Russell M. Raikes

The applicant sought to vary spousal support upwards, arguing the respondent deliberately reduced his income and failed to disclose financial benefits to minimize support obligations.

The respondent sought to reduce spousal support due to retirement.

The court found the respondent's retirement and reduced income were part of a scheme to reduce spousal support, imputed income to him for several years, and found the applicant had not made sufficient efforts to become self-sufficient.

Spousal support was varied upwards for the applicant, and significant arrears were ordered.

The court determined costs following a trial on custody, access, and child and spousal support, and a motion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules.

The respondent, who was legally aided, sought costs for both the motion and the trial.

The applicant, who was self-represented, did not make submissions.

The court fixed costs for the Rule 1(8) motion at $2,800 inclusive of HST, and trial costs at $9,605 inclusive of disbursements and HST, finding the respondent to be the more successful party despite some divided success.

The applicant's obstinacy and "pick and choose" approach to court orders were noted as factors increasing the difficulty of the case.

The applicant father sought costs on a full indemnity basis following a successful interim motion for custody and access, claiming the respondent mother acted unreasonably.

The respondent argued she acted in the child's best interests and that the claimed costs were excessive.

The court found no reason to deviate from the presumption that the successful party is entitled to costs, but rejected the claim for full indemnity costs, finding the respondent's conduct did not warrant it.

The court determined the motion was straightforward and fixed costs at $2,500 plus HST.

The applicant brought an urgent application for physician-assisted death and sought confidentiality orders, including a publication ban and sealing order, without giving notice to the media.

The court balanced the open court principle with the applicant's dire medical circumstances and privacy interests.

The court granted an interim publication ban and sealing order, authorized the use of pseudonyms, and directed the applicant to provide notice to the media, giving the media 60 days to bring a motion to challenge the orders.

The defendants, a treating psychologist and a children's aid society, brought motions under Rule 21 to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim.

The plaintiffs' action arose from a child protection investigation and criminal charges based on allegations of abuse made by a child previously adopted by the plaintiffs.

The court struck the claim against the psychologist without leave to amend, finding she owed no duty of care to the parents of her patient and was statutorily obligated to report suspected abuse.

The court also struck the adult plaintiffs' claims in negligence and various intentional torts against the children's aid society defendants, finding no duty of care was owed to the parents during a child protection investigation.

Leave to amend was granted for claims of misfeasance in public office and Charter damages.

The accused was arrested without a warrant for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking based on information provided by a confidential informant.

Following her arrest, she handed over methamphetamine to police.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence, arguing the arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court dismissed the application, finding the informant's tip was sufficiently reliable and detailed to provide reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

The court further held that even if the arrest was unlawful, the evidence would not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Following a family law trial where the applicant was successful, she sought substantial indemnity costs of $9,949 plus HST and disbursements.

The respondent did not make costs submissions.

The court found that while the respondent was unsuccessful, his position on equalization was not unreasonable given the unusual circumstances.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs and fixed costs at $3,500 inclusive, payable by the respondent at a rate of $300 per month.

The accused, charged with sexual offences and child pornography, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained from his cell phone.

Police attended the home of the accused's mother without a warrant, informed her the phone contained child pornography, and demanded she hand it over, creating exigent circumstances.

The court found the warrantless seizure violated section 8 of the Charter because the police instigated the exigent circumstances instead of pursuing prior judicial authorization.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2), finding the evidence was highly reliable, pre-existed the investigation, and its exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a commercial fishing corporation on four strict liability charges relating to inaccurate logbooks and Daily Catch Reports submitted by its vessel captain.

The trial judge had acquitted the corporation on the basis of due diligence, finding there was little more the owner could have done from shore.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by applying an incorrect standard of care and failing to consider what a proper system of compliance would entail.

The court found the corporation's blind trust in a captain with a known history of non-compliance did not amount to due diligence.

Convictions were entered and the matter remitted for sentencing.

Following the breakdown of a short marriage, the applicant sought an unequal division of net family property, repayment of certain loans, occupation rent, and an accounting for post‑separation rental income relating to three jointly owned properties.

The respondent argued that the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement during litigation under which she would receive one property and a payment from the proceeds of another after a severance of land.

The court found that the parties had indeed entered into a binding settlement agreement through email communications during the litigation.

The applicant breached that agreement by refusing to cooperate with the severance process and forcing the sale of the properties.

Because specific performance was no longer possible after the sales, the court ordered distribution of sale proceeds to approximate the settlement terms and dismissed the applicant’s remaining claims.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a prior order under s. 17 of the Divorce Act seeking termination of child support after the parties’ daughter began residing with him, as well as prospective variation of spousal support upon his planned retirement.

The mother opposed the motion and sought a retroactive increase in spousal support based on the father’s increased income.

The court found a material change in circumstances because the child had resided with the father since 2012 and held that the mother was not exercising shared parenting under the Child Support Guidelines.

Child support was terminated retroactive to May 1, 2014 and the mother was ordered to repay amounts received thereafter.

The court rejected the mother’s claim for increased spousal support but ordered a prospective reduction following the father’s retirement, with a time-limited continuation of support.

The accused, jointly charged with unlawful confinement and aggravated assault, brought applications to sever counts on the indictment.

One accused was additionally charged with attempted murder and several counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused argued that trying the drug charges together with the violent offences would cause severe prejudice and propensity reasoning.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the drug charges provided the context and motive for the violent offences, as the victim was a competing drug dealer.

The court held that the interests of justice favoured a single trial, and any potential prejudice could be addressed through proper jury instructions.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking an advance interim payment of $22,000 for expert valuation costs, disclosure of various corporate financial documents, and an order for a section 30 assessment under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court dismissed the request for a section 30 assessment due to an insufficient evidentiary foundation.

The court ordered partial disclosure of the requested financial documents, limiting the scope based on proportionality and the burden on the respondent's business.

Finally, the court ordered the respondent to pay an advance of $10,000 under Rule 24(12) to assist the applicant with expert valuation costs, finding the requested $22,000 excessive.

Insurer priority appeal from an arbitration decision under s. 268(2) of the Insurance Act concerning statutory accident benefits payable after a motor vehicle accident.

The application judge held that the arbitrator erred in law by requiring proof that a cohabiting relationship was permanent or likely to be permanent before using a shorter timeframe to assess principal financial dependency, and further erred by speculating about future relationship failure.

Applying the proper dependency principles, the court found that the two children were appropriately assessed over the seven-week pre-accident period and were principally financially dependent on the insured, and that the adult claimant was also principally financially dependent on him on the whole of the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and priority was shifted to the respondent insurer.

The applicant insurer appealed an arbitration decision regarding priority to pay statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The arbitrator had found that the injured mother and her two children were not principally financially dependent on the mother's new partner because their relationship lacked 'permanence' or 'likely permanence,' leading him to use a 12-month pre-accident timeframe.

The Superior Court held that requiring permanency was an error of law and that the arbitrator improperly speculated on the future of the relationship.

The court found that the mother and children were principally financially dependent on the partner at the time of the accident, making the respondent insurer responsible for the benefits.

On a motion by a defendant in the main action and plaintiff in a companion contribution and indemnity action, the court considered whether two construction-related proceedings arising from a leaky warehouse roof should be tried together or consecutively.

Applying the Rule 6.01 gateway criteria and the factors identified in 1014864 Ontario Ltd. v. 1721789 Ontario Inc., the court found the actions arose from the same factual matrix, involved overlapping causation issues, and created a real risk of inconsistent factual findings if heard separately.

The court declined consolidation but ordered that the actions be tried one immediately following the other, with the main action proceeding first and common witnesses to be examined once subject to the trial judge's direction.

Costs were left for further written submissions.

The applicant mother sought sole custody, child support, retroactive child support, and the right to obtain passports and travel with the children without the respondent father's consent.

The parties agreed on sole custody and ongoing child support based on the father's 2014 income.

The court denied the mother's request for unrestricted travel mobility due to concerns about safeguarding the father's access.

Given the father's limited past involvement and history, the court ordered a graduated access schedule starting with six months of supervised access.

The court also awarded retroactive child support of $10,276 for the period after the father obtained higher-paying employment, but declined to order contribution to extraordinary expenses as premature.