Angelo Giuseppe Sciacca

The City of Toronto, as Third Party, brought a motion to amend its Statement of Defence to the Third Party Claim to plead two statutory defences under the City of Toronto Act, 2006: failure to provide written notice (s. 42(6)) and that damages were caused by an object on an untraveled portion of the highway (s. 42(4)).

The Defendants opposed the motion, arguing presumed prejudice due to the late stage of the proceedings and that the proposed defences lacked merit.

The court, acting as case manager and trial judge, granted the motion, finding no actual or presumed prejudice and reiterating that the test for allowing an amendment to pleadings is not whether the defence will ultimately succeed at trial.

The moving party, a class member in a train derailment class action, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's Order dismissing his appeal for delay and sought an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The court applied the test for setting aside a dismissal order, noting the moving party had an intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay related to obtaining issued and entered orders, and demonstrated an arguable case on the merits.

The court found that truncating the appeal based on a procedural irregularity would be contrary to the interests of justice.

The motion was granted, the dismissal order was set aside, and an extension of time was granted.

The appellant, a class member in a train derailment class action who had an individual trial for damages, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his appeal for delay and to extend the time to perfect the appeal.

The court applied the test for setting aside a dismissal for delay, noting that the appellant had a continuous intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay related to difficulties in settling the trial judge's orders, and that the respondents suffered no prejudice.

Crucially, the court found that the appellant had an arguable case on appeal regarding the trial judge's credibility assessments and evidentiary rulings.

The motion was granted, the dismissal was set aside, and the appellant was granted an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The court determined costs following a 106-day individual assessment trial in a class action where the plaintiff recovered $50,000 after claiming $60,000,000.

The plaintiff sought over $7,000,000 in costs, including nearly $3,000,000 in interest on litigation loans.

The court ruled that interest on litigation loans is not a recoverable disbursement.

Finding that the plaintiff unreasonably rejected multiple offers to settle from the defendants, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs up to the date of the defendants' first offer in 2009, and awarded the defendants their partial indemnity costs thereafter, resulting in a net costs award of over $2.3 million payable by the plaintiff to the defendants.

The plaintiff, a class member in a class action arising from a 1999 VIA Rail train derailment, sought over $60 million in damages, primarily for past and future loss of income and future care costs.

The plaintiff claimed the accident caused severe, debilitating injuries that destroyed his highly lucrative consulting business in Poland and Eastern Europe.

The court found the plaintiff and many of his lay and medical witnesses lacked credibility, noting significant inconsistencies, lack of documentary evidence (such as tax returns and banking records), and evidence of extensive post-accident travel and business activities.

The court rejected the income loss and future care claims entirely, awarding only $50,000 in general damages for minor soft tissue injuries.

During a personal injury class action trial arising from a VIA Rail derailment, a class member sought to qualify a chartered accountant as an expert witness to quantify past and future wage loss.

The defendants opposed the qualification, arguing the expert lacked objectivity and his evidence was unnecessary.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the Mohan framework and found the expert's evidence was not necessary, as he merely accepted the class member's uncorroborated figures without independent analysis.

The court also found the expert failed to establish a basic threshold of objectivity, rendering him improperly qualified.

The expert evidence was ruled inadmissible.

During a trial for damages arising from a railway accident, the plaintiff (a class member) sought to qualify an expert witness to provide opinion evidence on the profitability of a proposed European pipeline project, claiming a loss of opportunity.

The defendants objected to the expert's admissibility.

Following a voir dire, the court refused to qualify the expert.

The court found the expert's evidence lacked reliability due to an undisclosed prior business relationship with the plaintiff.

Furthermore, the court held the expert evidence was unnecessary because the plaintiff failed to produce admissible evidence or documentation demonstrating he could have obtained the financing required to build the pipeline.

The plaintiff, AVS Transport Inc., sued Wim van Ravenswaay, Trevor van Ravenswaay, and 1046854 Ontario Inc. (W.G. Equipment Enterprises) for conversion of a stolen Mack dump truck.

The corporate defendant conceded liability for conversion of a "front clip" from the truck.

The court found William van Ravenswaay personally liable for conversion due to willful blindness regarding the stolen nature of the front clip, as he was the directing mind of the company and aware of industry fraud.

Trevor van Ravenswaay, an employee, was found not personally liable as there was no evidence he knew or ought to have known the front clip was stolen, despite his low credibility and significant role in the business.

Damages were assessed at $60,311.65, including the value of the front clip, loss of use, and investigation costs, with prejudgment interest.

During a personal injury trial arising from a train derailment, the defendants brought mid‑trial motions seeking orders requiring certain foreign witnesses to testify in person in Canada rather than by video conference and restricting the plaintiff to evidence previously disclosed under an earlier discovery order.

The court considered Rule 1.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the broader access‑to‑justice principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The judge held that credibility concerns alone did not justify refusing video evidence and found the balance of convenience favoured permitting the witnesses, located abroad, to testify by video conference with interpretation.

The court also declined to limit the plaintiff’s evidence to earlier will‑say statements, finding that continuing disclosure obligations and fairness required allowing updated affidavit evidence while preserving the defendants’ opportunity to challenge it.

During a trial for damages arising from a train derailment, the plaintiff testified in-chief that he had no criminal record in Poland and filed a certified Polish document to that effect.

The defendants sought to cross-examine him using uncertified Polish court documents suggesting he had a criminal history.

The plaintiff objected, arguing the documents were uncertified and inadmissible under s. 23 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court ruled that s. 23 is permissive and does not preclude proving foreign documents at common law.

The court allowed the defence to use the uncertified documents in cross-examination to challenge the plaintiff's credibility, noting the plaintiff would have the opportunity to explain or challenge the documents' reliability.

The moving defendants sought leave to extend time to serve and file a jury notice in a long-standing civil action arising from a fire, where damages had already been agreed and only liability remained for trial.

Applying the governing Divisional Court framework, the court considered the circumstances of delay and whether the opposing parties would suffer prejudice.

The court found no meaningful delay, held that the streamlined liability-only issues left ample time to prepare for a jury trial, and rejected the asserted prejudice as unsupported.

The motion was granted.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rules 26.02(b) and 5.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to add an individual as a defendant after the expiry of the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The claim arose from a letter allegedly authored by the proposed defendant accusing the plaintiffs of criminal conduct and demanding their resignation from a religious organization.

The plaintiffs argued they only discovered the individual’s potential liability after the limitation period when the corporate defendant denied responsibility for the conduct of the local council.

The court held that the evidentiary threshold for discoverability at the amendment stage is low and that the plaintiffs had provided a reasonable explanation showing a triable issue regarding due diligence.

The motion to add the proposed defendant was granted with leave for the added defendant to plead a limitations defence.

The plaintiff sought approximately $2.6 million in damages against a contractor and an acrylic sheet manufacturer arising from alleged defects in the design, manufacture, and installation of a skylight system for a horse riding arena.

The plaintiff alleged negligent design, negligent manufacture of acrylic sheets, negligent misrepresentation in product literature, and spoliation of evidence.

After a lengthy trial, the court found no negligence or breach of contract by the contractor and no negligence in the manufacture of the acrylic sheets by the manufacturer.

Although the manufacturer should have disclosed certain test results regarding light transmittance, the plaintiff failed to prove causation.

The court further held the plaintiff fundamentally breached the contract and was contributorily negligent by refusing to install an automatic controller and by failing to implement recommended ventilation and heating measures, and also failed to mitigate its losses.

Costs decision following a refusals motion concerning whether documents and information sought on discovery were protected by statutory privilege under s. 266(2) of the Education Act.

The moving party’s motion to compel answers was largely unsuccessful after the court determined the privilege applied, though the moving party succeeded on a limited issue regarding an investigator’s report and several other matters were resolved consensually.

The successful responding party sought over $15,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court held the requested amount was excessive given the simplicity of the factual issues and that certain claimed time related to general discovery obligations rather than the motion itself.

Applying proportionality and fairness principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded reduced costs of $6,000 against the moving party, with no costs payable by co-defendants who had merely responded to the motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 34.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to compel a private school to answer refused questions on discovery and produce unredacted documents identifying non‑party students and parents who may have information relevant to claims including defamation, malicious prosecution, and breach of contract.

The school resisted disclosure relying on the statutory privilege for Ontario Student Records under s. 266(2) of the Education Act.

The court found the plaintiff’s narrower interpretation of the privilege persuasive but concluded it was bound by prior authority holding that students’ names and addresses form part of the OSR and are protected by the statutory privilege.

As a result, the court held the information could not be disclosed without consent of the students or parents.

The motion to compel answers and production was therefore dismissed, subject only to disclosure that would not identify non‑party students or their parents.