Debora Lyons

Following the breakdown of a common law relationship, the parties disputed entitlement to the proceeds of sale of a custom-built home constructed through a shell corporation on jointly used funds and extensive labour.

The court held that the presumption of resulting trust over the parties’ joint RBC and BMO accounts was rebutted, accepted that the applicant had contributed substantial cash and labour, and found that the respondent’s evidence was frequently not credible.

Applying unjust enrichment and joint family venture principles from Kerr, the court concluded that the applicant’s on-site management, labour, and career sacrifice sufficiently offset the respondent’s greater direct monetary contribution.

The respondent’s claims for line of credit interest, occupation rent, and compensation for lost personal property were dismissed.

The trust funds representing the sale proceeds were ordered to be distributed equally.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a separation agreement and fixing the date of separation as July 31, 2018.

The application judge set aside the agreement under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act because the appellant failed to disclose a pending $4,000,000 investment in his company.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the non-disclosure warranted setting aside the agreement on fairness grounds.

The Court also upheld the application judge's factual determination of the separation date, finding it was supported by the evidence of the parties' ongoing interactions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to bring a motion for leave to appeal a costs order issued by Smith J. The court dismissed the motion, finding the applicant's explanation for the delay illogical and noting significant prejudice to the respondents due to the unpaid costs.

Furthermore, the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the applicant's grounds were too general and did not demonstrate a palpable and overriding error or error of law, which is required for leave to appeal costs orders.

This focused trial addressed the beneficial ownership of a condominium property for the purpose of calculating Net Family Property in a divorce proceeding.

The Applicant Husband argued the Respondent Wife was the sole beneficial owner, while the Respondent Wife contended her mother (Roya Souzankari) was the sole beneficial owner via a purchase money resulting trust.

The court found that the mother held a 64% beneficial interest and the wife held a 36% beneficial interest, based on their respective financial contributions to the property's acquisition, including initial deposits and subsequent mortgage principal payments.

The court dismissed both parties' extreme positions and provided a methodology for valuing the wife's interest at the date of marriage and separation.

The Respondent Mother brought an urgent motion seeking a restraining order and a change to existing parenting terms, requesting primary care of the children and supervised access for the Applicant Father.

The court found the Father's anger and instability threatened the children's and Mother's welfare, noting family violence in the form of emotional and psychological abuse and coercive control.

The court granted the Mother's requests, ordering supervised parenting time for the Father, sole decision-making authority for the Mother, and a restraining order against the Father.

The court also addressed the threshold for changing a temporary consent order, finding a material change in circumstances was not strictly necessary given the order's nature, but also that the Father's escalating behavior and the birth of a new child constituted material changes.

This case addresses a mother's (N.F.) cross-motion to relocate with her child from Barrie to Orangeville, opposed by the father (S.G.).

The court determined the move constituted a "relocation" under the Children's Law Reform Act, requiring 60 days' notice, which the mother failed to provide.

Despite the notice deficiency, the court found the relocation to be in the child's best interests, considering the mother's economic necessity, the availability of family support in Orangeville, and the child's young age.

The court ordered a new parenting schedule, granting the mother primary residence in Orangeville starting September 2023, with the father having three weekends per month and one mid-week overnight.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice, raising peripheral arguments including want of service and procedural errors by the application judge.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the procedural arguments and no basis to interfere with the application judge's conclusion on the merits.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $1,000.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision regarding the care of his child, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on a doctor's findings about emotional harm and placed undue weight on his economic circumstances.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's improved employment and housing but dismissed the appeal.

The court found the trial judge properly assessed the risk of emotional harm based on the appellant's history of inappropriate disciplinary measures and dysfunctional parenting.

The court also held that the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant's financial ability to provide a secure home as part of the mandated best interests analysis under the Child and Family Services Act.

The moving party, the biological father of a child made a Crown ward, brought a motion seeking leave to commence a new status review proceeding for the child so that the child's status could be decided alongside his sibling's.

The father argued the court had jurisdiction under s. 134(2) of the Courts of Justice Act to grant leave despite s. 64(7) of the Child and Family Services Act, which prohibits a new status review within six months of the final disposition of an appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the broad jurisdiction under s. 134(2) cannot supplant specific statutory prohibitions.

The court also declined to exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction to override the legislation.

The motion to extend the time for perfecting the appeal was granted.