Lauren Sigal

The applicant tenants brought an application for the interpretation of a commercial lease regarding parking rights and the payment of additional rent for utilities.

The court held that the lease clearly restricted the use of outdoor parking spaces to customers and visitors, denying the tenants' employees the right to park there.

However, regarding electricity costs, the court found the lease ambiguous and applied the contra proferentem rule against the respondent landlord, ruling that the tenants should pay based on actual usage rather than a proportionate share of square footage.

Success being divided, the parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

Following a successful summary judgment motion where the plaintiff recovered her deposit on a failed condominium purchase, the plaintiff sought costs of $483,236 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found the plaintiff's Rule 49 offers did not contain a clear, understandable compromise, disentitling her to substantial indemnity costs.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, the court noted the plaintiff's scattergun approach, unnecessary proceedings, and excessive billing.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs at $225,000, reflecting a fair and reasonable amount the defendant could expect to pay.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to recover $155,000 from three loans made to the corporate defendant and personally guaranteed by the individual defendants.

The plaintiff demanded repayment based on the defendants' failure to provide monthly financial statements, which had not been previously requested.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the plaintiff provided reasonable notice of default and whether the plaintiff's actions constituted a breach of contract.

The plaintiff's action was administratively dismissed for delay twice.

The defendant consented to setting aside the first dismissal but refused for the second.

The master dismissed the plaintiff's motion to set aside the second dismissal, finding the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence rebutting the presumption of prejudice.

The Divisional Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal, holding that the master erred in requiring affirmative evidence to rebut presumed prejudice.

The defendant's own conduct, including consenting to the first dismissal and engaging in settlement discussions, rebutted any presumption of prejudice, and the finality principle was not engaged because the plaintiff moved promptly.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss an application seeking rescission of a trademark licence agreement and damages on the basis that the agreement constituted a franchise agreement under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The applicants argued that the relationship was substantively a franchise requiring statutory disclosure.

The court held that the agreement was a single trademark licensing arrangement within the exemption in s. 2(3)5 of the Act and lacked the hallmarks of a franchise relationship, including significant operational control or assistance.

As the Act did not apply, the contractual forum selection and choice of law clauses favouring New York were enforceable.

The application was dismissed and costs awarded to the moving parties.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a municipal by-law that restricted the operating hours of licensed body rub parlours.

The appellant argued the City acted unreasonably and lacked sufficient evidence connecting the nuisance to licensed operations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that under section 213 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, the by-law is not reviewable on the ground of reasonableness, and finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's evidentiary findings.

The franchisor brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the franchisees’ counterclaim for rescission under s. 6(2) of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The franchisees alleged the disclosure document failed to disclose several material facts, including litigation involving the franchisor, anticipated policy changes, and potential renovation costs.

The court held that three of the alleged omissions were not material facts because they arose well after the disclosure document was delivered or could not reasonably affect the franchise price.

Although the existence of contemplated litigation should have been disclosed, the deficiency was not so stark or fundamental as to amount to no disclosure at all.

Accordingly, the franchisees could not rely on the two‑year rescission remedy under s. 6(2), and the rescission counterclaim was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding a $90,000 rent deposit.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the deposit was voluntary and therefore not 'required' under section 106 of the Residential Tenancies Act, meaning there was no contravention of section 135.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, finding that section 106(6) requires interest to be paid on the deposit, calculated on the monthly declining balance.