Robert C. Taylor

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss an application seeking rescission of a trademark licence agreement and damages on the basis that the agreement constituted a franchise agreement under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The applicants argued that the relationship was substantively a franchise requiring statutory disclosure.

The court held that the agreement was a single trademark licensing arrangement within the exemption in s. 2(3)5 of the Act and lacked the hallmarks of a franchise relationship, including significant operational control or assistance.

As the Act did not apply, the contractual forum selection and choice of law clauses favouring New York were enforceable.

The application was dismissed and costs awarded to the moving parties.

The defendant sought leave under Rule 48.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to proceed with a previously served motion for summary judgment after the parties had consented to place the action on the trial list.

The underlying action involved claims of negligence and breach of contract relating to allegedly improper industrial laundry systems and advice.

The court held that once parties consent to placing an action on the trial list, further motions require leave and such leave should only be granted where justified in the interests of justice.

The moving party had not notified the opposing party or the trial coordinator of its intention to continue the summary judgment motion when consenting to the trial listing, and there was no substantial change in circumstances warranting leave.

The court therefore refused leave and dismissed the motion.

The appellant sued her former employer for wrongful dismissal and its executive chairman for intentional and negligent infliction of nervous shock.

The motion judge struck the claim against the executive chairman, finding he was protected by a limitation of liability clause in the appellant's employment contract.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, applying the London Drugs exception to privity of contract.

The Court found the parties intended the limitation clause to apply to the executive chairman, who was acting in the course of his employment when he terminated the appellant.

Three plaintiffs in separate wrongful dismissal actions moved under Rule 77.05(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to have their proceedings transferred into case management.

Although the defendant did not oppose the request, the court held that parties must still demonstrate that the criteria under Rule 77.05(4) are met.

The court found insufficient evidence showing complexity, public importance, or other factors justifying case management, despite some delay in the litigation.

The decision emphasized that case management is reserved for proceedings where a demonstrated need for court intervention exists, particularly given limited judicial resources.

The motions were dismissed.

The defendant in a wrongful dismissal action sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing its appeal from a Master's order.

The Master had refused to strike allegations in the Statement of Claim that the defendant had a practice or policy of terminating employees for just cause when none existed, to avoid providing notice or pay in lieu.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting lines of cases that remained good law following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., and no reason to doubt the correctness of the lower court's decision.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision dismissing its appeal from a Master's order.

The Master had struck a summons issued by the defendant to examine the plaintiff as a witness on a motion to strike the defendant's counterclaim for defamation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, confirming that under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, no evidence is admissible on a motion to strike a pleading for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

Amertek Inc. sued the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) after losing money on a subcontract to supply fire crash trucks to the U.S. Army.

The trial judge found CCC liable for deceit, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, awarding disgorgement of a re-procurement penalty CCC avoided.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the trial decision, finding palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's conclusions.

The Court held that CCC's statements about the contract's profitability were not false when made, Amertek did not rely on them, the relationship was purely commercial rather than fiduciary, and there was no breach of contract or unjust enrichment.

The appeal was allowed and Amertek's action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for breach of contract.

The dispute centered on whether the appellant knew the building was not to involve post and beam construction and whether it breached the contract by unilaterally changing the design.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, agreeing that the parties were ad idem on the terms and that the appellant's delivery of draft drawings using an uncontracted construction technique constituted a breach.

The court also upheld the trial judge's measure of damages, which aimed to put the respondent in the position it would have been had the contract not been breached.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a supplementary endorsement amending a previous endorsement.

The appeal by the appellant Thomson was allowed, the summary judgment against him was set aside, and the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal at $12,000 on a partial indemnity basis and the costs of the motion below at $40,000.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment finding that a co-defendant held monies in trust for the respondent.

The motion judge had concluded that 75% of the sale price of products remained the property of the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found that the agreement merely created a contractual obligation to pay 75% of the invoiced amount, with the co-defendant assuming the risk of non-payment.

The lack of a requirement to segregate funds further negated the existence of a trust.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment against the appellant was set aside, and the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for abuse of process, which was based on the allegation that the respondents had brought prior Quebec proceedings challenging a will for an improper purpose.

The trial judge found that the Quebec action was not commenced for an improper purpose, and the Court of Appeal held this factual finding was entitled to deference.

The appellant also argued that the trial judge's comments at the outset of the trial demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal concluded that while some comments were troubling, they did not display a reasonable apprehension of bias when considered in totality.

The appeal was dismissed.