Melissa Sarah MacDonald

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault, raising three grounds: that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the nature and extent of the complainant's injury, that the trial judge erred by commenting on the appellant's review of Crown disclosure in assessing credibility, and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual determinations, holding that the trial judge was entitled to reject the appellant's evidence that the blow was accidental and to prefer the complainant's evidence, which was corroborated by the attending officer's observation of blood on her face.

Any minor factual errors in the narrative did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 12-month sentence for sexual assault against his employee.

He argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework by relying on R. v. J.J.R.D. to reject his evidence without identifying material flaws, effectively turning the trial into a credibility contest.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof, provided sufficient reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence, and properly rejected the appellant's evidence based on a considered acceptance of the Crown's case.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the 12-month term was fit given the aggravating factors, including the appellant's position of authority.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident in which he engaged in vaginal intercourse with the complainant while she was asleep.

The central issues were consent and honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The court rejected the accused's evidence that the complainant had invited him into the bedroom and instead accepted the complainant's evidence that she was asleep when the intercourse began.

The court found that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and that any belief in communicated consent was based on silence, passivity, and ambiguous conduct, which constitutes a mistake of law.

The court also found that the accused was at minimum reckless or willfully blind to the absence of consent.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident where the complainant was highly intoxicated.

The complainant had no memory of the sexual activity, but DNA evidence confirmed intercourse occurred.

The court found the complainant lacked the capacity to consent due to extreme intoxication, noting she was essentially unconscious.

The court rejected the accused's defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, finding he knew or was reckless to the lack of consent and failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with assaulting and uttering threats to cause bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and resisting two police officers in the execution of their duties.

The Crown withdrew the first three counts after the first witness completed examination-in-chief.

The trial proceeded on two counts of resisting peace officers contrary to section 129(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts of resisting the officers by slamming the door in their faces while they were lawfully investigating a domestic disturbance call.

The court found that the officers were engaged in the lawful execution of their duty to investigate a 911 call regarding potential domestic violence and that the defendant's act of slamming the door was intended to obstruct their investigation.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, calculating the total delay and deducting defence-attributable delay.

The court found that, after attributing 7 months of delay to the defence, the total delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

Alternatively, even if the delay exceeded the ceiling, the case presented exceptional transitional circumstances due to its complexity and multi-accused nature, justifying a trial on the merits.

The application for a stay was dismissed.