Natalie Kolos

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action against it for failure to provide notice within 10 days of the injury, as required by s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 2015 but did not notify the municipality until 2018, after retaining an expert who suggested a potential intersection design defect.

The court found the matter appropriate for summary judgment and held that the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay under s. 42(8), as he had sufficient facts to investigate a potential claim against the municipality much earlier.

The action against the municipality was dismissed.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Pollak J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were ordered as the parties had reached an agreement on costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to amend her notice of action, extend the time to file a statement of claim, and extend the time to serve the amended notice of action and statement of claim in a medical malpractice case.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff's deliberate decision to put her case on hold for 20 months, without contact with her lawyer, demonstrated a lack of intention to pursue the claim.

The court also found that the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay and that the defendants would suffer significant prejudice due to the passage of over four years since the events, leading to memory loss among medical professionals and loss of opportunity for timely investigation by the hospital.

The defendants brought a motion seeking broad production of documents from the plaintiffs' lawyers' files, arguing that the plaintiff had waived solicitor-client privilege by putting her state of mind regarding discoverability in issue for a summary judgment motion.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the fundamental nature of solicitor-client privilege.

It found that the plaintiff's state of mind after retaining current counsel in 2016 was not relevant to the discoverability issue for the limitation period, as the action was commenced within two years of that date.

The court distinguished the facts from cases where legal advice directly impacted the limitation period and suggested a more targeted approach through cross-examination for relevant pre-retainer discussions.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his action against the Toronto Police Services Board and an insurance company on the basis that the claims were barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the appellant was aware of all facts supporting his claims by June 2010 (regarding the insurance company) and January 2011 (regarding the police board), and that he commenced his action more than two years after those dates.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that discoverability for limitation purposes is based on knowledge of the facts necessary to support a claim, not knowledge of the applicable law.

The plaintiffs, National Industries Inc. and National Steel Car Limited, sought to amend their statement of claim against their insurance brokers, Peter Kirkwood and Marsh Canada Limited, to include allegations of negligence from 2008 and 2009 regarding D&O coverage.

The plaintiffs argued these were particulars of existing claims, while the defendants contended they were new causes of action barred by the limitation period.

The court found the proposed amendments constituted new causes of action, as they did not arise from the same factual matrix as the original claim, which focused on D&O insurance policies from 2010 and 2011.

Consequently, leave to amend the claim was dismissed.

The plaintiff's action against the Toronto Police Service Board and Desjardins General Insurance for alleged harassment, racial profiling, and wrongful insurance cancellation was dismissed on the basis of the two-year limitation period.

The court found that the plaintiff was aware of the facts giving rise to his claims by January 5, 2011, at the latest, but did not issue his Statement of Claim until July 28, 2014, well beyond the statutory period.

The plaintiff's argument of ignorance of the law, rather than facts, was rejected as a basis for extending the discoverability principle.

Costs were awarded to the defendants, reduced by half due to the plaintiff's self-represented status and financial burden.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant previously declared a vexatious litigant in three separate orders, sought leave to bring a motion to reinstate his appeals after they were dismissed for delay.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the moving party failed to perfect the appeals despite being capable of filing voluminous materials.

The court further held that the underlying appeals were entirely devoid of merit and that the interests of justice would not be served by permitting the matter to proceed.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to strike out the plaintiffs' statement of claim, the defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $15,419.95.

The plaintiffs argued there should be no order as to costs because the defendants had refused to mediate and the case was a matter of public interest.

The court rejected these arguments, finding no reason to depart from the normal rule that costs follow the event, and awarded the defendants their requested costs payable in any event of the cause.

The defendants moved to strike two paragraphs of a statement of claim in an action seeking Charter damages arising from an alleged unreasonable strip search following arrest.

The plaintiff alleged the impugned paragraphs were material to a s. 15 equality claim because they connected her individual treatment to broader allegedly disproportionate strip-search practices affecting Aboriginal persons.

The court held that the paragraphs pleaded relevant material facts, did not constitute an improper disguised class action, and were not scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious.

The motion was dismissed, with costs submissions deferred if not agreed.

In a personal injury action arising from a multi‑vehicle rear‑end collision, third parties sought summary judgment dismissing the third‑party claim and cross‑claims against them.

The moving parties argued that the rear‑ending driver’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and relied on the so‑called “clear line” doctrine to argue their conduct could not have contributed to the collision.

The defendants and another third party argued that the driver who stopped in a live lane of traffic may have breached duties under the Highway Traffic Act and that factual disputes existed regarding traffic conditions, visibility of hazard lights, and whether the vehicle was disabled.

Applying the modern summary judgment framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court held that credibility disputes and complex issues of causation and negligence required a trial.

The court further noted that the “clear line” doctrine could not displace the modern “but for” causation analysis.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against the police for negligent investigation.

The appellant alleged the police negligently failed to send a needle for communicable disease testing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for a negligence claim because uncontroverted evidence showed that testing the needle was impossible or unreliable, meaning no damages flowed from the failure to test.

Police officer plaintiffs commenced a civil action alleging negligence, defamation, malicious investigation, racial discrimination, and abuse of process arising from internal discipline proceedings under the Police Services Act following a public complaint.

The defendants moved to strike the claim on the basis that the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labour relations regime governing police discipline and grievance arbitration.

Applying the principles from Weber v. Ontario Hydro and subsequent jurisprudence, the court held that the essential character of the dispute concerned workplace discipline governed by the collective agreement and the Police Services Act, thereby ousting the court’s jurisdiction.

However, the court held it was possible that a properly pleaded claim for misfeasance in public office could fall outside the labour relations scheme if it alleged intentional abuse of public authority.

The statement of claim was struck against most defendants with leave granted to amend solely to plead misfeasance in public office.

The moving defendants sought to set aside a noting of default and to strike the statement of claim.

Applying the principles governing relief from default, the court considered the conduct of the parties, the promptness of the motion, the complexity and value of the claim, and the absence of prejudice to the plaintiff.

The court set aside the noting of default to allow the defendants to defend the action.

On the accompanying motion to strike, the court found the pleading failed to comply with Rule 25.06(1) because it contained almost no material facts, consisted largely of lists of alleged wrongs, and was largely unintelligible.

The statement of claim was therefore struck in its entirety with leave to amend.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision regarding a limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by failing to address the specific requirements of section 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002, particularly section 5(1)(a)(iv).

The judgment below was set aside and costs were awarded to the appellant.