Adrienne Lee

This divorce proceeding involved an applicant father, a 69-year-old physician with Parkinson's, and a 46-year-old self-represented respondent mother, concerning their 6-year-old son diagnosed with severe autism.

The mother's non-cooperation, including refusing consent for government funding, school assessments, and vaccinations for their son, and her general abusive and delaying tactics, led to the trial proceeding largely uncontested.

The court addressed decision-making authority for the child, child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property.

The father was granted final decision-making authority for the child's care.

The court ordered that the mother's equalization payment and spousal support entitlement be offset by the costs awarded to the father, prioritizing the child's best interests and the father's financial capacity to meet the child's significant needs.

The respondent (wife) brought a motion to enforce a consent order requiring the applicant (husband) to transfer his interest in a holding company and resign as officer/director, as a spousal tax-free capital rollover.

The husband refused to comply, arguing he was unaware he had signed a personal guarantee for the dental practice's line of credit and that the order should be set aside due to mutual or unilateral mistake, or unconscionability, as it did not address his release from the guarantee.

The court found no valid reason to set aside the order, noting the husband was represented by counsel, had an existing indemnity, and the wife had attempted to secure his release from the bank without success.

The court dismissed the husband's arguments of mistake and unconscionability, emphasizing that buyer's remorse is not a basis to disobey a consent order.

The motion to enforce the order was granted, compelling the husband to comply within seven days, regardless of the guarantee release, and ordering the wife to provide a further indemnity.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal from an interlocutory family law order without first obtaining leave to appeal.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

After the appellant failed to respond within the required timeframe, citing COVID-19 illness, the court dismissed the appeal as it required leave.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the appellant bringing a proper motion for leave to appeal, for which the court set strict deadlines.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion to suspend the respondent father's access visits with their seven-year-old son due to concerns over COVID-19 and interprovincial travel between Ontario and Quebec.

The mother alleged the father failed to practice proper social distancing during a recent visit.

The court found that the father's actions were not reckless and that he had agreed to abide by COVID-19 protocols for future visits.

The motion was dismissed as not urgent, with the court emphasizing the presumption that existing parenting arrangements should continue safely.

The respondent mother brought a motion for temporary child and spousal support, disclosure, and contribution to Section 7 expenses.

The court ruled that temporary support should be based on the applicant father's current annual draw income, with additional firm equity distributions to be shared as lump sums when received, rather than on his higher historical average income.

Disclosure was ordered from the father's date of separation (2014) forward.

The applicant father was largely successful on the support and disclosure issues, and costs were awarded in his favour.

The applicant sought an urgent order to relocate with the parties' one-year-old daughter, Freya, from Toronto to Victoria, B.C., citing a new job opportunity and psychological isolation in Toronto.

The respondent opposed the motion, emphasizing the importance of the child's attachment to both parents.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding that the proposed move was not in the child's best interests, as it would drastically reduce contact with the father during a critical developmental stage and disrupt the child's daily routine.

The Respondent brought a motion for a Voice of the Child Report for their two children (aged 8 and 6).

The Applicant opposed on procedural grounds (judge recusal due to prior settlement conference involvement, and motion not suitable for Form 14B) and substantive grounds (lack of jurisdiction without consent, children too young, report's limited utility).

The court dismissed the Applicant's objections, finding that "issue" in Rule 17(24) refers to substantive matters, not procedural ones, and that Rule 20.1(3) provides jurisdiction to order such reports without consent.

The court deemed the report appropriate given the children's ages and the lack of progress in negotiating parenting time changes.

The motion for the Voice of the Child Report was granted, with the Respondent to pay 100% of the fees, and no costs were awarded for the motion.

The father brought a motion to change a final order, seeking joint custody, access in the U.S., a name change for the child, and termination of spousal support.

The mother sought sole custody, restricted access, and increased child and spousal support.

The court dismissed the father's requests for joint custody, U.S. access, and a name change, finding he lacked credibility and the mother had encouraged access.

The court permitted the father to register the child's birth in the U.S. to preserve citizenship rights.

Child and spousal support were increased retroactively based on the father's higher income, but spousal support was ordered to terminate in 2018.

The respondent brought a motion regarding jurisdiction in a child support proceeding.

The applicant sought to vary a foreign child support order made in Maryland through either a Motion to Change or an Application under the Family Law Act.

The respondent argued the applicant must proceed under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act (ISOA).

The court held that jurisdiction to vary a foreign support order made corollary to a foreign divorce can only be derived from provincial legislation respecting enforcement of support orders, namely the ISOA.

The court stayed the Motion to Change and Application insofar as they related to support and ordered the applicant to proceed under the ISOA.

Insurers brought an application seeking direction on the disposition of insurance proceeds following the constructive total loss of a private aircraft.

Competing claims arose between parties asserting interests in the aircraft after a lessee allegedly registered the aircraft in his own name using false documentation and defaulted on lease obligations.

One respondent did not appear and consented to the proceeds being paid into court.

The court found significant uncontradicted evidence of arrears and fraudulent registration and ordered the proceeds paid directly to the aircraft owner, less costs, while releasing the insurers from further liability regarding the proceeds.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal on liability and partial success on the costs appeal, the respondents sought costs of the appeal totaling $675,880.87.

The appellant argued for no costs or a significantly reduced amount due to divided success and duplication of counsel by the amalgamated municipal respondents.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondents one set of costs, fixed at $125,000, reflecting the straightforward nature of the legal issues, the duplication of argument, and the appellant's partial success on the costs appeal.

The appellant, operator of a retirement home, appealed the dismissal of its action for misfeasance in public office against the City of Hamilton and the Regional Municipality of Hamilton-Wentworth, arising from an order to comply issued in 1994.

The appellant also appealed the trial judge's costs award of over $4 million.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the misfeasance claim, finding the public officials acted lawfully and in good faith to protect vulnerable residents.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the award to a partial indemnity scale and adjusting for duplication of counsel after the City and Region amalgamated.

The parties settled the matter on consent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant, Bell Globemedia Publishing Inc., was successful on appeal and sought partial indemnity costs for both the initial motion and the appeal from the respondents, Conrad M. Black and Barbara Amiel-Black.

The respondents argued that intervenors generally do not receive costs and that the amounts claimed were excessive.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $18,000 in partial indemnity costs for the appeal, finding the claimed amount excessive given the appellant's familiarity with the issues.

The court declined to award costs for the initial motion, as the motion judge made no costs order and the appellant had not sought such costs in its notice of appeal.

The appellant newspaper sought intervenor status to challenge sealing and protective orders made in respect of material filed on a motion for a Mareva injunction against the respondents.

The motion judge dismissed the newspaper's motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in refusing to grant the newspaper intervenor status, failing to give sufficient weight to the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press.

The Court set aside the order, granted the newspaper intervenor status for the limited purpose of challenging the protective order, and remitted the balance of the motion to the Superior Court for a new hearing.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a costs award.

The Court of Appeal declined to grant leave, regardless of which test for granting leave applied.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,500 on a partial indemnity scale.