Christos Vitsentzatos

The applicant mother sought an order to relocate the parties' two children to Italy for a 10-month school year to advance her career.

The respondent father opposed the relocation and brought a cross-motion for interim decision-making authority and primary residence.

The court, applying the best interests of the child framework from the Divorce Act and Barendregt v Grebliunas, found the mother's relocation plan reasonable and in the children's best interests, considering her career advancement, the temporary nature of the move, and her detailed plan for maintaining the father's parenting time.

The father's cross-motion was dismissed, and the mother was granted permission to obtain passports for the children without the father's consent.

Travel costs were apportioned 75% to the mother and 25% to the father.

The accused, who are Indigenous persons, were charged with possessing cannabis for the purpose of selling it at unlicensed dispensaries located on First Nations reserves.

The Crown conceded a section 8 Charter breach regarding one dispensary due to the improper use of a telewarrant, but the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

For the other two dispensaries, the court found the search warrants valid despite minor inaccuracies in the premises descriptions.

The court found the essential elements of the offences proven but refrained from entering convictions pending a constitutional challenge.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff sought full indemnity costs of $41,852.77.

The court found that the contract between the parties entitled the plaintiff to full indemnity for losses, including legal fees.

The court also noted it would have awarded full indemnity regardless, due to the defendant's high-handed and dishonest conduct in appropriating funds.

The defendant was ordered to pay the full amount sought.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision that structured settlement annuity payments received by the appellant should be treated as property rather than income under the Family Law Act.

The trial judge had found that the annuity payments fell within the definition of property and were not excluded property under section 4(2)3 of the Act, and therefore should not be treated as income for spousal support purposes.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that structured settlement annuity payments should be treated as income, not property, for purposes of the Act.

A child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving three children of a mother with a history of choosing inappropriate and dangerous intimate partners.

The Society sought Crown wardship with no access for all three children.

The mother sought return of all children under a supervision order.

The father of the youngest child sought placement of all three children with him or, alternatively, access.

The court found the children in need of protection and made the youngest child a Crown Ward with no access for adoption purposes, made the oldest child a Crown Ward with access to the mother, and returned the middle child to the mother's care under a supervision order with strict conditions regarding the mother's relationships and ongoing therapy.

A father sought access to his child while the mother held custody under an existing consent order.

The court assessed the request under s. 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act, focusing on the child’s best interests and the applicant’s ability to act as a parent, including consideration of past violence.

Evidence showed the applicant had an extensive criminal record involving violence, ongoing substance abuse issues, instability in housing and employment, and no contact with the child since birth.

The court also found credible evidence that the respondent remained fearful and that access could be used to continue intimidation.

The court concluded that access would not be in the child’s best interests and extended an existing restraining order to include the child.

In an undefended divorce application, the court addressed whether it could rely on a clearance certificate issued by the Central Registry of Divorce Proceedings where the certificate listed an incorrect application filing date and a clearance date that preceded the commencement of the proceeding.

The court reviewed the requirements under ss. 3(2) and 3(3) of the Divorce Act and the Central Registry of Divorce Proceedings Regulations, as well as r. 36 of the Family Law Rules.

The court held that a clearance certificate must accurately state the date the divorce proceeding was commenced and must have a clearance date on or after that date in order for the court to confirm exclusive jurisdiction.

Because the certificate showed a clearance date earlier than the filing date and an incorrect application date, it could not be relied upon.

The court ordered the Central Registry to issue a new clearance certificate reflecting the correct filing date and a clearance date on or after that date.