Angelo Giuseppe Sciacca

During a personal injury class action trial arising from a VIA Rail derailment, a class member sought to qualify a chartered accountant as an expert witness to quantify past and future wage loss.

The defendants opposed the qualification, arguing the expert lacked objectivity and his evidence was unnecessary.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the Mohan framework and found the expert's evidence was not necessary, as he merely accepted the class member's uncorroborated figures without independent analysis.

The court also found the expert failed to establish a basic threshold of objectivity, rendering him improperly qualified.

The expert evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The Applicant sought statutory accident benefits, including non-earner benefits, treatment plans, and examination costs, following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer denied the claims.

The arbitrator found the Applicant's evidence regarding her pre-accident functioning to be unreliable and exaggerated, noting extensive pre-existing medical issues and a history of claiming a Disability Tax Credit.

Relying on the credible evidence of the insurer's medical experts, who found no objective evidence of accident-related impairment and noted pain magnification, the arbitrator concluded the Applicant did not suffer a complete inability to carry on a normal life.

All claims for benefits, treatment plans, and a special award were dismissed.

The Applicant was ordered to pay the insurer's expenses.

The applicant sought to amend his human rights application to include allegations that the respondent failed to accommodate his disability between 2011 and 2013, and that certain 'wayfinder' work was available for five years prior to his placement in that role in July 2015.

The Tribunal denied the request to add the 2011-2013 allegations, finding it would substantially alter the nature of the case and expand the scope of the hearing.

However, the Tribunal permitted the applicant to pursue the allegation that wayfinder work was available prior to July 2015 as a further particular of his existing claim that the respondent failed to accommodate him from May 2014 onwards.

During a trial for damages arising from a railway accident, the plaintiff (a class member) sought to qualify an expert witness to provide opinion evidence on the profitability of a proposed European pipeline project, claiming a loss of opportunity.

The defendants objected to the expert's admissibility.

Following a voir dire, the court refused to qualify the expert.

The court found the expert's evidence lacked reliability due to an undisclosed prior business relationship with the plaintiff.

Furthermore, the court held the expert evidence was unnecessary because the plaintiff failed to produce admissible evidence or documentation demonstrating he could have obtained the financing required to build the pipeline.

The plaintiff, AVS Transport Inc., sued Wim van Ravenswaay, Trevor van Ravenswaay, and 1046854 Ontario Inc. (W.G. Equipment Enterprises) for conversion of a stolen Mack dump truck.

The corporate defendant conceded liability for conversion of a "front clip" from the truck.

The court found William van Ravenswaay personally liable for conversion due to willful blindness regarding the stolen nature of the front clip, as he was the directing mind of the company and aware of industry fraud.

Trevor van Ravenswaay, an employee, was found not personally liable as there was no evidence he knew or ought to have known the front clip was stolen, despite his low credibility and significant role in the business.

Damages were assessed at $60,311.65, including the value of the front clip, loss of use, and investigation costs, with prejudgment interest.

The applicant filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings to amend his human rights application to add details regarding an alleged breach of the collective agreement and to increase the monetary compensation claimed.

The respondent consented to the request and the intervenor took no position.

The Tribunal granted the request, noting that the applicant was not seeking to add new grounds of discrimination or new parties.

During a personal injury trial arising from a train derailment, the defendants brought mid‑trial motions seeking orders requiring certain foreign witnesses to testify in person in Canada rather than by video conference and restricting the plaintiff to evidence previously disclosed under an earlier discovery order.

The court considered Rule 1.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the broader access‑to‑justice principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The judge held that credibility concerns alone did not justify refusing video evidence and found the balance of convenience favoured permitting the witnesses, located abroad, to testify by video conference with interpretation.

The court also declined to limit the plaintiff’s evidence to earlier will‑say statements, finding that continuing disclosure obligations and fairness required allowing updated affidavit evidence while preserving the defendants’ opportunity to challenge it.

The Applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, but the Insurer denied various medical and rehabilitation benefits and cost of examination expenses.

The Applicant failed to attend the arbitration hearing and presented no evidence to support her claims.

The arbitrator dismissed the Applicant's claims for failing to meet the burden of proof.

The Insurer was awarded $1,500 in expenses due to the Applicant's conduct prolonging the proceeding.

During a trial for damages arising from a train derailment, the plaintiff testified in-chief that he had no criminal record in Poland and filed a certified Polish document to that effect.

The defendants sought to cross-examine him using uncertified Polish court documents suggesting he had a criminal history.

The plaintiff objected, arguing the documents were uncertified and inadmissible under s. 23 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court ruled that s. 23 is permissive and does not preclude proving foreign documents at common law.

The court allowed the defence to use the uncertified documents in cross-examination to challenge the plaintiff's credibility, noting the plaintiff would have the opportunity to explain or challenge the documents' reliability.

The moving defendants sought leave to extend time to serve and file a jury notice in a long-standing civil action arising from a fire, where damages had already been agreed and only liability remained for trial.

Applying the governing Divisional Court framework, the court considered the circumstances of delay and whether the opposing parties would suffer prejudice.

The court found no meaningful delay, held that the streamlined liability-only issues left ample time to prepare for a jury trial, and rejected the asserted prejudice as unsupported.

The motion was granted.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for arbitration regarding statutory accident benefits.

After his counsel withdrew, the applicant failed to attend two scheduled pre-hearing resumptions despite receiving notice that his claims could be dismissed.

The arbitrator found the claims had become vexatious due to the applicant's non-attendance and failure to communicate.

The application for arbitration was dismissed without a hearing, and the applicant was ordered to pay $300 in expenses to the insurer.

The defendants brought a motion seeking to remove opposing counsel on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest arising from prior interactions with one of the defendants during the lawyer’s previous employment at another firm.

The defendants alleged that confidential information was disclosed during a business lunch and argued that the lawyer should therefore be disqualified.

Applying the test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin, the court held that the defendants failed to establish that material confidential information relevant to the action had been imparted.

The court further found that any information discussed was either not confidential, not shown to be relevant, or had already been disclosed in the litigation record.

The motion to remove counsel was dismissed and costs were awarded against the moving parties.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rules 26.02(b) and 5.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to add an individual as a defendant after the expiry of the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The claim arose from a letter allegedly authored by the proposed defendant accusing the plaintiffs of criminal conduct and demanding their resignation from a religious organization.

The plaintiffs argued they only discovered the individual’s potential liability after the limitation period when the corporate defendant denied responsibility for the conduct of the local council.

The court held that the evidentiary threshold for discoverability at the amendment stage is low and that the plaintiffs had provided a reasonable explanation showing a triable issue regarding due diligence.

The motion to add the proposed defendant was granted with leave for the added defendant to plead a limitations defence.

The plaintiff sought approximately $2.6 million in damages against a contractor and an acrylic sheet manufacturer arising from alleged defects in the design, manufacture, and installation of a skylight system for a horse riding arena.

The plaintiff alleged negligent design, negligent manufacture of acrylic sheets, negligent misrepresentation in product literature, and spoliation of evidence.

After a lengthy trial, the court found no negligence or breach of contract by the contractor and no negligence in the manufacture of the acrylic sheets by the manufacturer.

Although the manufacturer should have disclosed certain test results regarding light transmittance, the plaintiff failed to prove causation.

The court further held the plaintiff fundamentally breached the contract and was contributorily negligent by refusing to install an automatic controller and by failing to implement recommended ventilation and heating measures, and also failed to mitigate its losses.

Costs decision following a refusals motion concerning whether documents and information sought on discovery were protected by statutory privilege under s. 266(2) of the Education Act.

The moving party’s motion to compel answers was largely unsuccessful after the court determined the privilege applied, though the moving party succeeded on a limited issue regarding an investigator’s report and several other matters were resolved consensually.

The successful responding party sought over $15,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court held the requested amount was excessive given the simplicity of the factual issues and that certain claimed time related to general discovery obligations rather than the motion itself.

Applying proportionality and fairness principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded reduced costs of $6,000 against the moving party, with no costs payable by co-defendants who had merely responded to the motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 34.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to compel a private school to answer refused questions on discovery and produce unredacted documents identifying non‑party students and parents who may have information relevant to claims including defamation, malicious prosecution, and breach of contract.

The school resisted disclosure relying on the statutory privilege for Ontario Student Records under s. 266(2) of the Education Act.

The court found the plaintiff’s narrower interpretation of the privilege persuasive but concluded it was bound by prior authority holding that students’ names and addresses form part of the OSR and are protected by the statutory privilege.

As a result, the court held the information could not be disclosed without consent of the students or parents.

The motion to compel answers and production was therefore dismissed, subject only to disclosure that would not identify non‑party students or their parents.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order finding that her insurer was obliged to defend and indemnify the respondent, Hertz Canada Limited, under s. 277(1.1) of the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 277(1.1) imposes no duty on the appellant's insurer to defend on behalf of Hertz, as it speaks only to priorities of payment.

The Court also found that the indemnity issue could not be resolved on the current record.

The appeal was allowed in part and the order varied.