Eli Lipetz

The plaintiff was entirely unsuccessful in her summary judgment motion against the defendant Port Dalhousie Vitalization Corporation (PDVC).

PDVC sought partial and substantial indemnity costs, as well as disbursements, having made two Rule 49 offers to settle which were not accepted.

The court, applying Rule 57 principles, found many of the defendant's claimed fees excessive and unnecessary, particularly regarding the involvement of two counsel, hours spent on boilerplate pleadings, and an aggressive stance against a pro forma motion to amend pleadings.

The court also reduced claimed disbursements, disallowing a previous costs award against the defendant and significantly reducing an orthopaedic report fee and a legal research fee.

Considering the plaintiff's personal circumstances and the novel, though unsuccessful, legal argument, the court awarded the defendant $20,000.00 in all-inclusive costs, a significant reduction from the $65,402.27 sought.

The plaintiff, Kristen Cass, sought summary judgment for declarations of liability against Port Dalhousie Vitalization Corporation (PDVC), the landlord of a tavern where she slipped and fell.

Cass argued PDVC was an "occupier" under the Occupier's Liability Act, a third-party beneficiary to the lease's insurance provisions, and negligent for failing to monitor the tenant's insurance obligations.

PDVC, in turn, sought summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court found PDVC was not an "occupier" as it lacked physical possession or control over the tavern area and had no maintenance responsibilities for that part of the premises.

The court also determined that Cass was not a third-party beneficiary to the lease's insurance clauses, as there was no intention by the contracting parties (landlord and tenant) to confer such a benefit on strangers, and the third-party beneficiary exception serves as a "shield" against liability, not a "sword" to make claims.

Furthermore, the court found no causal connection between PDVC's alleged failure to monitor insurance and Cass's fall, and no duty of care existed given the "carefree" lease and lack of symbiotic relationship.

The plaintiff's motion for declaratory relief was dismissed, and the defendant PDVC's motion for dismissal of the action was granted.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the out-of-province plaintiff to attend an examination for discovery in person at her own expense.

The plaintiff, who resided in Saskatchewan, opposed the motion and sought to have the examination in Toronto at the defendants' expense or by video conference.

The Master held that it was just and convenient to provide the defendant with the choice of conducting the examination by video conference or in person in Toronto, with the travel or video conferencing costs to be shared equally between the plaintiff and the defendants.

Multiple defendants brought motions to strike or dismiss claims arising from an alleged advance-fee loan fraud scheme.

The court held that claims against certain lawyer defendants were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the plaintiffs discovered the alleged wrongdoing in 2008 but commenced the action in 2012.

Another defendant successfully moved to dismiss the claim under Rule 57.03(2) for failure to pay outstanding court-ordered costs.

Additional defendants obtained an order striking the claim for fraud and deceit under Rule 21.01(1)(b) because the pleading failed to set out the necessary elements or particulars required by Rule 25.06.

The action against those moving defendants was dismissed.

The contractor responsible for snow and ice maintenance brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that both the plaintiffs’ slip-and-fall claim and the co-defendants’ cross‑claim were barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that a genuine issue requiring trial existed regarding discoverability of the contractor by the plaintiffs, given evidence that counsel made inquiries with the insurer and was told no other maintenance contractor existed.

However, the cross‑claim for contribution and indemnity by the condominium owner and manager was statute‑barred because they had actual knowledge of the contractor’s involvement and were served with the statement of claim more than two years before asserting the claim.

Summary judgment was therefore granted dismissing the cross‑claim but denied regarding the plaintiffs’ main action.