Angelo Giuseppe Sciacca

The applicant was struck by a vehicle while cycling and sought income replacement benefits (IRBs) under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The respondent terminated pre-104 week IRBs on March 1, 2021, based on insurer's examinations.

The Tribunal found the applicant was not entitled to the remainder of the pre-104 week IRBs, as her ongoing post-concussive symptoms were attributable to a pre-accident sports injury rather than the subject accident.

However, the Tribunal found the applicant experienced a severe deterioration in her accident-related psychological conditions, culminating in a catastrophic impairment finding and multiple hospitalizations for suicidal ideation.

Applying the stringent post-104 week test, the Tribunal concluded the applicant suffered a complete inability to engage in any suitable employment as of April 11, 2023.

The applicant was awarded post-104 week IRBs from that date onward, plus interest.

The respondent insurer requested reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that found the applicant catastrophically impaired and entitled to a post-104 week income replacement benefit (IRB) as of September 1, 2024.

The Tribunal denied the reconsideration request regarding catastrophic impairment, finding that the original adjudicator provided adequate reasons and properly weighed the psychiatric and surveillance evidence.

However, the Tribunal granted the reconsideration request regarding the IRB.

Relying on the Divisional Court's recent decision in Paesano, the Tribunal found that the original adjudicator erred in law by awarding a post-104 week IRB without considering the impact of her findings that the applicant was not entitled to a pre-104 week IRB or a post-104 week IRB for the three years prior.

The IRB decision was cancelled and remitted for a rehearing before a new adjudicator.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits for a catastrophic impairment following a motor vehicle accident.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal had previously determined in a 2024 decision that the applicant did not sustain a catastrophic impairment.

The applicant filed a second application based on new medical reports.

The respondent raised the preliminary issue of res judicata.

The Tribunal found that the three preconditions for res judicata were met.

Furthermore, the Tribunal declined to waive the doctrine, finding that the new medical reports did not constitute fresh evidence that would conclusively impeach the original results, as they relied on the applicant's inaccurate self-reporting of her pre-accident condition.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought a determination of catastrophic impairment and entitlement to income replacement benefits (IRBs) and a treatment plan.

The Tribunal found the applicant sustained a catastrophic impairment under Criterion 8 due to marked impairments in social functioning, concentration, persistence and pace, and adaptation resulting from accident-related psychological disorders.

The Tribunal denied the applicant's claim for IRBs during the first 104 weeks post-accident, finding she did not suffer a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of her employment.

However, the Tribunal granted IRBs from September 1, 2024 onward, finding her condition had deteriorated such that she suffered a complete inability to engage in any employment for which she was reasonably suited.

The claim for a second catastrophic assessment treatment plan was denied.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision denying his claim for removal from the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the LAT erred in law by disregarding his subjective evidence of psychological impairment, providing inadequate reasons, and demonstrating bias against subjective pain complaints.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the LAT adequately explained its weighing of the evidence and that no error of law or procedural fairness violation occurred.

The applicant sought a determination that she sustained a catastrophic impairment under Criterion 8 (mental or behavioural impairments) following a minor motor vehicle accident.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to establish that the accident was a necessary cause of her impairments, noting an extensive pre-accident medical history of physical and psychological disability that the applicant had minimized.

Furthermore, the Tribunal preferred the respondent's expert evidence, concluding that the applicant did not suffer a Class 4 marked impairment in three or more areas of functioning.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a preliminary issue decision which found he was not involved in an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule after slipping and falling on ice.

The applicant argued the adjudicator erred in applying the causation test and binding case law.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding no error of law and noting that the applicant was attempting to re-litigate his case.

The adjudicator correctly applied the binding Divisional Court decision in Porter, which held that a slip and fall on ice is not an accident within the meaning of the Schedule.

The applicant, an Uber driver, slipped and fell on an icy driveway while walking to the rear of his vehicle to help a passenger load luggage into the trunk.

He sought statutory accident benefits, which the respondent denied on the basis that the incident was not an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Schedule.

The Tribunal found that while the purpose test was met, the causation test was not.

The icy driveway was an intervening cause that broke the chain of causation, and the use or operation of the automobile was not the dominant feature of the injuries.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a preliminary issue decision that barred him from proceeding with his claim for accident benefits due to his failure to notify the insurer of his intention to apply within seven days.

The applicant argued the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by deciding an issue without notice and erred in its interpretation of section 32(1) of the Schedule.

The Vice-Chair dismissed the request, finding that the parties had explicitly agreed to the wording of the preliminary issue and that the applicant was attempting to re-litigate the Tribunal's interpretation of the Schedule without establishing an error of law.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a 2014 motor vehicle accident involving his children.

In 2021, he submitted treatment plans for psychological injuries, which the insurer denied because he had not submitted an Application for Accident Benefits (OCF-1) or provided a reasonable excuse for the delay.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to notify the insurer of his intention to apply for benefits within seven days or as soon as practicable, as required by section 32(1) of the Schedule.

The applicant provided no reasonable explanation for the multi-year delay.

Consequently, the application was dismissed.

Following a failed motion by the defendants to have their trial costs paid by various litigation loan providers, the loan providers sought their costs of the motion.

The court declined to award costs to the loan providers, finding that the defendants' motion raised a novel issue regarding the enforcement of a costs award against a litigation loan provider and the requirement for court approval of litigation loan agreements.

Given the novelty of the issue, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

Following a lengthy trial where the plaintiff was awarded $50,000 but the defendants obtained a costs award of over $3.4 million, the defendants moved to recover those costs from four non-party litigation loan providers who had advanced funds to the plaintiff.

The court declined to order costs against the non-parties, finding that while the loans carried exorbitant interest rates, providing them did not amount to an abuse of process under the 'person of straw' test or the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The court also noted that while litigation loans should be approved by the court in class proceedings, the statutory requirement to do so did not exist at the time the loans were made.

The City of Toronto, as Third Party, brought a motion to amend its Statement of Defence to the Third Party Claim to plead two statutory defences under the City of Toronto Act, 2006: failure to provide written notice (s. 42(6)) and that damages were caused by an object on an untraveled portion of the highway (s. 42(4)).

The Defendants opposed the motion, arguing presumed prejudice due to the late stage of the proceedings and that the proposed defences lacked merit.

The court, acting as case manager and trial judge, granted the motion, finding no actual or presumed prejudice and reiterating that the test for allowing an amendment to pleadings is not whether the defence will ultimately succeed at trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against his insurer after it denied coverage for his vehicle, which was destroyed by fire.

The insurer alleged the plaintiff made wilfully false statements, committed arson, and used the vehicle purchase to launder money.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the plaintiff's insurable interest, whether the fire was accidental, and the insurer's allegations of false statements, noting significant evidentiary gaps and inconsistencies that could not be resolved on a summary basis.

The moving party, a class member in a train derailment class action, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's Order dismissing his appeal for delay and sought an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The court applied the test for setting aside a dismissal order, noting the moving party had an intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay related to obtaining issued and entered orders, and demonstrated an arguable case on the merits.

The court found that truncating the appeal based on a procedural irregularity would be contrary to the interests of justice.

The motion was granted, the dismissal order was set aside, and an extension of time was granted.

The appellant, a class member in a train derailment class action who had an individual trial for damages, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his appeal for delay and to extend the time to perfect the appeal.

The court applied the test for setting aside a dismissal for delay, noting that the appellant had a continuous intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay related to difficulties in settling the trial judge's orders, and that the respondents suffered no prejudice.

Crucially, the court found that the appellant had an arguable case on appeal regarding the trial judge's credibility assessments and evidentiary rulings.

The motion was granted, the dismissal was set aside, and the appellant was granted an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The defendant appealed a Master's order extending the time for the plaintiff to serve the Statement of Claim.

The plaintiff had failed to serve the claim for nearly five years following a motor vehicle accident due to previous counsel's inadvertence.

The defendant argued the Master erred by reversing the burden of proof regarding prejudice.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master correctly applied the law by placing an evidentiary obligation on the defendant to provide details of prejudice, which the defendant failed to do.

The court determined costs following a 106-day individual assessment trial in a class action where the plaintiff recovered $50,000 after claiming $60,000,000.

The plaintiff sought over $7,000,000 in costs, including nearly $3,000,000 in interest on litigation loans.

The court ruled that interest on litigation loans is not a recoverable disbursement.

Finding that the plaintiff unreasonably rejected multiple offers to settle from the defendants, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs up to the date of the defendants' first offer in 2009, and awarded the defendants their partial indemnity costs thereafter, resulting in a net costs award of over $2.3 million payable by the plaintiff to the defendants.

The plaintiff, a class member in a class action arising from a 1999 VIA Rail train derailment, sought over $60 million in damages, primarily for past and future loss of income and future care costs.

The plaintiff claimed the accident caused severe, debilitating injuries that destroyed his highly lucrative consulting business in Poland and Eastern Europe.

The court found the plaintiff and many of his lay and medical witnesses lacked credibility, noting significant inconsistencies, lack of documentary evidence (such as tax returns and banking records), and evidence of extensive post-accident travel and business activities.

The court rejected the income loss and future care claims entirely, awarding only $50,000 in general damages for minor soft tissue injuries.

The Applicant sought accident benefits for medical treatment plans and assessments following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer denied the claims, arguing the Applicant's injuries were minor, pre-existing, or caused by a subsequent workplace accident.

The arbitrator applied the material contribution test and found that the motor vehicle accident did not materially contribute to the Applicant's physical complaints, which were largely attributable to a pre-existing history of back pain and a significant workplace injury that occurred days after the motor vehicle accident.

The arbitrator dismissed the claims for a chronic pain program, physiotherapy, and an orthopaedic assessment, finding them not reasonable and necessary.

However, $300 was awarded for a psychological assessment report.

The Applicant's claim for a Special Award was dismissed, as the insurer did not unreasonably withhold payments.

The Applicant was ordered to pay $11,863.52 for the insurer's expenses due to the insurer's near-total success in the proceeding.