63 total
Random police stops for the R.I.D.E. program are authorized at common law.
The appellant was randomly stopped by police as part of the R.I.D.E. program.
The officer smelled alcohol and demanded a breath sample, which the appellant failed to provide.
The appellant argued the random stop was unlawful, providing a reasonable excuse for his failure.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that while there was no statutory authority for the random stop, it was authorized at common law as a justifiable use of police powers associated with their general duties to prevent crime and protect life and property.
The appeal was dismissed.
Provincial legislation providing for compulsory treatment of heroin addicts is valid public health legislation.
The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of the Heroin Treatment Act, a British Columbia statute providing for the compulsory treatment and detention of heroin users.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act was intra vires the provincial legislature.
The Court found that the pith and substance of the legislation was the medical treatment of heroin addicts, which falls within the province's general jurisdiction over health matters under section 92(16) of the British North America Act, 1867.
The compulsory aspects of the treatment were deemed incidental to its effectiveness and not a colourable attempt to enact criminal law.
Appeal dismissed; trial judge's error on drunkenness defence in constructive murder did not cause miscarriage of justice.
The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 213(d) of the Criminal Code, where the underlying offence was indecent assault.
He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the defence of drunkenness.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding drunkenness and the mental elements of constructive murder, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice because the jury's verdict indicated they were satisfied the appellant had the capacity to commit the indecent assault.