Frances M. Wood

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order under appeal, and directed a new trial on the terms set out in the filed consent order.

The endorsement contains no substantive merits analysis.

The respondent brought a motion for a restraining order and an order requiring the applicant to vacate a residential property he owned, while the applicant brought a cross‑motion seeking interim spousal support based on an alleged common law relationship.

The parties disputed whether they had cohabited in a continuous common law relationship and whether the applicant had any possessory or constructive trust interest in the home.

The court found there was an arguable case that the parties were in a common law relationship but that significant factual disputes remained, including issues relating to income and property interests.

To preserve the status quo pending trial, the court allowed the applicant to remain in the home in lieu of interim spousal support and declined to grant a formal restraining order.

The matter was ordered to proceed to an expedited trial.

Following reasons on motions and cross-motions, the court addressed costs submissions in a commercial dispute involving enforcement issues and procedural dismissal arguments.

The defendants argued divided success and relied on an offer to settle, but the court found the offer irrelevant because the judgment amount substantially exceeded it.

The court held the plaintiff was substantially successful, particularly regarding outstanding costs awards and resisting dismissal of the claim under Rules 48.14 and 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although a Mareva injunction was vacated, the court held that this occurred on the court’s own initiative and did not alter the overall success analysis.

The plaintiff was awarded partial-indemnity costs fixed at $20,000 payable forthwith.

The defendants moved for a declaration that the plaintiff’s action was deemed dismissed as abandoned under Rule 48.15(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff brought a cross‑motion seeking declarations that the action was not abandoned, recovery of unpaid costs with interest, and related relief concerning a Mareva injunction.

The court held that Rule 48.15(6) does not apply to defended actions and therefore the action was not deemed dismissed.

The court also found that interest continued to accrue on unpaid costs and ordered payment of the outstanding amount, with the defendants’ defence and counterclaim to be struck if payment was not made.

The Mareva injunction was ordered vacated following payment or dismissal of the defence and counterclaim.

The parties disputed their date of separation, the validity of a separation agreement, equalization, and spousal support.

The applicant husband claimed separation occurred in 2006, while the respondent wife claimed 2000.

The court found the parties separated in 2000 and lived separate lives under the same roof thereafter.

The court set aside a 2000 separation agreement, finding the husband was only shown the signature page and the agreement was unconscionable.

The wife was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $57,797.33 and indefinite spousal support of $1,500 per month to the disabled husband.

The appellant appealed a contempt order and a second motion order arising from family law proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed a motion to admit fresh evidence regarding a translated document.

On the main appeal, the Court varied the contempt order to remove findings of breach that were not requested or supported by evidence.

The Court also struck unrequested restraining and child transfer orders, and reversed an order holding the appellant's share of matrimonial home proceeds as security for future child support, finding no evidence that he would fail to comply with future orders.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant appealed an order that denied retroactive child support and set ongoing support at $45.00 per month.

The Divisional Court found that the motions judge made palpable and overriding errors by relying on unsworn submissions from unrepresented parties, failing to consider retroactive support for one of the children, and arbitrarily reducing the appellant's employment expenses without reasons.

The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and the matter remitted for rehearing with directions for full financial disclosure.

The appellant sought a capacity assessment and visitation rights regarding her mother, who suffered from advanced Parkinson's disease and had consented to permanent gastrostomy tube feeding.

The motions judge dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction under the Substitute Decisions Act and the Health Care Consent Act, and awarded solicitor-and-client costs against the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that a capacity assessment cannot be ordered absent a pending guardianship application or reasonable grounds to doubt capacity.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs award and reduced it to a party-and-party scale, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify punitive costs.