Andrew Rintoul

The Town of Ajax sought an order requiring the respondents to demolish and remove above-grade construction carried out without a building permit at 599 Kingston Road West, Ajax.

The respondents acknowledged the unpermitted construction but resisted demolition, arguing they should be allowed to continue obtaining the requisite Record of Site Condition (RSC).

The property had a history of soil contamination from its prior use as an automotive facility.

The respondents had entered into a Conditional Building Permit Agreement allowing only below-grade work pending RSC approval, but proceeded to construct above-grade elements without authorization.

Despite multiple warnings, stop work orders, and a mandatory injunction, construction continued.

The court found the respondents' conduct was a calculated decision by an experienced developer to circumvent regulatory requirements and ordered demolition as the only appropriate remedy to enforce building code compliance and protect public safety.

Corus Entertainment Inc. sought a declaration that Rogers Communications Inc. could not remove one of Corus's television channels from its existing packages, citing affiliation agreements and regulatory "standstill" provisions under the Broadcasting Distribution Regulations.

Corus also sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the channel's removal pending a CRTC decision and a sealing order for confidential information.

The court dismissed the application for a declaration, finding that the affiliation agreement granted Rogers the broad right to create and modify television packages, which included the right to remove channels.

The court also dismissed the interlocutory injunction, holding that the CRTC had exclusive jurisdiction over regulatory matters and that Corus failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

Finally, the sealing order was denied as the information was not deemed confidential under the "open court" principle, and the test for sealing orders was not met.

This endorsement concerns an application by Accuride Canada Inc. for an Amended and Restated Initial Order (ARIO) under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).

The applicant sought to increase the maximum amounts secured by the Administration, Directors', and Intercompany Charges, approve an Intercompany Supply Agreement with its parent company, and extend the stay of proceedings.

The court granted the ARIO, finding the requested relief necessary for the applicant's continued operations and restructuring efforts, and noting the Monitor's support for the reasonableness and necessity of the proposed changes.

Accuride Canada Inc. sought an initial order under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) due to insolvency, exacerbated by declining demand, increased costs, and the withdrawal of financial support from its U.S. parent, Accuride Corp, which had commenced Chapter 11 proceedings.

The Applicant's London Plant had been unprofitable for over a decade.

The Applicant requested a 10-day stay of proceedings to explore a going concern transaction or an orderly wind-down, along with approval for interim financing (Intercompany Loans secured by an Intercompany Charge), an Administration Charge, a Directors' Charge, and authority to make pre-filing payments to critical third-party suppliers.

The court granted the initial order, finding the Applicant met the CCAA requirements for insolvency and jurisdiction, and that the requested relief was appropriate and necessary to stabilize operations and preserve stakeholder value during the initial stay period.

The applicants, Peter and Dorotea Pallotta, sought a declaration under s.178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) that the respondent, Licio Edward Cengarle, their former solicitor, was not released from the unpaid balance of a $254,056.89 judgment debt following his bankruptcy discharge.

The debt arose from Cengarle's breach of trust and vicarious liability for his employee's fraudulent mortgage scheme, which involved the misappropriation of the Pallottas' funds from his trust account.

The court found that the debt resulted from misappropriation or defalcation while Cengarle acted in a fiduciary capacity, and the s. 62(2.1) BIA exception for discharge did not apply as the Pallottas did not vote for the proposal.

The court granted the declaration and lifted the statutory stay of proceedings under s. 69.1 of the BIA to allow the Pallottas to enforce their judgment.

The appellant property owner appealed a judgment granting the City's application to enforce a Heritage Easement Agreement.

The appellant had made unauthorized alterations to his property, including cutting down trees and building a hockey rink and cabana.

The application judge found the appellant breached the Agreement and granted a permanent injunction.

On appeal, the appellant argued the application judge misinterpreted the Agreement and that the City's enforcement was motivated by bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's decision and concluding that the City had exercised its contractual discretion in good faith.

The City of Markham brought an application for declaratory relief and a permanent injunction against a homeowner who removed trees and built a concrete hockey rink in the backyard of his heritage-designated property without City approval.

The homeowner argued the Heritage Easement Agreement only applied to the building, not the grounds, and that the City's enforcement was unconscionable and violated his Charter rights.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the agreement applied to the entire property and granted the City sole discretion to determine breaches and conduct remedial work.

The court dismissed the unconscionability and Charter arguments, issued the requested declarations, and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting further unauthorized work.

The applicant sought the appointment of an arbitrator under a construction agreement.

The respondent cross-applied for a declaration that the arbitration was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, and that procedural preconditions were not met.

The court granted the application to appoint an arbitrator and dismissed the cross-application, holding that under the competence-competence principle and the 'hands-off' approach to arbitration, the arbitrator should determine their own jurisdiction and the limitation period defence.