Scott Ronald Byers

The appellant, J.H., appealed final child protection orders placing his children in extended society care with no access, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The appellant claimed the trial judge rejected his plan for the children's return before final submissions.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's statements in context, applying the high threshold for apprehension of bias.

It found that the trial judge's comments, including hypothetical scenarios and expressions of preliminary thoughts, did not indicate a closed mind but rather an open one amenable to persuasion by submissions.

The appeal was dismissed, with no costs awarded.

Two consolidated appeals arising from a family law proceeding between parents concerning custody and access to their child.

The respondent appealed an order dismissing a recusal application against a judge, and the appellant appealed an order denying leave to amend pleadings to seek custody.

The court found the case had become a procedural morass characterized by lack of good faith efforts to resolve issues.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The court emphasized that the appellant had pursued indirect procedural tactics rather than direct routes of review, and that the custody issue had been finally determined by a subsequent order that was not appealed.

This appeal concerns a mother's request for access to three of her six children in extended care following their apprehension by the Children's Aid Society in 2015.

The motion judge granted Crown wardship without access.

The Divisional Court affirmed the decision but applied the old Child and Family Services Act rather than the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the transitional provisions of the new Act applied, the record was insufficient to satisfy the expanded access test, the children's Indigenous heritage was not properly considered, and the approach to summary judgment in child protection matters was misapplied.

The matter was remitted to Superior Court for determination under the new legislation.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a family law matter.

The appellant (father) sought to stay family law claims pending resolution of a constitutional challenge under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The motion judge struck the amended answer as lacking proper pleading of the constitutional claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting leave to amend the answer but refusing to stay the interim support order or the family law claims.

The respondent (mother) was found to be more successful on the appeal.

The court awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $20,000, inclusive of the costs of a stay motion and all disbursements and HST.

The respondent in matrimonial litigation moved to have the former case management judge recuse himself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The new case management judge dismissed the motion, finding it premature and pointless as the former judge was not scheduled for future involvement.

The court determined the respondent had an ulterior motive to revisit prior rulings and that the motion constituted an abuse of process, contrary to the Family Law Rules' objectives of saving time and expense.

The appellant appealed a costs award of over $300,000 made by the motion judge in family law proceedings.

The motion judge had awarded costs to the respondent following a successful motion to strike the appellant's answer on the basis that a constitutional issue was not properly pleaded.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the merits, which provided the appellant with the opportunity to amend his answer.

The respondent remained entitled to costs of the original motion, but the costs award was reduced from over $300,000 to $200,000.

The court found that the motion judge erred in principle by adopting a "close to full recovery" approach, giving undue weight to settlement offers in circumstances where settlement was not practically possible, inappropriately increasing costs based on the appellant's ability to pay and the respondent's financial need, and failing to apply the proportionality principle required by the Family Law Rules.

Two members of the Haudenosaunee (Six Nations of the Grand River) brought a family law dispute regarding custody, child support, and spousal support.

The respondent raised a constitutional claim under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, asserting an Aboriginal right to have the dispute resolved through Haudenosaunee governance processes and laws rather than Ontario family law.

The motion judge struck the constitutional claim without leave to amend and dismissed it as lacking standing and justiciability.

The appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the dismissal of the constitutional claim and permitting the appellant to seek leave to amend his pleading.

The court held that while the constitutional claim faced serious obstacles, it was premature to dismiss it summarily at an early stage of proceedings.

The court also refused to stay the family law proceedings and permitted interim support orders to continue pending resolution of the constitutional claim.