ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-449220
DATE: 20130926
BETWEEN:
R & G DRAPER FARMS (KESWICK) LTD.
Applicant
– and –
1758691 ONTARIO INC. c.o.b. ATV FARMS
Respondent
Morris Manning, Q.C. and
Theresa R. Simone,
for the Applicant
J.F. Lalonde,
for the Respondent
HEARD: September 13, 2013
W. MATHESON J.
[1] In this Application, the Applicant (“Draper Farms”) seeks an order declaring that the arbitral award made by Robert E. Goldman dated December 20, 2011 (the “Award”) is invalid and seeks an order setting it aside. The Award arose from a dispute between Draper Farms and the Respondent (“ATV Farms”) regarding the purchase and sale of carrots and 2” carrot chunks. Draper Farms alleges a number of jurisdictional and fairness deficiencies in the arbitration process.
[2] Draper Farms is located is Keswick, Ontario. ATV Farms is located in Bradford, Ontario. Both Draper Farms and ATV Farms were members of the Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation (“DRC”) and the arbitration proceeded under its Rules.
[3] Draper Farms has also brought a motion to strike out certain evidence proffered by witnesses for ATV Farms on this Application. That motion was heard together with this Application.
Transactions Giving Rise to Arbitration
[4] In 2011, Draper Farms ordered ten shipments of 2” carrot chunks from ATV Farms. Draper Farms planned to sell them to its customer in Salinas, California. Ultimately, Draper Farms tried to cancel the last two orders, and there were disputes between ATV Farms and Draper Farms about the price and quality of a number of the other shipments. ATV Farms, having not been paid for the shipments, invoked the DRC dispute resolution mechanism described below.
[5] ATV Farms had purchased the whole carrots from which it produced the carrot chunks from Draper Farms. Again, there was a dispute between the parties about price. As a result, Draper Farms counterclaimed against ATV Farms in the DRC dispute resolution process, seeking set off of the amount it said it was due for its carrots.
DRC
[6] The DRC is an industry-run organization with its head office in Ottawa, Ontario. Its members include, among others, farmers and fresh food processors. It describes itself as arising from NAFTA:
BY-LAW NO. 1
Preamble. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Advisory Committee on Commercial Dispute Resolution Regarding Agricultural Goods, a tri-national committee composed of government and industry representatives from Mexico, Canada and the United States appointed pursuant to §707 of NAFTA, unanimously recommended that an industry-driven program be created to deal with commercial disputes arising in cross-border trade between the three NAFTA countries. In accord with that recommendation, and based upon extensive consultation with appropriate industry and government representatives from the three (3) NAFTA countries, this Corporation is hereby organized.
[7] Membership in the DRC is voluntary. ATV Farms applied and became a member in 2008. Draper Farms applied and became a member in 2009. The DRC requires that its members adhere to its mediation and arbitration procedures.
[8] As provided for in Article 9 of the DRC Rules, the application form requires applicants to agree as follows:
I understand and agree that if I and/or the organization I represent are accepted as a member or members of the [DRC], I and/or the organization I represent shall be bound by the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, Rules, Trading Standards, Transportation Standards and Mediation and Arbitration Rules of [DRC]. I specifically agree that all disputes between me and/or my organization and any other member or members of the DRC shall be resolved exclusively pursuant to the Mediation and Arbitration Rules of the DRC. [emphasis added]
[9] The Rules also provide as follows:
Article 2(3) Each regular member agrees that any dispute, controversy or claim with another member,… arising out of or in connection with any transaction involving fresh fruits and vegetables as defined in the By-Laws of the [DRC] shall be resolved exclusively in accordance with these Rules….
[10] The DRC administers a six-stage dispute resolution process, including, in its final two stages, formal mediation and arbitration.
Dispute Resolution Regarding ATV Farms’ Claim
[11] By Notice of Dispute dated June 10, 2011, ATV Farms invoked the DRC mediation process, seeking $68,187.42 in relation to allegedly unpaid invoices rendered to Draper Farms for the eight shipments of 2” carrot chunks. Draper Farms responded in accordance with the Rules, including a counterclaim for 968 boxes of whole carrots it sold to ATV Farms, for which Draper Farms claimed it had not been paid. Mediation proceeded but was unsuccessful.
[12] At the conclusion of the mediation process, the DRC sent the parties a notice about next steps. It emphasized the confidentiality of the mediation process, stating as follows:
Please also be advised that the informal file currently in our possession will be “sealed”. When each of you participates in selecting the arbitrator, that arbitrator will not have access to the paperwork, conversations, or any background associated with this case prior to the filing of the Notice of Arbitration & Statement of Claim. You will therefore each need to document your case completely and provide a full explanation of your position in the matter.
[13] Article 2 of the DRC Rules provides that all discussion between the parties in the informal consultation process shall be kept confidential and may not be used by the parties in subsequent proceedings. Article 25 further provides that all records, reports or other documents received by the mediator while serving in that capacity shall be confidential.
[14] ATV Farms proceeded to the next step in the DRC alternative dispute resolution process. In August of 2011, it delivered a Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim.
[15] Although both parties were entitled to counsel, neither party was represented by counsel in the arbitration.
[16] In its Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim, ATV Farms appended a number of documents, including documents prepared by Draper Farms for use in the mediation. ATV Farms included, for example, a document that Draper Farms submitted to the mediator setting out its position on the merits of the ATV Farms claim. ATV Farms also included material from the mediation in its Defence to the Draper Farms counterclaim.
[17] Draper Farms, after receipt of these materials, did not ask that the mediation documents be removed. The DRC, which also received the ATV Farms materials, did not ask that the mediation documents be removed. Thus, they ultimately went to the Arbitrator and it appears from the Award that the Arbitrator took them into account.
[18] As part of the arbitration process, the DRC encouraged the parties to agree on a place of arbitration, which they did. The arbitration was conducted on the ATV Farms premises in Bradford Ontario. As well, the DRC provided a list of potential candidates for the arbitrator, although the parties were not limited to selecting from the list. The DRC provided a brief summary of each potential arbitrator’s background. Mr. Goldman was shown as being from Florida and having a speciality in agricultural law.
[19] In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the DRC Rules provided that the parties rank the listed arbitrators, and the DRC would select an arbitrator. Mr. Goldman was selected. He had been ranked 2nd by Draper Farms and 4th by ATV Farms. The parties also had an opportunity to challenge the DRC’s selection of Mr. Goldman after receiving notice of it. The selection of Mr. Goldman was not challenged by either Draper Farms or ATV Farms.
[20] The arbitration proceeded at the premises of ATV Farms. During the arbitration, the Arbitrator requested ATV Farms obtain and produce additional documents and a witness, both of which were available on the premises. Draper Farms now challenges this and other aspects of the arbitrator process as outside the Rules.
Arbitration Award and Challenge by Draper Farms
[21] By decision dated December 20, 2011, the Arbitrator awarded ATV Farms damages in the amount of its claim of $68,187.24 (using the price of $0.21/pound claimed by ATV Farms), less $9,680 for the Draper Farms counterclaim (rather than the $110,944 it claimed).
[22] On December 21, 2011, the DRC notified the parties that payment of the Award was due within 30 days of the date of the Award (unless extended by the Arbitrator). It also noted that the DRC Rules did not provide for an appeal process, but did give the arbitrator a very limited ability to amend or correct a decision based on clerical, arithmetic or typographical errors, or accidental slips or mistakes. The DRC Notice was silent on the subject of the application of arbitration legislation.
[23] The DRC Rules make no mention of any arbitration legislation, or which legislation may apply. In this Application, there is a dispute between the parties on that key question. ATV Farms says the Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17 (the “Arbitration Act”) applies, and Draper Farms says the International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.9 (“ICAA”) applies.
[24] The President of the DRC, Mr. Webber, who provided evidence on this Application, attested that when the Rules were drafted the DRC took both Acts into consideration and decided to draft the Rules such that either statute would apply depending on the specific circumstances of each dispute. This information was not included either in the Rules or in the many detailed DRC communications with the parties explaining each step in the arbitration process. This was profoundly unhelpful in this case given the dispute that has now arisen.
[25] By Notice signed by Mr. Webber dated January 19, 2012, the DRC notified Draper Farms that if the Award was not paid by the next day, Draper Farms’ membership would automatically terminate under the Rules, and the termination of membership would be made public. Mr. Webber wrote to Draper Farms again on January 23, 2012 to inform it that those steps would be taken, and they were.
[26] Mr. Webber also assisted ATV Farms by providing evidence for an application to enforce the Award, commenced on March 1, 2012 in Ottawa.[^1]
[27] Draper Farms proceeded to challenge the Award by commencing this Application on March 2, 2012, within the three month time period provided under the ICAA. However, the Arbitration Act requires that any court challenge permitted under that Act be brought within 30 days of receipt of the Award, i.e., January 20, 2012. ATV Farms therefore contends that Draper Farms is out of time.
[28] Very briefly, Draper Farms challenges the Award on these grounds:
(1) that carrots do not fall within the definition of “fresh fruits and vegetables” in the DRC Rules and therefore the DRC process did not apply and the Arbitrator did not have jurisdiction;
(2) that the Arbitrator lost jurisdiction due to a failure to apply mandatory minimum prices under the Farm Products Marketing Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.9 and related Vegetables for Processing–Marketing, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 440;
(3) that the Arbitrator did not have the necessary expertise, as is shown by his failure to invoke the Farm Products Marketing legislation and regulations;
(4) that the Arbitrator breached the Rules by relying on documents from the Mediation;
(5) that it was unfair in hindsight for the arbitration to be held at ATV Farms even though Draper Farms agreed to the choice of location at the time;
(6) that the Arbitrator failed to keep control of the arbitration and wrongly called for documents and another witness during the arbitration.
[29] With respect to all the matters listed above, Draper Farms did not raise the issue, or object, at the time. Thus, in addition to other arguments, ATV Farms relies on waiver.
[30] Draper Farms also complains that there was an unfounded claim for privilege over parts of certain emails produced on Mr. Webber’s cross-examination on this Application. These emails were written in 2013 and related to a challenge to Mr. Webber’s impartiality as an expert witness. Given my ruling on the motion to strike, below, this complaint is no longer relevant.
Motion to Strike Out Portions of Affidavits
[31] Draper Farms moves to strike out certain affidavits, or, alternatively, asks that they be given no weight. At issue are affidavits of Fred Webber (President and CEO of the DRC), Crystal Medeiros (Office Manager of ATV Farms) and Susan Charron (Law Clerk). The challenge is on a number of different bases, including that these affiants put forward speculation, argument, unqualified opinion evidence, information without foundation or source, and generally frivolous, vexatious and scandalous statements.
[32] With respect to Mr. Webber in particular, there is also a challenge to his ability to provide expert evidence. This arises because in one of Mr. Webber’s supplementary affidavits he provides opinion evidence together with a detailed account of his background and experience, and a signed expert undertaking in the form required under Rule 53 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[33] ATV Farms’ position on the motion was that Mr. Webber signed the Rule 53 undertaking because as a third party, Mr. Webber understood that he had to give evidence that was fair, objective and impartial. ATV Farms’ counsel confirmed at the hearing of the Application that Mr Webber is not being advanced at as expert.
[34] ATV Farms disputed any improper evidence in any of the affidavits, and alternatively indicated that any minor defects could be dealt with by the relieving provisions in the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[35] There is no doubt that these affidavits contain paragraphs that fail to observe the requirements for affidavit evidence on an application. The affidavits contain a significant amount of argument, which is both inappropriate and unhelpful, unfounded opinion evidence, and general observations and conclusions without foundation or identification of the source of the information.
[36] With regard to Mr. Webber’s opinion evidence, his October 11, 2012 affidavit does reasonably leave the reader with the impression that he is being advanced as an expert witness under Rule 53. Draper Farms was understandably concerned at the suggestion that Mr. Webber was being advanced as an impartial expert witness given his position at the DRC and direct involvement in this matter. Although it has now been clarified that he is not being advanced as an expert, his evidence includes opinion evidence.
[37] I, therefore, indicated at the hearing that I was of the view that Draper Farms had raised valid objections to these affidavits. I indicated that I was not inclined to strike out the affidavits altogether, since they are an amalgam of proper evidence and other material.
[38] The motion is therefore granted in respect of the alternative relief sought – that the improper evidence be given no weight.
Issues
[39] The issues on this Application are as follows:
(i) whether the Arbitration Act or the ICAA applies;
(ii) if the Arbitration Act applies, whether the court has jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, and if so whether an extension be granted; and,
(iii) if the ICAA applies or an extension of time is granted under the Arbitration Act, whether the Award should be declared invalid and set aside.
Applicable Arbitration Legislation
[40] Draper Farms has proceeded under the ICCA, the applicability of which is now disputed. ATV Farms submits that the Arbitration Act applies and Draper Farms is, therefore, out of time.
[41] The Arbitration Act and the ICAA are mutually exclusive. Section 2 of the Arbitration Act provides as follows:
2(1) This Act applies to an arbitration conducted under an arbitration agreement unless…
(b) the [ICAA] applies to the arbitration.
[42] The ICAA adopts the Uncitral Model Law, set out in the Schedule to the ICAA. Article 1 of the Model Law provides that it applies to international commercial arbitration. Article 1(3) provides that an arbitration is international if:
(a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of that agreement, their places of business in different States; or
(b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties have their place of business:
(i) the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitration agreement,
(ii) any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commercial relationship is to be performed or the place with which the subject-matter of the dispute is most closely connected; or
(c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country.
[43] There is no question that the parties both have their places of business in Ontario, and have not expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration relates to more than one country. Nor was the place of arbitration outside Ontario. Only Article 1(3)(b)(ii) is of potential relevance to invoke the jurisdiction of the ICAA.
[44] Here, the commercial relationship at issue was between two Ontario businesses. Draper Farms sold carrots to ATV Farms to be made into carrot chunks, and bought carrot chunks from ATV Farms. Draper Farms bought the carrot chunks for sale to a California purchaser; however, the California company was the customer of Draper Farms, not ATV Farms. The California customer was not a party to the purchase and sale agreements that were the subject of the Award. Nor did ATV Farms ship directly to the California company; Draper Farms took delivery of the carrot chunks at issue.
[45] While the involvement of a California company forms part of the backdrop to the transactions in dispute in the arbitration, Ontario remains the place where the obligations of the commercial relationship between ATV Farms and Draper Farms were to be performed. Ontario also remains the place with which the subject-matter of the dispute is most closely connected. I therefore conclude that in this case the ICAA does not apply.
[46] Draper Farms relies upon the decision of the Divisional Court in Freshway Specialty Foods Inc. v. Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corp. (2006), 2 O.A.C. 385 (“Freshway”) in support of its position. In that case, Freshway was located in British Columbia and had a dispute with an Arizona company. This statement appears in the judgment of the Divisional Court, at para. 3:
The [ICAA] applies to arbitration administered by DRC. Freshway was a party to a DRC supervised ICAA arbitration. The other party was MAP, located in Arizona, U.S.A.
[47] There is no doubt that the ICAA applied on the facts of the Freshway case; however, the Court did not find that the ICAA applies exclusively to all arbitrations under the DRC. In Freshway, there was no dispute about which arbitration legislation applied. I, therefore, do not consider the above statement as determinative of the issue in this Application.
[48] Draper Farms also points to the DRC’s own description of its inception, arising from NAFTA, and the international nature of its mandate. There is no doubt that there is an international aspect to the inception and mandate of the DRC. However, the ICAA definition of “international arbitration” does not turn on the reasons for or mandate of the organization administering the arbitration process. It focuses on the location of the place of business of the parties, the location of the actual arbitration, the place where the obligations are performed and the place the subject matter of the arbitration is connected with. Here, all of those locations/places are Ontario.
[49] Turning to the Arbitration Act, Draper Farms advances one further argument that it does not apply. Specifically, it argues that because that Act applies only to an arbitration conducted under an “arbitration agreement” (s. 2, above) it has no application to the Award. Draper Farms argues that there must be a specific agreement between the parties to arbitrate, and there was no such agreement here. Further, Draper Farms argues that its participation in the ATV-initiated mediation/arbitration was compulsory, not voluntary. Once ATV Farms initiated the process, Draper Farms had no choice but to participate under the DRC Rules.
[50] The modern approach to statutory interpretation requires courts to interpret a legislative provision in its total context, in keeping with the legislative text and the legislative purpose. The term “arbitration agreement” is defined in the Act as follows:
s. 1 “arbitration agreement” means an agreement by which two or more persons agree to submit to arbitration a dispute that has arisen or may arise between them;
[51] Also relevant is s. 5 (1) of the Act, which provides as follows:
An arbitration agreement may be an independent agreement or part of another agreement.
[52] These provisions do not require a specific agreement between the parties to arbitrate a single dispute. Further, the legislative purpose supports a broad interpretation of the term. It would be unduly narrow to construe the Act to be limited to specific individual agreements.
[53] To join, all members of the DRC must agree as follows: “I specifically agree that all disputes between me and/or my organization add any other member of members of the DRC shall be resolved exclusively pursuant to the Mediation and Arbitration Rules of the DRC.” This satisfies the requirement of s. 2 of the Act that the arbitration be conducted under an arbitration agreement.
[54] I, therefore, conclude that the Arbitration Act applies.
Extension of Time
[55] The Arbitration Act provides that an award binds the parties unless it is set aside or varied under s. 45 (appeals on questions of law) or s. 46 (setting aside an award on specified grounds). Section 47 imposes a 30-day time period within which these challenges must be brought. Draper Farms brought this Application within the three month period provided for in the ICAA, but outside the 30-day period under the Arbitration Act. It therefore needs an extension of time.
[56] I am satisfied that Draper Farms intended to challenge the Award in a timely way, and that there is no prejudice to ATV Farms in extending the time. I would grant an extension of time if I had the jurisdiction to do so.
[57] The Arbitration Act contains no provision authorizing a court to extend the 30-day time period. However, it does authorize the extension of another time period. Section 39 gives the court authority to extend the time within which the arbitral tribunal is required to make an award, even if the time has expired.
[58] The question of whether or not the court has authority to extend the 30-day time period prescribed by s. 47 of the Act was addressed in Jean Estate v. Wires Jolley LLP (2010), 2010 ONSC 4835. In that case, Justice Grace concluded that he did not have authority to extend the time period for the following reasons (at para. 55):
(i) the statute has created its own time frame within which an appeal is to be commenced. The time limits set forth in the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply;
(ii) since jurisdiction to extend time in one situation is expressly given in section 39, I am of the view the power to extend a time limit in the Arbitration Act, 1991, does not exist unless it is specifically conferred;
(iii) section 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 contains no such statement.
[59] Justice Grace concluded that this is not a situation where the Legislature has left a “functional gap or vacuum” that the court can fill using its inherent jurisdiction.
[60] I find that the decision in Jean Estate applies here with equal force. I do not have jurisdiction to extend the 30-day time period. This Application is therefore statute-barred.
Merits of Application
[61] If I am wrong on the issue of an extension of time, I would nonetheless dismiss the Application on the merits.
[62] As set out in s. 6 of the Arbitration Act, no court shall intervene in a matter governed by the Act except for the following purposes, in accordance with the Act:
- To assist the conducting of arbitrations.
- To ensure that arbitrations are conducted in accordance with arbitration agreements.
- To prevent unequal or unfair treatment of parties to arbitration agreements.
- To enforce awards.
[63] Only purposes 2 and 3 are of potential relevance here.
[64] Section 45 of the Act provides, in some circumstances, for appeals on questions of law or mixed fact and law. Section 46 provides that an award may be set aside on various listed grounds. Those grounds include exceeding the scope of the arbitration agreement and failure to treat an applicant fairly and equally. Assuming this Application was proceeding under this Act, I do not find legal error or unfair or unequal treatment that would justify setting aside the Award.
[65] Beginning with the issue of whether the DRC has jurisdiction over carrots, I find that carrots are caught within the definition of “fresh fruits and vegetables” in the DRC Rules.
[66] Article 5 of the DRC By-laws defines fresh fruits and vegetables as follows:
The definition of fresh fruits and vegetables includes all fresh and chilled fruits and vegetables, fresh cuts, edible fungi and herbs, but excludes any fresh fruits and vegetable that is frozen or been planted as seed. [emphasis added]
[67] Essentially, Draper Farms argues that the exclusion for vegetables grown “as seed” should be read as excluding all vegetables grown “from seed” (my emphasis). This would not only exclude carrots but numerous other vegetables. I accept the position that the exclusion applies only to vegetables that are planted as seed, such as seed potatoes. This is supported by other DRC documents that expressly list carrots, suggesting that carrots were intended to be within its mandate.
[68] By becoming a member of the DRC, Draper Farms agreed that any dispute, controversy or claim with another member arising out of or in connection with any transaction involving fresh fruits and vegetables as defined in the By-Laws would be resolved exclusively under the DRC Rules. The dispute with ATV Farms falls squarely within this agreement to arbitrate. I, therefore, find that there was jurisdiction.
[69] With respect to the argument that the Arbitrator lost jurisdiction due to a failure to apply mandatory minimum prices under the Farm Products Marketing Act and related Vegetables for Processing – Marketing Regulation, I find that ATV Farms is not a “processor” within the meaning of the Regulation. Under the Regulation, “processor” means a person engaged in the business of processing vegetables. The definition of “processing” in the Regulation is very specific, providing that “processing” means,
(a) canning, dehydrating, drying, freezing, pickling or processing with sugar or sulphur dioxide or any other chemical or by heat, and combining or mixing a vegetable with one or more other vegetables,
(b) entering into a contract for the purchase of vegetables for the purpose of performing on the vegetables any of the operations mentioned in clause (a), or
(c) entering into a contract for the purpose of having any of the operations mentioned in clause (a) performed on vegetables.
[70] It is not alleged that ATV Farms entered into a contract as contemplated by subparagraphs (b) and (c). I am satisfied on the evidence of Mr. Agresti of ATV Farms that its production of 2” carrot chunks from whole carrots does not fall within subparagraph (a). I, therefore, conclude that the Regulation does not apply.
[71] The complaint about Mr. Goldman’s expertise was based upon his failure to apply the above regime. Given my finding on the inapplicability of the Regulation, there is no foundation for this complaint. Further, Article 65 of the DRC Rules requires that objections to an arbitrator be made within certain time lines and Draper Farms did not object to Mr. Goldman’s expertise in a timely way. It had an opportunity to exclude Mr. Goldman at the outset and instead ranked him its second choice of all the names put forward by the DRC. It also did not object to the DRC’s selection of Mr. Goldman, though it had an opportunity to do so.
[72] With respect to the use of documents from the Mediation in the arbitration process, it does appear that the Rules were breached by ATV Farms. However, the breach has been waived. Draper Farms received the ATV Farms pleadings as part of the formal pre-arbitration pleadings of ATV Farms. The pleadings appended Draper Farms mediation documents. Draper Farms was obviously in the position to recognize its own mediation documents. Further, Draper Farms had just received a notice from the DRC reminding the parties about confidentiality regarding the mediation process. Draper Farms must have known of the breach and was well placed to object at that early stage if it wished to do so. It did not object. The DRC Rules provide that any party that knows of a failure to comply with the Rules and proceeds without promptly stating its objection in writing shall be deemed to have waived the objection. I conclude that this objection was waived.
[73] On the location of the arbitration, Draper Farms specifically agreed to it. On the alleged failure to keep control of the arbitration as evidenced by requesting documents and another witness during the arbitration, Article 76(3) of the DRC Rules provides that at any time in the proceedings, the arbitrator may order parties to produce other documents, or other evidence he deems necessary or appropriate. The Arbitrator was, therefore, within his authority to request documents and another witness during the arbitration. While it may appear to Draper Farms, in hindsight, that it would have been in a better position if that evidence was not so conveniently available, it does not justify setting aside the Award.
[74] In conclusion, I find that there was jurisdiction and no failure to treat Draper Farms fairly and equally. I would therefore not set the Award aside.
Order and Costs
[75] The Application is, therefore, dismissed. If either party seeks costs of the Application or the motion to strike it may provide brief written submissions together with a bill of costs, to be delivered to me by October 25, 2013. The responding party to a costs request shall deliver a brief written response, if any, by November 15, 2013.
W. MATHESON J.
Released: September 26, 2013
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-449220
DATE: 20130926
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
R & G DRAPER FARMS (KESWICK) LTD.
Applicant
– and –
1758691 ONTARIO INC. c.o.b. ATV FARMS
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
W. MATHESON J.
Released: ** September 26, 2013**
[^1]: That proceeding has since been stayed pending the determination of this Application.