counsel. As a result, this issue should be dealt with at this stage in the proceedings.
Issue #1- Was There an Agreement?
[26] Yes.
[27] The potential problem with this question, and the reason that I chose not to address it head-on in my previous reasons, is that this conference call was not recorded. As a result, I ran the risk of deciding a question where there could have been a dispute about what had transpired before me without having access to a record. As I have noted above, however, the parties confirm that there was, in fact, an agreement.
[28] Specifically, the parties had agreed that any alleged improprieties with the swearing of the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit would not be referred to during the remainder of this proceeding by either side. The acknowledgement of this agreement on the part of both parties accords with my understanding of what was discussed during our conference call.
Issue #2- Should the Agreement be Enforced In Spite of the References in the Factums?
[29] Yes.
[30] I reach this conclusion for four reasons. First, and most importantly, when the parties reach an agreement about how litigation should be conducted, the Courts should enforce those agreements unless there are good reasons not to. In this case, I see no reason why this agreement would not be enforced. As discussed elsewhere in these reasons, I can see a great many reasons (mostly relating to the choice of counsel) for this agreement to be enforced.
[31] Second, it must be remembered what the issue in this case is. This is an assessment hearing for work that was performed by Ms. Viele for the clients in and prior to 2008. The Clients have sought a stay of this action, and raised serious allegations about the manner in which the Solicitor handled disclosure in this case. That argument remains open to them. However, the swearing of a single Affidavit during the course of a proceeding is unlikely to affect whether or not a Court views the Solicitor’s conduct as inappropriate. Even if true, the allegation about the 2015 Affidavit is a more peripheral matter when compared to the other issues in this case and will consume a significant amount of Court resources to litigate.
[32] Third, neither party has been prejudiced by the references to this issue in the factums that they filed. This assessment is proceeding before a Judge who will be able to disabuse herself or himself of any extraneous issues, including the issue about the Affidavits. In other words, no one has been disadvantaged by the breaches of the agreement and there is no reason not to enforce it.
[33] Finally, the references in the factums were relatively limited, especially in Ms. Viele’s factum. While they breached the agreement between the parties, it is clear that they were not the focus of the summary judgment motion, or of the parties submissions.
Issue #3- Similar Fact Evidence
[34] Mr. Roefe argues that the evidence about the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit should be received by the judge conducting the assessment because it meets the test for similar fact evidence. It also appears that Mr. Roefe is seeking to introduce Mr. Teplitsky’s disciplinary history from Tennessee to support his assertion that this September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit was improperly commissioned. This issue only arises if I am wrong in my conclusions about whether the agreement should be enforced. However, given the complexity and length of this proceeding, I am of the view that it is helpful to address all of the issues at once.
[35] In support of his claim that this evidence meets the test for similar fact evidence, Mr. Roefe cited Greenhalgh v. Douro-Dummer (Township) ((2009) 181 A.C.W.S. (3rd) 489 (Ont. S.C.J.)), Hodson v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce ((2001) 16 C.C.E.L. (3rd) 110 (Ont. Div. Ct.)), MacDonald et al v. Canada Kelp Company (1974 Carswell BC 156 (B.C.C.A.)) and Alexander J. Holdings Ltd. v. Delta Play Ltd ((1999) 88 A.C.W.S. (3rd) 1168 (B.C.S.C.)). Of these decisions, Greenhalgh is the most helpful as it contains an extensive discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Handy (2002 SCC 56, [2002] S.C.J. No. 57), which is the leading case on the use of similar fact evidence.
[36] The first principle that comes from these cases is that similar fact evidence is generally inadmissible. It is up to the party seeking to admit the evidence to show that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
[37] Then, the probative value of the evidence is assessed, using a four part test:
a) The evidence must be adduced to address a specific issue. It cannot be adduced to demonstrate that the party is of “bad character”.
b) The Court must assess whether there is a potential for collusion.
c) The similarities and differences in the evidence must be considered.
d) The strength of the evidence must be considered.
[38] Then, the court must consider the prejudicial effect of the evidence. There are two types of prejudice: moral prejudice and reasoning prejudice.
[39] Finally, once the probative value and prejudicial effect are considered, the Court then engages in a balancing act to determine whether the evidence should be admitted.
[40] I will deal with each part of the test in the sections that follow
a) Probative Value
[41] In Greenhalgh, supra, Lauwers J. (as he then was) noted, at paragraph 29, that the Handy analysis can only be carried out by the trial judge unless it is immediately evident that the evidence will not pass muster. In this case, I am prepared to make a ruling on this issue now for reasons that I will outline when I review the evidence.
[42] I start with an analysis of the probative value of the evidence in this case. The specific issue that it seeks to address appears to be whether Ms. Viele improperly commissioned an Affidavit in 2008. What Ms. Viele did (or did not) do in 2008 does not seem to be particularly linked to an event seven years later, which arose in different circumstances. It is even less similar to what Ms. Viele’s current counsel did in a different set of circumstances in a different jurisdiction four years previously in a case that did not involve Ms. Viele.
[43] This brings me to the potential for collusion. In this case, there is no chance that Ms. Gargarella-Capobianco colluded with Ms. Viele or Mr. Teplitsky. This is a factor that would support admission of the evidence, as it would be more reliable.
[44] Then, there are the similarities between the evidence. The overriding similarity is that the three incidents all involve alleged flaws in the commissioning of Affidavits, and two of them involve the same type of flaw, which is a floating attestation page that was not commissioned with the rest of the Affidavit. There are some similarities with this evidence, and some basis for admitting it.
[45] This brings me to the strength of the evidence. There are two significant flaws, from the Client’s perspective, in this evidence. First, there are flaws in Ms. Gargarella-Capobianco’s evidence itself. Part of the explanation that Ms. Gargarella-Capobianco gives for not remembering this issue for seven years is the unusual appearance of the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit. In order for her explanation that the 2008 Affidavit was improperly commissioned to be accepted, a trier of fact may have to accept that the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit was improperly commissioned. Otherwise, the significant delay in remembering this issue will weaken Ms. Gargarella-Capobianco’s evidence.
[46] The second flaw in the evidence is that it will be very difficult for Mr. Roefe to prove that the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit was improperly commissioned. First, the original no longer exists. Second, both Mr. Teplitsky and Ms. Viele would testify that this Affidavit was properly commissioned. Third, Mr. Teplitsky advises that he will produce another witness who will testify that the Affidavit was properly commissioned.
[47] As a result, when these factors are considered, the evidence appears to be relatively weak. This is a factor that favours exclusion.
b) Prejudicial Effect
[48] Then, there is the prejudicial effect of this evidence. The types of prejudice that are normally considered are moral prejudice and reasoning prejudice. In this case, both types would be present. In terms of moral prejudice, it must be remembered that it will be difficult for Mr. Roefe to establish at the assessment that the Affidavit was, in fact, improperly commissioned. He will be faced with both Ms. Viele’s evidence and Mr. Teplitsky’s evidence. In order to attack their credibility, he would have to suggest that they are the type of people who would engage in misleading the Court.
[49] In terms of reasoning prejudice, the evidence seems to be an attempt to “bootstrap” Katharine Gargarella-Capobianco’s credibility by trying to show that Ms. Viele (and her lawyer) would improperly commission affidavits. This is the sort of reasoning that a trier of fact should be concerned about engaging in.
[50] I acknowledge that ruling on the admissibility of this evidence at the outset rather than during the course of the Assessment is an unusual step to take. However, in the unique circumstances of this case I view it as an appropriate step to take for three reasons, as follows:
a) Leaving this matter to the Assessment Judge would have resulted in Ms. Viele losing her choice of counsel, which would be very prejudicial to Ms. Viele, and would have further delayed this matter.
b) Leaving this matter to the Assessment Judge, to be determined after hearing evidence, would have required a more complete waiver of solicitor-client privilege by Ms. Viele than has been required to address this issue now.
c) It will be very difficult to persuade the Judge hearing the Application that this evidence should be admitted. I am not certain that it meets the obviousness standard articulated in Greenhalgh, but as can be seen from the analysis above, it is close.
[51] I am not reaching any conclusions on whether Mr. Roefe and his client pursued this issue because they wanted to force Mr. Teplitsky off the file. It is, however, the effect that would be achieved if I accepted their arguments on this point.
Issue #4- The Tennessee Disciplinary History
[52] It was not clear to me from Mr. Roefe’s submissions as to whether he was seeking to rely on the Tennessee disciplinary history only under the category of similar fact evidence, or whether he had other grounds for seeking to rely on it. As a result, I will also consider this evidence separately under the probative value and prejudicial effect rubric.
[53] It is clear from the materials that, if Mr. Roefe is permitted to use the Tennessee disciplinary history, then Mr. Teplitsky wishes to re-litigate the issues from that disciplinary hearing. Mr. Tepliltsky argues that the offline discussion between the chair of the Hearing Panel and a witness is a breach of natural justice, and would make the judgment unenforceable in Canada. I make no comment on whether that argument would be successful, except to note that the principle of comity between jurisdictions may raise a bar to Mr. Teplitsky’s arguments.
[54] There is a simpler way to resolve this issue. As I have noted above, this evidence is of marginal relevance, as it does not meet the test for similar fact evidence. In addition, it is not evidence of Ms. Viele’s conduct. It is not even evidence of Mr. Teplitsky’s conduct in this case. Instead, Mr. Roefe seeks to use this evidence as proof of Mr. Teplitsky’s alleged propensity to swear false affidavits and/or otherwise misrepresent himself in order to attack Ms. Viele’s credibility.
[55] Putting aside the potential factual dispute, there are a number of serious problems with this position. First, even if Mr. Teplitsky was properly sanctioned by the Hearing Panel in Tennessee, it is the only occasion that was brought to my attention where he might have engaged in professional misconduct. This does not establish a pattern of conduct.
[56] Second, there is no evidence that Mr. Teplitsky has been sanctioned by any law society since the Tennessee incident, which took place in 2011, and which was adjudicated in 2012 and 2013. It is quite possible that, if Mr. Teplitsky engaged in improper conduct, he learned from it. This one incident alone is insufficient to establish a pattern of similar fact, or to support an inference that Mr. Teplitsky improperly commissioned the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit.
[57] Third, this evidence is prejudicial in two ways. First, accusations of professional misconduct made against a solicitor are always a serious matter (see Gargan v. Viele, supra, at paras 74-76). The prejudicial effect of this evidence will be magnified if it is permitted to be used in this case. Mr. Roefe will be arguing that Ms. Viele misconducted herself, and will be pointing to someone else’s alleged misconduct to support that allegation. That makes the evidence both irrelevant and prejudicial.
[58] In addition, the evidence is prejudicial because it interferes with Ms. Viele’s choice of counsel. In essence, by raising this allegation, Mr. Roefe seeks to force Mr. Teplitsky to remove himself as counsel in this case, and become a witness. The Court of Appeal has recognized that the Courts should be reluctant to permit counsel to be called as a witness. In R. v. Elliott (2003 CanLII 24447 (Ont. C.A.)), the Court stated that, in order to call opposing counsel as a witness, the party seeking to call the witness must demonstrate that the evidence is both relevant and necessary (see paragraphs 114-118). Although Elliott was a decision in the criminal context, these principles are applicable in the civil context as well (see Lauzon v. Axa Insurance (Canada) 2012 ONSC 6730 at paragraph 32).
[59] In this case, the evidence about what Mr. Teplitsky may or may not have done in a different jurisdiction in a different set of circumstances does not appear to be relevant. However, even if it is relevant, I do not view it as necessary evidence because it does not relate directly to the issues in this case. The primary issue in this case is whether Ms. Viele is entitled to claim fees for the work that she did in and prior to 2008. The secondary issue in this case is whether the conduct of Ms. Viele in the litigation of this case has been so egregious as to justify a stay of proceedings. The conduct of Ms. Viele’s current solicitor (who was not her counsel for much of the proceeding) in a different matter in a different jurisdiction seems to me to be both irrelevant and unnecessary to determining those issues. This evidence is not admissible.
Conclusion and Costs
[60] For the reasons set out above, I am directing that the evidence relating to the Client’s concerns about the swearing of the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit and the evidence relating to Mr. Teplitsky’s disciplinary history in Tennessee is not to be received before the judge conducting the assessment hearing.
[61] I will also expressly note that I am making no findings, one way or the other, about the swearing of the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit. I should also note, however, that Mr. Teplitsky asked me to address what he sees as an “incorrect impression” created by my reasons in the summary judgment motion decision, and particularly paragraphs 29 and 53 of that decision. I decline to do so. My reasons speak for themselves. In my view, the issues related to the September 23rd, 2015 Affidavit and the Tennessee disciplinary history are at an end in this litigation.
[62] As a result, there should be no impediment to Mr. Teplitsky continuing to act as counsel in this case. My assistant will be in contact by e-mail to schedule a further case management conference with counsel. This conference is to be in-person, and to be held in Brampton or such other location where I am presiding on the day the conference is scheduled.
[63] In terms of costs, submissions are due from both parties, within fourteen (14) calendar days of the date these reasons are released. They are not to exceed two (2) single-spaced pages exclusive of bills of cost, case-law and offers to settle.
[64] Reply submissions are due within seven (7) calendar days thereafter, and are not to exceed one (1) single-spaced page.
[65] The parties are reminded of my directions with respect to the page lengths of submissions. Those directions remain in force.
LeMay J.
DATE: May 11, 2018
COURT FILE NO.: 2675/09
DATE: 2018 05 11
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Frances M. Viele – and- Gargan Investments Limited
BEFORE: LeMay J.
COUNSEL: B. Teplitsky, Counsel for the Solicitor
M. Roefe, Counsel for the Client
ENDORSEMENT
LeMay J.
DATE: May 11, 2018