Jasmine T. Akbarali

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for injuries sustained in a slip and fall on an icy, sloped municipal boulevard connecting to a private driveway.

She argued the municipality owed a higher standard of maintenance because pedestrians occasionally cross there, and that the adjacent property owner was an occupier of the boulevard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the municipality's maintenance standard was for vehicles, not pedestrians, and the adjacent owner did not exercise control over the boulevard to qualify as an occupier.

Following the dismissal of a civil action alleging negligence and wrongdoing by police and the Crown arising from a historic murder conviction later quashed, certain police defendants sought substantial indemnity costs against the plaintiff.

The court considered the extraordinary circumstances of the case, including the miscarriage of justice that resulted in the plaintiff serving decades in prison and the role of state actors in the events leading to that outcome.

Although the action had been dismissed as an abuse of process due to the inability to re-litigate factual findings already determined by the Court of Appeal and the prejudice caused by the passage of time, the court held that ordering costs would be unfair and contrary to the interests of justice.

Exercising its discretion, the court declined to award costs to the successful defendants.

The plaintiff, whose murder conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal after a reference, brought a civil action against the Crown and police alleging negligence and wrongdoing related to an undisclosed alibi.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the action.

The court dismissed the action as an abuse of process, finding that it sought to relitigate factual findings already made by the Court of Appeal regarding the absence of wrongdoing by the Crown and police.

The court also held that, alternatively, a permanent stay under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act was warranted due to the impossibility of a fair trial given the passage of over 40 years, faded memories, and lost evidence.

The parties sought costs following an appeal where the appellant's appeal on the merits was dismissed, but her appeal on costs was allowed.

The respondent sought full or substantial indemnity costs for the appeal on the merits, arguing the appeal was a continuation of a meritless will challenge.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding the appeal raised a narrow question of law, and awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs of $32,866.

The appellant was awarded partial indemnity costs of $9,273.30 for her success on the costs appeal.

The amounts were set off, resulting in a net payment of $23,592.70 to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order requiring the plaintiff to undergo three defence medical assessments by a psychiatrist, a neurologist, and a neuropsychologist.

The appellants did not object to the neuropsychologist but challenged the other two.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding the neurologist, finding the motion judge reasonably relied on the neuropsychologist's evidence that a neurological exam was necessary to determine organic brain injury.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the psychiatrist, as there was no evidence explaining why a psychiatric assessment was warranted in addition to the other examinations.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's determination that the respondent met the statutory threshold for serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function following a motor vehicle accident.

They also appealed the jury's award of $16,000 for past lost income.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's threshold determination or the jury's modest award for past lost income, noting the trial was brief and simple.

The purchaser appealed a trial judgment finding the vendor was entitled to a purchase price readjustment of approximately $433,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that a rollover credit was an adjustment to the purchase price, not a term of the contract.

The vendor cross-appealed on costs and pre-judgment interest.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the trial judge erred by applying a $100,000 settlement from the vendor's negligent solicitor entirely as a credit against damages, and instead attributed $50,000 to unrecoverable costs.

The Court also awarded pre-judgment interest from the date of closing, holding that mutual delay in commencing litigation did not justify depriving the vendor of interest.

The appellant doctor appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for the respondent's psychiatric injury, which developed after the doctor failed to promptly disclose a talar fracture in the respondent's ankle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that factual causation was established on the 'but for' test, as the respondent would not have suffered the psychiatric harm had the doctor disclosed the fracture.

The Court also found that legal causation was established, as it was reasonably foreseeable that a breach of the doctor-patient trust could cause a recognized psychiatric illness in a person of ordinary fortitude.

The appeal was dismissed, and the damages and costs awards were upheld.

The appellant physician performed ear surgeries using a new antiseptic introduced by the hospital, which caused profound hearing loss in two patients.

The hospital settled with the patients and sought contribution and indemnity from the appellant, arguing he was negligent in failing to inquire about the new antiseptic's properties.

The trial judge found the appellant 50% liable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, finding no evidence that the appellant breached the standard of care or that further inquiries would have revealed the antiseptic's ototoxicity prior to the surgeries.

The hospital's claim was dismissed.

The appellant was injured in a car accident and received income replacement benefits (IRBs) from the respondent insurer.

Years later, an accountant discovered the insurer had underpaid the IRBs by failing to apply the statutory minimum.

The appellant amended his claim to seek the shortfall, but the trial judge found the claim was statute-barred, holding that the insurer's Statement of Defence constituted a refusal to pay.

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that since neither party was aware of the calculation error, the pleading could not constitute a clear refusal to pay under the SABS.

The Court also held that the mandatory interest rate under s. 68 of the SABS applies to post-judgment interest, ousting the Courts of Justice Act rate.

The appeal was allowed and the insurer's cross-appeal regarding the loss of earning capacity benefits claim was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision recognizing a U.S. civil judgment against them for over $36 million.

They argued that they were denied a meaningful opportunity to defend the U.S. action because outstanding Canadian criminal charges precluded them from testifying in the U.S. proceeding without incriminating themselves.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants could have testified in the U.S. proceeding and subsequently argued for the exclusion of that evidence in their Canadian criminal trial under the Charter or the trial judge's common-law discretion.

The respondent employee, who suffered from chronic fatigue syndrome, was terminated after refusing to meet with an occupational medicine specialist chosen by the appellant employer to assess his disability and accommodation needs.

The trial judge found the employee was wrongfully dismissed, awarded 15 months' notice, extended the notice period to 24 months for bad faith in the manner of dismissal (Wallace damages), and awarded $500,000 in punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the wrongful dismissal and Wallace damages, but reduced the punitive damages to $100,000.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the employer's appeal in part, upholding the 15-month notice period but setting aside the Wallace and punitive damages.

The Court held that damages for the manner of dismissal should be assessed under the Hadley v. Baxendale principle rather than by arbitrarily extending the notice period, and found no bad faith or independently actionable wrong to justify aggravated or punitive damages.

The appellant, Bell Globemedia Publishing Inc., was successful on appeal and sought partial indemnity costs for both the initial motion and the appeal from the respondents, Conrad M. Black and Barbara Amiel-Black.

The respondents argued that intervenors generally do not receive costs and that the amounts claimed were excessive.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $18,000 in partial indemnity costs for the appeal, finding the claimed amount excessive given the appellant's familiarity with the issues.

The court declined to award costs for the initial motion, as the motion judge made no costs order and the appellant had not sought such costs in its notice of appeal.

The appellant newspaper sought intervenor status to challenge sealing and protective orders made in respect of material filed on a motion for a Mareva injunction against the respondents.

The motion judge dismissed the newspaper's motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in refusing to grant the newspaper intervenor status, failing to give sufficient weight to the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press.

The Court set aside the order, granted the newspaper intervenor status for the limited purpose of challenging the protective order, and remitted the balance of the motion to the Superior Court for a new hearing.

The appellants brought a class action for prospectus misrepresentation under s. 130(1) of the Ontario Securities Act.

The respondent company made an initial public offering with a prospectus containing a sales forecast.

Before the offering closed, internal analysis showed sales lagging due to unseasonably warm weather, but this was not disclosed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the company had no obligation to disclose the intra-quarterly results because they did not amount to a 'material change' under the Act.

The Court also held that the Business Judgment Rule does not apply to statutory disclosure obligations.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant employer sought a stay of execution of a Court of Appeal judgment awarding wrongful dismissal and punitive damages to the respondent employee, pending an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court granted the stay under s. 65(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Act based on the appellant's undertaking to pay.

However, applying the test for lifting a stay to s. 65(4) of the Act, the court partially lifted the stay to the extent of $60,000 to alleviate the respondent's severe financial hardship pending the appeal.

The appellants sought costs of the appeal and trial on a partial indemnity basis following their success.

The respondent argued for no costs, asserting the class proceeding raised a novel point of law and involved a matter of public interest.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding the litigation was a commercial dispute between sophisticated actors involving established principles.

The court awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $100,000 plus GST to both the individual and corporate appellants, along with disbursements, and ordered trial costs to be assessed on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for prospectus misrepresentation under s. 130(1) of the Securities Act.

The trial judge had held that the appellants had a continuing obligation to disclose poor intra-quarterly financial results before the closing of their initial public offering, and that their failure to do so rendered an implied representation of objective reasonableness in their financial forecast false.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act distinguishes between material facts and material changes, and imposes no continuing obligation to disclose material facts after a prospectus receipt is issued.

The Court further held that the trial judge erred in implying a representation of objective reasonableness and in failing to apply the business judgment rule to management's assessment of the forecast.

The appellant invested in limited partnerships marketed as tax shelters and made monthly interest payments on loans used to purchase the units.

The partnerships were later revealed to be a sham, and Revenue Canada disallowed the appellant's tax deductions.

The appellant sued the respondent accounting firm for negligence, alleging they breached the standard of care for a review engagement by failing to include a 'going concern' note in the financial statements, which he claimed would have prompted him to stop making interest payments earlier.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the accountants met the standard of care for a review engagement and that, even if a going concern note had been included, the appellant would not have noticed it or acted upon it.

The appellant was convicted of wilfully promoting hatred against Muslims through pamphlets and a recorded telephone message.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that wilful blindness satisfied the mens rea requirement for the offence under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code, and that the defence of good faith expression of religious opinion under s. 319(3)(b) was improperly rejected.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that wilful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge and satisfies the stringent mens rea requirement for wilfully promoting hatred, and that the appellant's statements went beyond the good faith expression of religious belief.