Lauren Sigal

The applicant tenants brought an application for the interpretation of a commercial lease regarding parking rights and the payment of additional rent for utilities.

The court held that the lease clearly restricted the use of outdoor parking spaces to customers and visitors, denying the tenants' employees the right to park there.

However, regarding electricity costs, the court found the lease ambiguous and applied the contra proferentem rule against the respondent landlord, ruling that the tenants should pay based on actual usage rather than a proportionate share of square footage.

Success being divided, the parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

Following a successful summary judgment motion where the plaintiff recovered her deposit on a failed condominium purchase, the plaintiff sought costs of $483,236 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found the plaintiff's Rule 49 offers did not contain a clear, understandable compromise, disentitling her to substantial indemnity costs.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, the court noted the plaintiff's scattergun approach, unnecessary proceedings, and excessive billing.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs at $225,000, reflecting a fair and reasonable amount the defendant could expect to pay.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to recover $155,000 from three loans made to the corporate defendant and personally guaranteed by the individual defendants.

The plaintiff demanded repayment based on the defendants' failure to provide monthly financial statements, which had not been previously requested.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the plaintiff provided reasonable notice of default and whether the plaintiff's actions constituted a breach of contract.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss an application seeking rescission of a trademark licence agreement and damages on the basis that the agreement constituted a franchise agreement under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The applicants argued that the relationship was substantively a franchise requiring statutory disclosure.

The court held that the agreement was a single trademark licensing arrangement within the exemption in s. 2(3)5 of the Act and lacked the hallmarks of a franchise relationship, including significant operational control or assistance.

As the Act did not apply, the contractual forum selection and choice of law clauses favouring New York were enforceable.

The application was dismissed and costs awarded to the moving parties.