Anthony Andreopoulos

G.S. was found guilty by a jury of five sexual offences against D.A., committed between 1998 and 2001 when D.A. was 13-16 years old.

The offences involved sexual intercourse and a breach of trust, as G.S. was D.A.'s workplace supervisor and family friend.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the inherent wrongfulness and profound harm of sexual offences against children.

Despite G.S. having no prior criminal record and no remorse, the court imposed a significant penitentiary sentence of 5.5 years for two counts of sexual assault, to be served concurrently, and conditionally stayed other convictions.

Ancillary orders included DNA sample, SOIRA registration for life, lifetime prohibitions on attending places frequented by children, and contact prohibitions.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of two counts of sexual assault against two different complainants.

The assaults involved touching and digital penetration while the victims were sleeping in the offender's apartment.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought seven months.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the breach of trust and the profound impact on the victims.

The offender was sentenced to 15 months' incarceration followed by two years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, and SOIRA registration.

Benjamin Kowba was found guilty by a jury of two counts of sexual assault.

This endorsement constitutes the first segment of a bifurcated sentencing hearing, tasked with determining the factual basis of the jury's ambiguous verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused digitally penetrated complainant K.K. without consent, and kissed S.G.'s arm and touched her breast while she was sleeping.

However, the court found that the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused undid the button and zipper on S.G.'s shorts.

The decision outlines the principles for factual findings following a jury verdict, particularly when the verdict's factual implications are ambiguous.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained during alleged Charter breaches, including violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused was arbitrarily detained for approximately one hour without lawful authority, unlawfully arrested under section 200 of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to remain at the scene of an accident, and denied her right to counsel.

The court concluded that the breath samples and related evidence were obtained as a result of these Charter violations and excluded all such evidence from trial, rendering the Crown's case fatal.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action arising from a tractor‑trailer rollover accident.

The driver plaintiff, an independent owner‑operator, had signed a waiver agreement and capital compensation plan enrollment waiving the right to sue the defendants in exchange for private disability insurance benefits.

Applying the three‑part test from Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and Highways), the court held the exclusion clauses applied to the circumstances, were not unconscionable, and were not contrary to public policy.

The court rejected arguments of unequal bargaining power and noted the plaintiffs had already received disability benefits under the plan.

Summary judgment was granted and the plaintiffs’ claims, including derivative claims by minor children, were dismissed.

The accused, a Michigan resident, was arrested for operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol in his blood.

He was held for a bail hearing based on a police practice of holding all non-residents, despite having no reasonable grounds to believe he would fail to attend court.

The court found violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

While declining to grant a stay of proceedings, the court excluded the breath test evidence as the appropriate remedy, resulting in dismissal of the charge.

The contractor responsible for snow and ice maintenance brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that both the plaintiffs’ slip-and-fall claim and the co-defendants’ cross‑claim were barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that a genuine issue requiring trial existed regarding discoverability of the contractor by the plaintiffs, given evidence that counsel made inquiries with the insurer and was told no other maintenance contractor existed.

However, the cross‑claim for contribution and indemnity by the condominium owner and manager was statute‑barred because they had actual knowledge of the contractor’s involvement and were served with the statement of claim more than two years before asserting the claim.

Summary judgment was therefore granted dismissing the cross‑claim but denied regarding the plaintiffs’ main action.