Frances M. Wood

David Grier, through his litigation guardian, moved to strike Janet Grier's notice of objection to the passing of accounts, citing her non-compliance with court orders.

Janet, through her litigation guardian, cross-moved for a full accounting of James Grier's estate, arguing that the estate's true value was undetermined.

The court dismissed David's motion to strike, finding it premature given the need for a proper valuation of the estate and Janet's health issues.

The court granted Janet's cross-motion for directions, ordering a strict timetable for disclosure of estate financial information by David.

The applicant father brought a Motion to Change seeking retroactive termination of a 1982 combined spousal and child support order and repayment of alleged overpayments totaling $78,229.87.

The father argued his support obligation ended in 1996.

The court found the father's delay in bringing the motion was entirely his own fault, despite being advised by courts in 1993 and 2007 to do so.

Taking a holistic approach, the court noted the father historically underpaid support, failed to contribute to extraordinary expenses, and that the mother used the funds to support the children.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no overpayment occurred.

Following an appeal decision that recalculated child and spousal support, the parties made further written submissions on calculation corrections and costs.

The Court of Appeal accepted both parties' submissions to correct the child support calculations based on clarified living arrangements and section 7 expenses.

On the issue of costs, the court affirmed the trial judge's costs award of $22,000 to the respondent, finding that the respondent's pre-trial offer remained considerably more generous than the final result obtained by the appellant.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order terminating child and spousal support and requiring her to reimburse the respondent for overpayments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the termination of spousal support, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant had achieved self-sufficiency following an inheritance.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred by failing to increase spousal support for the period after child support ended, and made several calculation errors regarding child support overpayments.

The appeal was allowed in part, adjusting the amounts owed between the parties.

The appellant appealed a trial decision regarding custody, access, and section 7 expenses.

He argued the trial judge was biased, improperly curtailed his questioning, and erred in granting the respondent final decision-making power and ordering him to pay 100% of extraordinary expenses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's interventions appropriate, the custody arrangement sensible to minimize conflict, and the section 7 order a reasonable exercise of discretion given the significant income disparity between the parties.

The applicant sought spousal support and a declaration of an interest in a residential property following the breakdown of her relationship with the respondent.

The court found that the parties were common law spouses who cohabited for over 11 years.

The applicant was awarded non-compensatory spousal support due to her inability to work following a bipolar disorder diagnosis.

The court also found that the respondent was unjustly enriched by the applicant's contributions to the maintenance and preservation of the property, awarding her monetary compensation for her share of the joint family venture.

Former spouses disputed continued child and spousal support obligations after their adult daughters completed undergraduate degrees.

The court considered whether the children remained “children of the marriage” under the Divorce Act and how their employment income and educational pursuits affected support entitlement.

It held that child support does not automatically end after a first undergraduate degree, but must be assessed based on the children’s circumstances and means.

Child support for one daughter ended in 2011 and for the other in 2013, with partial reimbursement ordered for payments made thereafter.

Spousal support continued beyond the date asserted by the payor but terminated in 2013, with modest retroactive adjustments for underpayment.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order under appeal, and directed a new trial on the terms set out in the filed consent order.

The endorsement contains no substantive merits analysis.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings on support, equalization, and ownership of the Britannia Street home in a family property dispute.

The Court of Appeal held there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge's reasons accepting an earlier attribution of income, attributing financial responsibility for a vehicle, and finding that one appellant owned the home rather than holding it in trust for the other.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was awarded appeal costs of $1,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The respondent brought a motion for a restraining order and an order requiring the applicant to vacate a residential property he owned, while the applicant brought a cross‑motion seeking interim spousal support based on an alleged common law relationship.

The parties disputed whether they had cohabited in a continuous common law relationship and whether the applicant had any possessory or constructive trust interest in the home.

The court found there was an arguable case that the parties were in a common law relationship but that significant factual disputes remained, including issues relating to income and property interests.

To preserve the status quo pending trial, the court allowed the applicant to remain in the home in lieu of interim spousal support and declined to grant a formal restraining order.

The matter was ordered to proceed to an expedited trial.

Following reasons on motions and cross-motions, the court addressed costs submissions in a commercial dispute involving enforcement issues and procedural dismissal arguments.

The defendants argued divided success and relied on an offer to settle, but the court found the offer irrelevant because the judgment amount substantially exceeded it.

The court held the plaintiff was substantially successful, particularly regarding outstanding costs awards and resisting dismissal of the claim under Rules 48.14 and 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although a Mareva injunction was vacated, the court held that this occurred on the court’s own initiative and did not alter the overall success analysis.

The plaintiff was awarded partial-indemnity costs fixed at $20,000 payable forthwith.

The defendants moved for a declaration that the plaintiff’s action was deemed dismissed as abandoned under Rule 48.15(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff brought a cross‑motion seeking declarations that the action was not abandoned, recovery of unpaid costs with interest, and related relief concerning a Mareva injunction.

The court held that Rule 48.15(6) does not apply to defended actions and therefore the action was not deemed dismissed.

The court also found that interest continued to accrue on unpaid costs and ordered payment of the outstanding amount, with the defendants’ defence and counterclaim to be struck if payment was not made.

The Mareva injunction was ordered vacated following payment or dismissal of the defence and counterclaim.

The parties disputed their date of separation, the validity of a separation agreement, equalization, and spousal support.

The applicant husband claimed separation occurred in 2006, while the respondent wife claimed 2000.

The court found the parties separated in 2000 and lived separate lives under the same roof thereafter.

The court set aside a 2000 separation agreement, finding the husband was only shown the signature page and the agreement was unconscionable.

The wife was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $57,797.33 and indefinite spousal support of $1,500 per month to the disabled husband.

The appellant appealed a contempt order and a second motion order arising from family law proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed a motion to admit fresh evidence regarding a translated document.

On the main appeal, the Court varied the contempt order to remove findings of breach that were not requested or supported by evidence.

The Court also struck unrequested restraining and child transfer orders, and reversed an order holding the appellant's share of matrimonial home proceeds as security for future child support, finding no evidence that he would fail to comply with future orders.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant appealed an order that denied retroactive child support and set ongoing support at $45.00 per month.

The Divisional Court found that the motions judge made palpable and overriding errors by relying on unsworn submissions from unrepresented parties, failing to consider retroactive support for one of the children, and arbitrarily reducing the appellant's employment expenses without reasons.

The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and the matter remitted for rehearing with directions for full financial disclosure.

The appellant sought a capacity assessment and visitation rights regarding her mother, who suffered from advanced Parkinson's disease and had consented to permanent gastrostomy tube feeding.

The motions judge dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction under the Substitute Decisions Act and the Health Care Consent Act, and awarded solicitor-and-client costs against the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that a capacity assessment cannot be ordered absent a pending guardianship application or reasonable grounds to doubt capacity.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs award and reduced it to a party-and-party scale, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify punitive costs.