Jasmine T. Akbarali

The appellant appealed the motion judge's dismissal of his action for delay.

The action involved a dispute over ownership of shares in a corporation with an equity interest in a property development in Windsor, Ontario.

The appellant commenced the action in February 2004, more than seven and a half years after the relevant events in June 1996.

The action experienced significant periods of inactivity, including over five years of dormancy after the appellant filed his Affidavit of Documents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the delay was inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial to the defendants, creating a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible.

The appellants' income property was substantially damaged by fire.

They decided to demolish the site and build an eight-and-a-half-storey condominium, claiming replacement cost and building code upgrades under their insurance policy.

The insurer paid only the actual cash value, arguing the condominium was not a 'replacement' of 'like kind and quality'.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy required any replacement to be of like kind and quality to trigger replacement cost coverage.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal regarding the apportionment of damages, the court determined the costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

The third parties were ordered to pay partial indemnity costs of $50,000 to the appellants and $75,000 to the respondents.

The appellants were ordered to pay $30,000 in partial indemnity costs to the respondents, as the respondents were required to address all issues initially raised by the appellants.

The appellant commercial garage owner appealed a jury verdict finding him 37% liable for catastrophic injuries suffered by a minor who, along with a friend, stole an unlocked car with the keys left inside from the garage lot.

The Court of Appeal conducted an Anns-Cooper analysis and upheld the finding that the garage owner owed a duty of care to the minors, as the risk of theft and joyriding by minors was reasonably foreseeable and the garage owner had a responsibility to secure the vehicles.

The court found no residual policy considerations to negate the duty, noting that the minor's illegal conduct was properly addressed through contributory negligence rather than denying a duty of care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, a police officer and the police services board, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligent police investigation of the respondents regarding stolen auto parts.

The trial judge had determined the standard of care without relying on expert evidence and awarded substantial damages.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in departing from the general rule that expert evidence is required to establish the standard of care for a professional, as the investigation was technical and the police conduct was not egregious.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in formulating the standard of care and failing to consider the respondent's committal for trial.

The judgment was set aside except for an agreed award for damaged property.

The appellants, an engineering firm and its principal, appealed a trial judgment apportioning liability for damages between them and their insurers.

The trial judge found the appellants liable in negligence and breach of contract for errors and delays in engineering drawings for a construction project.

The trial judge apportioned 45% of the damages to the appellants and 55% to the insurers, based on an exclusion clause for delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that all delays were caused by the appellants' negligence in having to correct errors, which was covered under the policy.

The insurers' cross-appeal regarding the assessment of damages and the date used for foreign currency conversion was dismissed.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Law Society Appeal Panel related to his uncivil in-court conduct during a lengthy securities fraud trial.

The appellant argued that trial judges, not the Law Society, should oversee in-court conduct and that the Appeal Panel's test for incivility failed to protect zealous advocacy.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasonableness standard of review applied to the Appeal Panel's decision.

The Court found that the Law Society has the statutory authority to discipline lawyers for in-court incivility, independent of a trial judge's actions.

The Court upheld the Appeal Panel's test for incivility and its finding that the appellant's repeated, unfounded allegations of prosecutorial misconduct constituted professional misconduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following its decision on the main appeal.

In accordance with the parties' agreement, the court ordered that the costs of the appeal be paid out of the estate of the deceased.

The successful appellant was awarded $46,000, and the respondents were awarded $25,000.

The respondent was injured when he tripped over a motorcycle parked on a walkway between trailers at a campsite.

The appellant insurer denied statutory accident benefits, arguing the incident did not meet the definition of an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The application judge found that the temporary parking of the motorcycle constituted an ordinary or well-known use of the vehicle, satisfying the purpose test.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that parking a vehicle is an ordinary and well-known activity to which vehicles are put, and dismissed the appeal.

The deceased left a will that expressly disinherited his daughter, stating she had had no communication with him for several years.

The daughter challenged the will, adducing extrinsic evidence that her father's actual motive was racially discriminatory because she had a child with a white man.

The application judge admitted the evidence and set aside the will on public policy grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that third-party extrinsic evidence of a testator's motive is inadmissible when the will is clear and unambiguous.

Furthermore, the court held that the public policy doctrine cannot be used to void an unconditional, private testamentary bequest based on a testator's alleged discriminatory motive, affirming the principle of testamentary freedom.

The appellant physician appealed a partial summary judgment order in a medical malpractice action arising from the delayed diagnosis of a brain tumour.

The appellant had admitted breach of the standard of care and causation, leaving only contributory negligence and the specific list of injuries to be determined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness, no error in the burden of proof regarding contributory negligence, and no error in the motions judge's listing of specific injuries based on uncontradicted expert reports.

The appellant, acting as power of attorney for his incapacitated father, appealed an application judge's order that released frozen joint funds to the respondent wife, granted her sole authority over a jointly owned Florida property, awarded her $900 per month in spousal support, and ordered the appellant to personally pay $13,500 in costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

The court upheld the release of the joint funds and the personal costs award based on the appellant's litigation conduct.

However, the court ordered the partition and sale of the Florida property nunc pro tunc, finding the appellant had authority to sever the joint tenancy.

The court also reduced the spousal support award to $300 per month, noting the application judge failed to consider the father's capacity to pay.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal and the respondent's cross-appeal regarding a finding of professional misconduct, the court determined the issue of costs.

The appellant argued that no costs should be awarded because the proceeding involved matters of public interest and novel issues.

The court rejected this argument, noting that while the case clarified the law, the appellant was unsuccessful and should bear the costs.

The court awarded costs of $30,000 to the respondent, which included a reduction to reflect the respondent's lack of success on the cross-appeal.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel finding him guilty of professional misconduct for incivility during a criminal trial.

The Appeal Panel had reduced his penalty to a one-month suspension and $200,000 in costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Law Society has jurisdiction to discipline lawyers for in-court conduct without intruding on judicial independence.

The Court articulated the test for when incivility becomes professional misconduct, requiring that the conduct undermines or has the potential to undermine the proper administration of justice.

The Court found the Appeal Panel's application of the test and the resulting penalty and costs orders to be reasonable.

The Law Society's cross-appeal regarding the evidentiary use of prior judicial comments was also dismissed.

The appellants, estate trustees of the deceased, appealed a trial judgment granting dependants' relief to the respondent, the deceased's common-law spouse.

The deceased had left a $17 million estate but excluded the respondent from her wills following a corporate reorganization.

The trial judge awarded the respondent a property, $100,000 per year for life, and $50,000 every five years for a vehicle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the deceased failed to make adequate provision for the respondent, nor in her assessment of the amount and duration of support or the substantial indemnity costs award.

Two legal associations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning professional misconduct and the role of advocates.

The appeal raised issues regarding when zealous advocacy crosses into actionable misconduct and the use of prior court decisions in disciplinary proceedings.

The court granted both motions, finding that the proposed interveners, as recognized organizations of advocates, would provide useful perspectives on the implications of the issues raised without duplicating the parties' submissions.

The appellants purchased a yacht for over $1 million and later sued for fundamental breach, returning the yacht.

After the close of pleadings, the action languished for over ten years with minimal steps taken.

The motion judge dismissed the action for delay under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court's inherent jurisdiction, finding the delay inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that the court has inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action for delay as an abuse of process when the delay is of such magnitude.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the pickup truck he was a passenger in went through a red light and was struck by a transport truck going through a green light.

The jury found the driver of the pickup 95% liable and the driver of the transport truck 5% liable.

The appellants (the transport truck driver and owners) appealed, arguing the jury verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misdirected the jury on causation, and there was improper cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding evidence supported the jury's conclusion that a reasonably prudent driver should have been aware of the hazard, the jury charge was not in error when read as a whole, and the improper cross-examination was not serious enough to undermine trial fairness.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his civil wrongful-conviction action as an abuse of process and alternatively staying it under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action alleged negligence, misfeasance, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, misrepresentation, and Charter breaches arising from the non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory alibi evidence in a murder prosecution.

The court held that the prior criminal reference did not determine all issues raised in the civil action and was not intended to bind future proceedings after the conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The motion judge also erred in relying on delay and changed positions by the appellant to justify a stay.

The appeal was allowed and the dismissal and stay orders were set aside.

The appellants sued the City of Oshawa for negligence, alleging the City incorrectly advised them that no building permit was required for a deck, and subsequently negligently investigated and prosecuted them under the Building Code Act.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the City acted reasonably.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming the trial judge applied the correct standard of care for negligent investigation.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the trial judge's award from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, as the appellants' conduct was not reprehensible.