Robert C. Taylor

In this wrongful dismissal action, the plaintiff sought leave under Rule 48.04(1) to bring a motion for discovery of six former employees of the defendant, after having already set the action down for trial.

The plaintiff argued that information regarding the termination of other employees was relevant to his claim for unvested restricted share units.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no substantial or unexpected change in circumstances to justify granting leave.

The plaintiff had been aware of the defendant's refusal to provide this information for over two years and had deliberately chosen to set the action down for trial, despite being offered the option to withdraw the trial record to pursue discovery issues.

The court emphasized that discovery of non-parties is an exception, not a rule, and that the plaintiff's desire to maintain his place in the trial queue while pursuing further discovery was not a valid reason to grant leave.

The plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action brought a motion to compel the corporate defendant to produce a specific employee, Salome Larios Ampuller, as its representative for examination for discovery.

The defendant objected, arguing the selected employee was inappropriate due to her subordinate role, lack of involvement in the termination decision, and potential for excessive undertakings.

The court, applying Rule 31.03(2) and relevant case law, found that the plaintiff had a prima facie right to select the representative and that Salome was sufficiently knowledgeable regarding the central issue of the alleged theft.

The court dismissed the defendant's objections, finding the selection was bona fide and not oppressive, and that requiring a different representative would prejudice the plaintiff.

The motion was granted, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendant employer brought a motion to quash three Rule 39.03 summonses to witness served by the plaintiff employee in advance of a pending pleadings motion.

The plaintiff sought to strike out portions of the defendant's amended pleading alleging after-acquired cause.

The court found that the extensive list of documents requested in the summonses amounted to a fishing expedition and an attempt to initiate early discovery.

The motion was granted and the summonses were quashed as an abuse of process.

The defendants brought a motion to strike various portions of the plaintiff's statement of claim, including claims for an oppression remedy under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, conspiracy, and breaches of the Ontario Human Rights Code, as well as references to mediation and inflammatory language.

The court granted the motion in part, striking the OBCA oppression, conspiracy, and OHRC claims (with leave to amend), a specific paragraph regarding mediation content (without leave to amend), and the term 'looting' (with leave to amend).

Costs were awarded to the defendants.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a dismissed interlocutory injunction application.

The defendants, who successfully resisted the injunction, sought substantial indemnity costs, citing the plaintiff's alleged misconduct and the impact on their livelihoods.

The plaintiff argued for partial indemnity or costs in the cause, and sought discounts.

The court determined that costs should be fixed and paid forthwith on a partial indemnity basis, applying a 10% reduction for work that would benefit the overall litigation.

Substantial indemnity was denied as the plaintiff had a serious issue to be tried and the alleged misconduct did not meet the threshold for elevated costs.

The plaintiff, Pioneering Technology Corp. (PTC), sought an interlocutory injunction against former employees and a contractor (Laird Comber, Wayne Zu, and Steph Cooper) to prevent them from using confidential information and developing a competing business venture.

PTC alleged breach of contract, fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and breach of confidence, stemming from the defendants' undisclosed plans to collaborate with a Chinese supplier (Donghai) to distribute a product (2BGT) in North America, potentially involving PTC.

The court applied the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions from *RJR MacDonald v. Canada*.

While a serious issue to be tried was found regarding fiduciary duties and corporate opportunity, the court determined that PTC failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as any potential damages from a competing venture could be quantified, and there was no evidence of imminent harm or disclosure of confidential information.

The balance of convenience also did not favour granting the injunction, given the preliminary stage of the defendants' plans and Donghai's prior decision not to contract with PTC for the 2BGT.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought an action for wrongful dismissal following his termination from the defendant company.

The dispute centered on whether the plaintiff was contractually required to work full-time in Toronto rather than splitting his time with his residence in San Francisco.

The court found that the written employment agreement was never finalized due to unauthorized changes and 'slip-sheeting' of signature pages.

However, an oral contract existed which did not require the plaintiff to work full-time in Toronto.

The court held that the plaintiff's refusal to work full-time in Toronto did not constitute cause for termination and awarded damages based on the termination provisions of the oral contract.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a Master's decision reserving the costs of a motion to strike an affidavit to the judge hearing the underlying application.

The applicants argued they were largely successful on the motion to strike and should have been awarded costs.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error in principle in the Master's conclusion that he could not determine which party was more successful without a qualitative analysis of the struck paragraphs, which was best left to the application judge.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge who refused leave to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim by striking certain defences and counterclaims.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge failed to provide explicit reasons for denying leave to amend and that leave should only be denied in the clearest of cases.

The court allowed the appeal and varied the order to grant leave to amend.

The court issued a costs endorsement following an interlocutory decision where the defendants sought to interpret a previous order, imposing additional and retroactive obligations on the plaintiff and its expert.

The plaintiff successfully resisted the defendants' arguments on most issues.

The court found the defendants' positions unreasonable and unfair, particularly their allegations of misconduct against the plaintiff's counsel and expert, which unnecessarily consumed court and plaintiff's time.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiff, reducing the claimed amount due to excessive research time and high expert invoice.

This is a costs endorsement following a pleadings motion where the Plaintiff largely succeeded in striking portions of the Defendants' pleadings.

The Plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $122,000.00.

The Defendants argued for each side to bear its own costs or for costs limited to $5,000.00, citing mixed success, leave to amend, and the Plaintiff's procedural disorganization.

The court found the Plaintiff to be the successful party but reduced the costs significantly, noting that both parties contributed to lengthening the proceeding and that the Plaintiff's initial cost claim was unreasonable.

The court ordered the Defendants to pay $30,000.00 in costs to the Plaintiff.

The defendants brought a motion seeking directions on the interpretation of a previous order for the seizure and imaging of electronic devices, arguing it should implicitly incorporate standard Anton Piller Order protections and that Deloitte Inc. should be deemed an independent supervising solicitor.

The plaintiff resisted, asserting the original order was clear and granted on notice, not ex-parte.

The court dismissed the defendants' primary requests, holding that the order, having been granted after a full hearing with both parties present, did not automatically include ex-parte Anton Piller terms or appoint Deloitte as an independent supervising solicitor.

The court provided further directions for managing the collected electronic documents, including a timeline for the defendants to review MD5hash documents and the option for them to appoint their own expert to assist with keyword searches.

The plaintiff, TSI International Inc., brought a motion to strike significant portions of the defendants' Statement of Defence under Rules 25.11 and 21.

The defendants' pleadings included defences of abuse of process and the "clean hands" doctrine, as well as counterclaims for wrongful and constructive dismissal.

The court dismissed the defendants' abuse of process and clean hands defences under Rule 21, finding them to have no reasonable chance of success.

Consequently, numerous paragraphs of the Statement of Defence related to these dismissed defences were struck without leave to amend, except where relevant to the defendants' wrongful and constructive dismissal claims.

The court also clarified that prior judicial findings from an injunction motion do not constitute final factual determinations for the purpose of striking pleadings.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss an application seeking rescission of a trademark licence agreement and damages on the basis that the agreement constituted a franchise agreement under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The applicants argued that the relationship was substantively a franchise requiring statutory disclosure.

The court held that the agreement was a single trademark licensing arrangement within the exemption in s. 2(3)5 of the Act and lacked the hallmarks of a franchise relationship, including significant operational control or assistance.

As the Act did not apply, the contractual forum selection and choice of law clauses favouring New York were enforceable.

The application was dismissed and costs awarded to the moving parties.

The defendant sought leave under Rule 48.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to proceed with a previously served motion for summary judgment after the parties had consented to place the action on the trial list.

The underlying action involved claims of negligence and breach of contract relating to allegedly improper industrial laundry systems and advice.

The court held that once parties consent to placing an action on the trial list, further motions require leave and such leave should only be granted where justified in the interests of justice.

The moving party had not notified the opposing party or the trial coordinator of its intention to continue the summary judgment motion when consenting to the trial listing, and there was no substantial change in circumstances warranting leave.

The court therefore refused leave and dismissed the motion.