Stanley G. Mayes

The Tribunal considered whether to defer the human rights application pending the completion of a concurrent grievance.

The applicant indicated that the grievance had been withdrawn on the advice of her union.

As the grievance was withdrawn, the Tribunal found it inappropriate to defer the application and ordered that it proceed.

Chad Ouellette brought a motion for a declaration that no child support arrears were owed to his former wife, Lynne Ouellette (now Lynne Sawyer), and that he had overpaid.

Ms. Sawyer argued that Mr. Ouellette should be responsible for child support based on his former income, asserting that his failure to provide updated employment information disentitled him to a reduction.

She also sought to have a higher income imputed to him based on past earning potential and alleged "cash work." The court, after a trial, found Mr. Ouellette's evidence regarding his employment and cash earnings to be credible and rejected Ms. Sawyer's claims of imputed income as speculative and unsupported.

The court ordered that Mr. Ouellette's child support arrears be reduced to zero but found no evidence of overpayment.

No costs were awarded, as both parties' conduct contributed to the necessity of the trial.

The respondent brought a Request for an Order during Proceeding seeking, among other things, an order that the applicant undergo an Independent Medical Examination (IME) by a psychiatrist selected by the respondent.

Following case management hearings, the parties agreed that an IME would not be ordered at this stage and that the hearing would be bifurcated.

The Tribunal ordered the bifurcation of the hearing and extended the deadline for filing documents and witness statements on consent.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a declaration that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction to hear corollary relief proceedings for child support under the Divorce Act because a separation agreement had previously been filed in the Ontario Court of Justice under the Family Law Act.

The court considered whether the filing of a separation agreement under s. 35 of the Family Law Act deprived the Superior Court of jurisdiction to hear a corollary relief claim under s. 15.1 of the Divorce Act.

Relying on recent appellate authority, the court held that an application for corollary relief under the Divorce Act is not an application to vary an order made under provincial legislation.

Such relief can only be sought in the Superior Court of Justice and may supersede prior provincial orders.

The motion challenging jurisdiction was therefore dismissed.

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment based on disability after being terminated from her position as a cleaner during her training period.

The respondent claimed the termination was due to poor performance and dishonesty about an illness.

The Tribunal found that the respondent perceived the applicant to have endometriosis requiring surgery, and that this perception was a factor in the decision to terminate her employment.

Although no wage loss was established, the Tribunal awarded $3,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The appellant seized collateral from a third party who had purchased it from the debtor, arguing its security interest attached upon possession under s. 11(2)(b) of the Personal Property Security Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the seizure did not constitute possession sufficient for attachment under s. 11(1) to defeat the third party's interests, as the appellant did not have a signed security agreement prior to the seizure.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him personally liable on a contract for the provision of farm produce.

The contract was originally drafted between the respondent and a corporation, but the name of the appellant's partnership was added by hand and initialled by his partner.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the handwritten addition was sufficient to make the partnership and its individual partners parties to the contract.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering them to pay the respondent over $200,000 in a dispute over whether funds advanced were personal loans or shareholder advances.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge exceeded his role by assessing credibility and making findings of fact where genuine issues for trial existed.

The Court also found a reasonable apprehension of bias due to inappropriate comments made by the motion judge during prior procedural motions, and ordered that all future proceedings be heard by a different judge.